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An Organizational Analysis of Three Advocacy Groups:
Generalizing Methodological Techniques
And an Application to Change
In Urban Educational Institutions
William E. Miller, B.A., Providence College
M.Ed.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Barbara J. Love
This endeavor addresses a simple yet disturbing problem: The
American public has lost control over many of its governance systems.
While the American Democracy designed for an agrarian society 200 years
ago was consistent with current economic and demographic peculiarities,
that same governance system does not meet the needs of a substantially
different American society. This does not mean to imply that American
democracy was designed to discriminate. It does mean that the American
democratic system has not sufficiently evolved to effectively serve a
technocratic urban society. The result has been a widening gap between
the public mass and the governing few, between the theoretical decision-
makers and the real decision-making process. Within this the widest gap
sees the most powerless constituency to be the poor and minority population
of our nation’s cities.
As a government endeavor, control of public education offers corro-
borating testimony to the state of public disenfranchisement from their
own social systems. The insulation of urban educational bureaucracies
from
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their public stands in stark contrast to the democratic ideal of partici-
pation in decision-making. Public schools have long been viewed by re-
formers as potential instruments of social change. Especially in urban
areas, this hope has been consistently false. Public schools have become,
in fact, preservers of the status quo. The citizens of our country's
large cities have been faced with myriad problems that their educational
systems have failed to help them meet. Poverty, racism, unemployment,
and inadequate housing are only some of the barriers faced by millions
of urban Americans. Not only has inadequate education help cause the
economic powerlessness of poor and minority people, it contributes to
their further political impotence.
The reason for an urban focus in addressing the public role in
education is simple yet compelling. As will be documented in the study,
the most dramatic example of citizen alienation in the nation today can
be seen in our cities, where three out of every four Americans live.
Further, of all the public institutions that have entrenched themselves
into a state of bureaucratic unresponsiveness, urban educational systems
are clearly among the most insulated. In the past ten years, educational
researchers have been prolific in substantiating the failure of urban
edu-
cation to meet the needs of poor and minority people. Despite
the contro
versy that much of the data have generated, studies continue
to show the
inability of the traditional learning programs in public
schools to func-
tion successfully in urban areas. Although the
cities' citizens have
long been aware of this reality, and their
dissatisfaction repeatedly
supported by research, urban educators have
not responded with any real
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change. The deficiencies of public education have been most glaring in the
failure to provide successful socio-economic mobility for the poor and
minority students who comprise a substantial portion of its membership.
The state is initially the responsible one for the delivery of educational
services to the citizenry. What it has offered and provided to the urban
public is most unsatisfactory.
The focus of the study is on change— its needs and one strategy.
Fundamental change is necessary for urban education to be viable. An
important question is how to achieve changes which reflect the needs and
wishes of urban Americans. The research to follow is geared to the develop-
ment of a mechanism designed to effect such change. Group advocacy as a
change mechanism offers a provocative concept to the urban reformer. This
study will design such a strategy useful to an urban public in need of
initiating educational change.
The independent advocacy group is a mechanism that focuses on the
most basic of problems— the exclusion of people from decision-making pro-
cesses. The advocacy group proposal adds a new element to the organiza-
tional strategies designed and pursued in the urban communities in the
1960’s. This new tactic for political mobilization is presented as a
unique formula for initiating educational change grounded in real needs
of an identified urban constituency.
The study has three basic objectives. The first is to analyze
three functioning advocacy groups, their organizational components,
their
operating methodologies, and their efficacy as change catalysts.
Secondly,
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the study will generalize a technology of group advocacy as an institutional
change strategy as extracted from the analyzed advocacy organizations.
Finally, the study will develop an application of this advocacy group or-
ganizational technique to change for urban education.
The hard work of urban reformers over the last fifteen years has
laid the groundwork which makes this research possible. By coordinating
and analyzing the data generated by community organizers, urban education
reformers-, and other urban researchers, the present undertaking hopes to
produce a coherent and usable mechanism for the improvement of urban
education systems.
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CHAPTER I
AH OVERVIEW OF ADVOCACY GROUP PURPOSE AI^D GROWTH
The Need for Urban Public Participation
This study is an effort to shape a theoretical basis for group
advocacy and extract a generalizable methodology. The attempt will aim
at offering a new, functional institutional change strategy useful to an
urban public. The purpose of the endeavor is to detail the methodology
of an advocacy group as it can be applied to the change process in urban
education. As a relatively new strategy, citizen action groups employing
advocacy tactics have shown notable results in affecting institutional
decision-making. Their successful work in the areas of consumer protection,
corporate accountability and government responsiveness has shown them to be
an influential force on bureaucratic institutions. What is unknown is if
the organizational methodologies of advocacy groups can be generalized and
applied to varied environments. Although there have been instances of
success by advocacy groups in their impact on institutional decision-making,
there is no comprehensive data that indicate the mechanism's applicability
to other issues or to other fields. A goal of the study is to
give to a
disenfranchised urban public a comprehensive and comprehensible strategy
for affecting change in both the way decisions are made in
education and
in the status of their performance.
The ability of advocacy groups to provide a power
base for a pre-
viously powerless citizenry presents the unique
prospect that their methods
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can be applied to urban educational decision-making. The power of policy-
making in urban educational institutions is held by a small, insulated group
of professionals. Of all the interested parties, the citizen, the tax-
paying "stockholder" of the educational enterprise, has least control over
the policy decisions that shape these institutions. Ralph Kimbrough's
summation makes the point:
Decisive power is exercised in most local school districts by rela-
tively few persons who hold top positions of influence in the informal
power structure of the school district. The success of significant
educational projects and proposals is often heavily dependent upon
the support or lack of support of these men in power.
^
"These men" is no idle reference as Knezevich (1969) indicates. The member-
ship of most Boards of Education, school committees and school system ad-
ministrations is primarily white male whose socio-economic status is not
3
reflective of the constituent population-at-large.
The sheer size of the educational establishment in large urban centers,
with their bureaus and departments, districts and divisions, makes it a
difficult task to even find the locus of power on a given issue. Not only
is the urban educational bureaucracy complex and difficult to manage, to
^Evidence in support of this contention is as compelling as it is
comprehensive; cf . Alan Rosenthal, ed.. Governing Education: A Reader__on
Politics, Power and Public School Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1959);
Steven Knezevich, Administration of Public EducationJNew York: Harper &
Row, 1969); David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Random
House,
1968); and Marilyn Gittell, Participants and Participation (New
York:
Center for Urban Education, 1967).
?Ralph B. Kimbrough, Political Power and Educational Decision-
Making (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 202.
^Stephen Knezevich, Administration of Public Education, pp.
225-227
.
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the further dismay of the urban public, that establishment fails on a wide
variety of bases. In the last decade many observers of educational pro-
cesses have come to agree with Raymond Mack's statement;
Clearly, a sizable proportion of our population is capable of absorbing
formal education that it is now given an opportunity to secure.
The stratification system operates to remove some of these people from
school before they have an opportunity to realize their educational
potential.'^
The group that is typically removed as competitive contributors from
the system includes minority and impoverished Americans. While generally
negating the contentions of school efficacy as a whole, research has re-
peatedly focused on the non-white urban poor as the primary victims of
educational failure.^ Schools continue to maintain unequal opportunities
for poor and minority children. Their discriminatory practices have served
to maintain the same inequalities for poor and minority adults by failing
to provide a career lattice for non-white students.
The maintenance of educational inequality for minority citizens is
both blatant and subtle. The urban poor are victimized by inferior educa-
tional programs that are poorly financed. Teaching methods and curricula
^Raymond W. Mack, Transforming America: Patterns of Social Change
(New York: Random House, 1967) , p. 73.
^Tbe most notable and ambitious research supporting these findings
include James Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington.
Government Printing Office, 1966); and Christopher Jencks , et al.
Inequality (New York; Basic Books, 1972).
^The President's Commission on School Finance, Schools , People and
Money (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972); and Kenneth Carlson,^
"Equalizing Educational Opportunity," Review of Educational Research,
Vo. ^2
No. 4, Fall 1972, pp. 453-45.
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materials have only recently recognized the world of other Americans beside
the white, suburban middle class;
TVie content of scliool readers can utterly devalue the experiences
of Negro and working-class children by erasing them from the world;
it poses the problem that in order to accept formal educational goals
that Involve mastering such material, they must devalue themselves.
Textbook negation of the world known to working class and Negro
children does a serious disservice, not only to them, but. to middle-
class white children as well.
In less obvious ways, they are often victimized by negative teacher
attitudes and low expectations about their competence, aptitude, and self-
worth. The Rosenthal and Jacobson studies show a meaningful correlation
gbetween the attitudes and expectations of teachers and student achievement.
Rist's observational study supports this finding and details its oppressive
9
consequences for the poor and minority children in urban schools. Educators
persist in the discriminatory categorization of poor children through stan-
dardized testing and placement practices that repeatedly block their socio-
economic advancement.
The outcome has been that non-white, urban citizens have comprised
an inordinate proportion of the victims of educational failure in America
as measured by cognitive achievement, drop-out rates and social status or
^Eleanor B. Leacock, Teaching and Learning in City Schools (New York
Basic Books, 1969), p. 80.
®R. Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).
^Ray C. Rist, "Student Social Class and Teacher Expectation:
The
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Ghetto Education" in Harvard Education
al Review,
Vol. AO, No. 3, August, 1970.
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income level in adulthood. In a society alert to the failure of its educa-
tional system, cognizant of the need to change it, little substantive move-
ment has been realized. Education perpetuates the rejection of minority
people by continually failing to provide a workable lattice for anyone
besides the v^/hite, affluent population.
Urban educational problems have been the focus of attention of numer-
ous social scientists. Harrington's expose sparked the "war on poverty" that
resulted in billions of government dollars being channeled into American
cities over the last decade to eradicate poverty. Community Action
Agencies rose in most cities to generate community interest and activism
for change in social structures. The results, however, have been discour-
aging to educational change advocates. The Economic Opportunity Act of
1964 establishing Community Action Agencies sought to tackle urban pro-
blems and was the first ambitious attempt to mobilize participation by
poor and minority urban citizens as an explicit strategy for change. Taeir
lack of effective organizational models hampered many of these efforts.
This need for better organizational designs for community mobilization
gives rise to analyzing advocacy methodlogy as a potentially effective
vehicle.
The plethora of neighborhood organizations funded with public
monies
have made little impact on education in urban systems.
The Institute of
1962).
^^Michael Harrington, The Other America (New York:
MacMillan Co
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Public Administration in a comprehensive study of six major urban centers
in 1968 concluded:
Local community action agencies have not in and of themselves been
the major innovators or primary agents of change in decision-making
with regard to the educational problems and needs of the poor within
the public school systems examined.
Further,
School bureaucracies are sufficiently isolated from the formal
political structure that other public agencies have little more
(or not even as much) access to them as do private organizations.
As to the urban school system itself, the Institute found "that the
practices of the public school examined . . . indicate that school systems
are not organizationally equipped to emljark on a constructive, extensive
13
program for the disadvantaged.
Another study for the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1969 came
to similar conclusions.^^ This study, which surveyed a sample from 50
American cities, conceded that Community Action Agencies had negligible
direct impact on educational change, but found the stimulation of public
interest in education and the mobilization of community resources to be
significant to the change process. The study concluded:
^^The Institute of Public Administration of the Pennsylvania State
University, Politics, Poverty and Education: An Analysis of Decision-
Haking Structures (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1969), p. 366.
^^
Ibid
.
,
p. 378.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 394.
^'^Barso, Reitzel & Associates, Community Action & Institutional
Change (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1969).
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Although C.A.A. 's appear to have had little direct influence on
change within schools, they have played a key role in mobilizing
parents and parent groups in target areas. Increased parent
activity is highly related to school change and may be a signi-
ficant causal factor.
In isolating elements of various change strategies that have shown
evidence of goal achievement, the correlation between citizen involvement
and institutional change shown in evaluative research efforts is a signifi-
cant starting point. The growth of the educational establishment in this
century has offered expanded opportunities for some Americans to partake in
almost limitless learning endeavors. A parallel development, however, is
a gap between disenfranchised constituencies and the decision-making process
which directs this establishment. Efforts to change the flawed and unequal
aspects of the basic structure of educational institutions, and the consequent
performance of their programs, must follow from a consideration of public need
and intent. Perpetuation of the present structure, which excludes poor and
minority citizens, and present performance, which repeatedly fails this same
population, is an inequity that contradicts basic democratic aspirations and
ideals
.
This emphasis on community participation is an effort to counteract
the alienating impact of the urban educational bureaucracy to make it re
sponsive to the needs of human beings. As a change strategy for urban edu-
cation advocacy groups assume that the citizenry must be involved in the
basic policy design of the institution in order for the institution to
meaningfully serve their needs. To the degree that wider participation
has
practical potential for changing existing flaws in urban education,
advocacy
groups hold promise.
^^Ibid., V-2.
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The problem is the failure of educational programs for poor and
minority people. The process of changing urban education now must begin
by including the urban public in decision-making to determine what they
want their educational system to be. This process demands that they be
included in decision-making for their schools, colleges, and special edu-
cational programs. Ivliile the ultimate goal is better urban educational
programs for poor and minority citizens, a critical starting point is
developing effective vehicles for their participation in shaping these
programs. That participation will not always insure improvements, but
it will provide a valuable first step.
Developing Participation in Urban Areas
The "New England tox>m meeting" is often used as a reference for an
ideal form of citizen participation in government decision-making. With
the growth of population and expansion of cultural and ideological diver-
sity, toxm meeting methods of participatory democracy have become imprac-
tical. The evolution to representative decision-making has resulted, in
part, in a separation between the citizenry and the government. In
America’s cities, this gap is large enough to have caused many citizens
to become alienated from the social and political processes that shape
the texture of their lives.
The magnitude of today's public institutions, many of which are
complex bureaucracies, has helped render the American citizen a passive
reactor to their decisions. Whereas most people do little more than
-9-
vote each year (and a sizable portion do not even do that), America still
maintains credence in the tenent that the citizen exercises ultimate power
in their society. This belief is largely false for poor and non-white urban
Americans
.
The quality of political choices offered to the urban resident has
been consistently poor. The lack of agressive leadership, which represents
the broad interests of the urban population, prevents the availability of
meaningful options for the community. l^Hiile full participation is a valu-
able ideal, the necessity to rely on representatives for input conveys a
trust by the public that their priorities are cared for by political
leaders and decision-makers. James G. Marsh notes that "the political
system renders decisions without achieving shared goals. We do not expect,
X6
do not require, and do not observe consistent collective goals." With
this basic inequity. Marsh queries: "Who does comparatively better in
politics?" The benefactors of the political system include the rich, the
educated, and the powerful incumbent. The weakest group in the political
process is the urban disenfranchised—poor and minority people. They com-
prise the alienated constituency which is without any organized input to
decis ion-making
.
The people who have the least power are those without an organized
voice for impact on the decision-making process. In school systems,
for
James G. Marsh, "Politics and the City," Urban Pro
cessesj
—
^
Viewed by. the Social Sciences , William Gorham, moderator
(Washington, i.C..
The Urban Institute, 1970 ), p. 26.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 29 .
'
-10-
example, administrators are hired for active participation in decision-
making; board or committee members hold legislated power; even teachers
maintain input through influential unions. But the parents, whose per-
sonal investment includes financing the institution and entrusting to
them the care of their children, have little meaningful voice in the
system.
There have been attempts to organize public power within the sys-
tem. These attempts range from the school parent teacher organization
through New York City's Decentralization Law of 1969. There is, however,
an inherent weakness in internal strategies to organize public decision
making in schools. Any power that parents have in school decision making
is provided for by the grace of the system itself. It relies on the
administration, the school board, and the teachers relinquishing some of
their own power within the system. And whatever power is given to parents
18
is usually given grudgingly. Many attempts to build public participa-
tion in school decision-making demonstrates that school bureaucracies do
not recognize the public's rights and will not willingly relinquish their
control over the schools.
Attempts to bring power back to the public is best initiated by
independent public organizers. Unless the citizens take steps to demand
and regain a power base in their schools, they will always be treated as
a powerless nuisance by the system's leadership. The advocacy group
offers both a prospect for new leadership in the urban area, and the
necessary methodologies with which they can secure power in
decision-making.
^®See Gittell and Berube, Confrontation at Ocean Hil I-Br
ownsviU_e
(New York: Praeger Co., 1969), and Gittell, Participants
and Participatj^
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Advocacy is certainly not a new concept in society. Individuals
and groups have long advocated causes or ideas on their own behalf or
on behalf of others. What is new, however, is the advocacy group as an
organized voice for public interest issues. The advocacy group has grown
over the past decade to be a force in change that business, industry, and
government agencies have come to respect and respond to, even if against
their will. The person who has perhaps done more than anyone to foster
this growth of power and influence is Ralph Nader. As his reputation
has emerged, since first coming on to the national scene in the mid-1960 ’s,
so has the concept of organized advocacy as a force in social change. He
has been the prime mover and inspirational leader of citizen activism.
The meaning of Nader's work is found in his exposing to the public how
bureaucratic institutions have eliminated accountability to the population
they propose to serve, and have insulated themselves from challenge or
change. The practicality of his strategy was demonstrated when he openly
challenged corporate giants such as General Motors over the issue of
automobile safety. ITnat started then with a "David and Goliath" scenario
has come to be recognized as an embryonic science of public interest acti-
vism.
As a strategy for change, Nader tactics for citizen organization
and mobilization are still now only being defined, refined, and developed.
Ralph Nader is significant, however, because he gave evidence that the
citizen can force his way back into power in the system. What began as
a series of citizen attacks on shabby corporate practices at the local
level, spurred in confidence by Nader victories, has become a new
process
of institutional change that holds impressive potential. The
implication
-12 -
of Nader's work is not simply that we have the capacity to force automobile
manufacturers to build safer cars, but that public advocates can take action
against exclusion from their own systems, economic or political, social or
educational
.
While Nader espouses a new citizenship for the nation so as to
involve every person in the decision-making process, this is largely an
unattainable goal. It is unrealistic to propose complete involvement
by citizens in every social issue affecting their lives. Marsh points to
the need for political "brokerage" as a practical and realistic way for
19
insuring meaningful options being presented for public choosing. With
the urban center being isolated politically and economically, such choices
are not presently available. The advocacy group is in the position to
serve as the public's broker to force the creation of new options repre-
senting their priorities
.
In addition to the sheer size of the population, there is another
more compelling reason why direct public input to decision-making is un-
workable. The bureaucratization of public services has introduced a high
level of professionalization in all levels of government. The issues
affecting citizens are not only too numerous to digest, they are usually
technically complex and confusing. Education has developed its
own
vocabulary and its own set of concerns which require full-time
study to
understand. This is true of any other institution which
provides services
to the public. It is no longer possible for the
average citlten to main-
Ibid
.
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tain a command of the subtle Issues in education, health, or economics.
Even services such as police and fire fighting have become the domain
of highly skilled professionals. In tracing the growth of professionali-
zation in urban education, David Tyack notes that;
As city residents became more interdependent, they increasingly
turned to specialized and impersonal agencies to accomplish tasks
they and their neighbors had once performed. As the place of
work became separated from the home, activities had to be coor-
dinated in time and place, new means of transportation and communi-
cation deviged, and an urban discipline developed in the city’s
residents
.
Urban citizens were separated from the responsibilities of providing
necessary human services to each other.
The liability in the professionalization of tasks is the tendency
for citizens to become alienated from society. Tyack’ s study found that
’’the change to bureaucratic specialization of function was gradual and
beset with serious problems of group conflict and ambiguity of political
authority." The problem of political authority relates to the need for
better leadership and Marsh’s prescription for political brokerage. The
advocacy group offers the prospect for renewed leadership through the
building of new alliances in the urban community. It is also in a posi-
tion to confront large bureaucracies with a matched understanding of com-
plex issues heretofore the domain of the skilled professional. Advocacy
groups have been successful by employing the data and vocabulary of the
^^David B. Tyack, The One Best Svstem; A History of Amerl cjm
Urban Education (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 32.
21
Ibid.
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institutions they challenge. By meeting the bureaucracy on its own terms,
the advocacy group has been able to challenge the professional about the
sophisticated issues of economics and social welfare, and even technological
questions such as the hazards of nuclear power. Since many issues are
beyond the grasp of most citizens, the advocacy group can represent coali-
tions of people and combine a technical competency that was seldom availa-
ble before.
The advocacy group as a link between the community and the educa-
tional establishment adds a new dimension to public input to decision-making.
In urban areas, the advocacy group can fulfill a need for people to have a
better understanding of the large educational bureaucracy. It can also
represent the community to the institution using the skills and resources
of professionally trained educators. Adding this intermediary element of
advocacy groups as political brokers, the quality of life for the urban
resident might be significantly improved. Marsh states: "If we are to
strengthen and improve the city, therefore, we need to devise new ways to
improve political brokerage within the city ... to provide flexible
• •
22
resources to alternative, potentially competing groups in the cities.
The urban educational advocacy group presents a unique style of repre-
sentative leadership in an insulated bureaucracy for an isolated consti-
tuency.
22James G. Marsh, "Politics and the City," p. 36.
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Statement of the Problem
The problem presented is how to form generalized advocacy group
methodologies which can be applied to urban education. Working with a
socio-economically oppressed urban constituency, how can the advocacy
group concept be made functional from an organizational point of view?
Similarly, can generalized advocacy methodologies be divided categorically
and applied separately? Questions of stable funding in economically de-
pressed communities and focal points for community coalitions on contro-
versial issues are major problems to the application of the advocacy group
mechanism to urban education.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to systematically investigate a re-
presentative sampling of functioning advocacy groups and to generalize
organizational and methodological processes that have helped advocacy
groups to succeed as change agents. These extracted methodologies will
be applied to a theoretical outline for an urban educational advocacy
group.
Methodology of Research
Three advocacy groups are identified for an organizational analy-
sis. These analyses are structured to address a series of elements from
which conclusions about their efficacy can be drawn and replicable com-
ponents isolated. Using pre-determined categories, each group will be
subjected to identical scrutiny. A collated evaluative summary will
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identify the strengths of each organization. These strengths will then
be applied to a proposal for an organizational model of an advocacy group
for urban education. The model will be designed to reflect a synthesis
of organizational components found in the groups analyzed, and an inte-
gration of methodological elements.
Limitations of the Study
As a new phenomenon, advocacy groups have generated little data
which either describe their theoretical base or evaluate their efficacy.
There was no evidence of controlled assessment of performance, correla-
tion between objectives and outcomes, or the impact of advocacy group
activity on institutional decision-making.
The foundation upon which the model is built is still a new and
recent approach to institutional change. It has not been utilized long
enough to warrant hard conclusions concerning its outcomes as a change
mechanism. Related to this is the absence of any clearly identified theory
of group advocacy as an institutional change strategy. This study is an
attempt to develop a definition of methodology in a cohesive form. Many
advocacy groups are issue oriented or defined around a particular problem.
The groups analyzed in this study are among the very few organized as
change-directed endeavors
.
Outline of Chapters
The first chapter has outlined the problem of institutional isola-
tion from the urban community. Specifically, the focus for urban educa-
tional isolation was established. Also provided was methodology
of research
for the remainder of the study.
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Chapter II will detail the related issues that affect the study.
More detail is offered about the failures of urban educational bureau-
cracies. An important set of concerns is the particularly debilitating
consequences of public e::clusion for poor and minority citizens. These
issues are central to the overall rationale for presenting a new change
strategy for urban education.
Chapter III will identify and analyze three advocacy groups pre-
sently functioning at the local, state, and national levels.
Chapter IV will offer a collated evaluative sunnnary of the three
groups and an analysis of organizational and methodological replicability
Chapter V offers specific recommendations, limitations of the
analyses, and suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER I I
PUBLIC EXCLUSION FROM DECISION-MAKING
IN URBAN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The Growth of Institution Isolation
• America is a society of bureaucracies. Almost every public service
provided to Americans is designed, managed, and delivered by a bureaucracy.
For many citizens, seeking individual assistance or redress from a large
institution is a frustrating experience. As advocacy groups grapple with
the problems of institutional polarization, it is critical that they com-
prehend the effects of institutional isolation from the public.
An outside observer would undoubtedly find it incongruous that
present day American society is of the same republic established two
hundred years ago—a nation ”of the people, by the people, and for the
people." From the outset, a limitation of democratic freedom has been
the compromise of the representative decision-making process which intrudes
upon individual liberty to behave with a freedom that effects the lives of
others. The American translation of the representative decision-making
process is "participatory" or "popular" democracy. Limitations notr^ith-
standing, our management of this process has not developed in consistent
parallel to our nation's socio-economic growth over the last two
centuries.
The disturbing inability of the public to influence decision-
making is related not only to growth of the nation, but
the evolution
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of democracy as a professional enterprise. The complexity of social sys-
tems precludes public understanding of the decision-making process. Tofler
states
:
The mass of voters today are so far removed from contact with their
elected representatives, the issues dealt with are so technical that
even well educated middle-class citizens feel hopelessly excluded
from the goal-setting
. . . the politician grows increasingly less
accountable to "the folks back home."^
In view of consumer-crusader, Ralph Nader, even if the citizen
takes seriously his democratic responsibilities, and conscientiously
participates in electing his public representatives, his choices seldom
amount to more than "expensive contests between tweedledum and tweedle-
dee." One basic assumption, then, is that while the profession of
American democracy is "participatory," the reality is that it is signifi-
cantly "exclusionary." It has been a predictable pattern of institutional
development that as bureaucracies grow larger and more powerful they cor-
relatively become more insulated and unresponsive to the public they are
established to serve. More disturbing than this primary fact is the dis-
couraging inability of our mammoth bureaucracies to change themselves.
Americans seldom understand what its large institutions are doing.
Whether it concerns a new piece of legislation or a new educational pro-
gram, the public does not have access to Important data and hence forms
opinion with a dearth of Information. This is especially true for dis-
^Alvin, Tofler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), p. AlA.
^Donald K. Ross, A Public Citizen's Action Manual (New York: Grossman
Publishers, 1973). Introduction by Ralph Nader, p. viii.
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cnfranchised poor and minority people who have even less access to resources
which would help them respond with understanding. The wealthy and educated
citizen is in a far better position to digest the processes of our large
bureaucracies. America’s large social and governmental institutions serve
a minority of (wealthy) people and ignore many of the needs of poor and non-
white urban Americans. It has become exceedingly difficult for elected
officials to accurately represent the real wishes of their constituency.
Likewise, the public, often confused with media manipulation and public
relations gimmickry, has difficulty determining the issues at hand and the
candidate's stand on them.
The result of institutional isolation in the city is a growing
alienation of oppressed constituencies. McLuhan presents a compelling
case for the electronic age, media implosion as a cause of widespread
public apathy and alienation. Just as Narcissus was numbed by his mirror
image, the America of the electronic age is victimized by a similar "auto-
amputated" narcosis.
The principle of numbness comes into play with electric technology
... We have to numb our central nervous system when it is
extended or exposed, or we will die. Thus the age of anxiety
and of ^lectric media is also the age of the unconscious and of
apathy
.
There needs to be greater opportunities for public participation
in decision-making. Participation to exist because the
population, al-
though often politically impotent, is at the same time an
informed and con-
scious public.
^Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media;
—
Tlie Extensions of to
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), p. 56.
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Intellectually
,
it is quite logical to defend many of our large
public institutions as being consistent with the aims of popular democracy.
American citizens are placated with assurances that their voice is heard
through their elected representatives; that their vote counts. They choose
their local, state, and federal decision-makers. These "accountable re-
presentatives" in turn designate the shape, direction, budget, and personnel
for the operation of our public institutions. What has happened to the
nation over the last two centuries alters significantly the prospect of
American society being aligned with theories of democracy. The explosive
growth of the urban population, the professionalization of public services,
and the expanding role of government in human services has made it difficult
for the public to maintain a sense of popular control. This pattern is
reflected in the widespread apathy and alienation common in current society
.
It is not uncommon to have elections of significant import generate less
4
than a two-thirds response from the voters.
Yet the millions who stay away from the polls are to a large degree
cognizant of the problems and issues alive in the society. Whether public
apathy is a result of alienation, social, economic, or political oppression,
or electronically inflicted narcosis, the disconsolate reality is that
there is a disproportionate number of poor and minority citizens numbered
among the excluded in our society. While the American city is the
nucleus
of political and economic power, it is also the center of group
oppression.
^Penn Kimball, "The Case for Universal Voter
Enrollment,
Electoral Reform , Richard Carlson, ed. (New York:
National Municipal
Issues of
League, 1974), p. 22.
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racism, and the effective exclusion of the disenfranchised from decision-
making. This has a telling effect on the community's ability to partici-
pate in the determination of educational priorities.
Institutional Victimization of the Urban Poor
Excluded minority factions, relatively small in number in the
nineteenth century, are counted in the millions today. Of the fifty-one
million families living in the United States today, over thirty-seven
million live in urban areas. One out of four urban families receive some
5form of public assistance income. Poverty in the American city is a per-
vasive disgrace. The "other America" elucidated by Harrington in the mid-
sixties is still alive, though now more visible, with an inflation of num-
bers perhaps the only change. The facts about poverty recognized a
decade ago still bear truth today. Housing patterns in urban areas per-
sist in racial isolation. Eighty-five percent of all black families are
living in our cities, along with one out of every ten Hispanic families.
And of these, over 35 percent subsist below the national poverty level.
Municipal governments continue to function as institutions of
oppression for the impoverished. Zoning laws are either antiquated or
ignored. Renewal and site-planning reflect the same pell-mell for the
^Bureau of Census, 1970, "U.S. Summary, p. -4 10.
^Michael Harrington, Tlie Other America (New York: MacMillan
Co.,
1962) .
. ^Bureau of the Census, 1970 , Census of the Po
pulati^ (Vol. 1,
Part 1, Sec. 1 - U.S. Department of Commerce).
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poor that officials were aware of a decade ago. The poor as pariah is wit-
nessed still in the treatment accorded them at the hands of law enforcement
agencies, the juvenile justice system, as well as the education establish-
ment. To be poor in the American city of the nineteen-seventies is to feel
the same sense of dejection as poverty offered before the onslaught of the
domestic legislation of the sixties.
Ryan presents a provocative account of how America's power
establishment victimizes the urban poor at every turn. In his chapter on
The Hydraulics and Economics of Misery," he details the quality of
health care for the poor—the social status of the institutionalized
and the response of the health establishment. In these and other areas,
society not only oppresses the poor, but blames them for their condition
Ryan described the relationship between the poor and the criminal justice
system:
. .
.
(the poor) are substantially less likely to receive a suspended
sentence or probation, more likely to be sent to jail or prison . . .
the fact that (more than half) of the persons arrested are poor sheds
no light whatsoever on the criminality of the poor. These facts only
identify the objects of police and court activity. There are law vio-
lators and there are law violators; one kind gets arrested, the other
kind is usually left alone.
Most discouraging for the poor in our nation’s cities is the power-
iessness to correct the myriad problems confronting them. Short of vio-
lence and disruption, there are seemingly no effective avenues for correc-
^Williara Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Random House,
Pantheon Books, 1971), pp. 136-163.
^Ibid.
,
pp. 203-204.
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tion and response. The reactions of responsible officials and the public
range from "Blaming the Victim" for their status, as described by Ryan, to
ignoring their existence as Harrington has documented.
Urban Poor; The Preponderance of Minority Americans
Even a cursory glance at income statistics reveals the stark dis-
crepancy existing between the worlds of white and minority citizens.
Affluent societies adjust to having a segment of oppressed people in their
midst as an unavoidable fact of life. We accept the existence of a bottom
on the social stratosphere. Beyond this self-exoneration we can also ad-
just to the fact that the occupancy of this portion of the social ladder
is reserved primarily for blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and Indian
Americans:
The cumulative impact of previous deprivation and discrimination and
the fears of future prejudice have forced a large portion of minority
groups into lower or working class status in America. ... an un-
ending pattern of bigotry [has] perpetuated a class and social situa-
tion in which any black child, regardless of class background, may be
treated by public officials as if he were unworthy of respect and
trust ... As long as institutions maintain separate and unequal
conditions for black and whit^^Americans , there will be subtle evi-
dence for racial differences.
American institutions have helped to perpetuate differences in
social status for black and white citizens. Twenty years have transpired
since the Supreme Court ordered integrated schooling for American
children
to be affected "with all deliberate speed." Recently in the city
of Boston
^Syrd L. Jones, "Change and Institutional Racism," in Atron Gentry,
Byrd Jones, eds. Urban Education: The Hope Factor
(Philadelphia: W. B.
Saunders Co., 1972), pp. 83-84.
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Massachusetts, we have witnessed an exacerbating eruption of white violence
against the mandate that seemed endemic to an era passed. After being
found in contempt of court for failing to submit a plan for ending Boston’s
segregated school system, a citicd school committeeman's observation was
"that reconstruction has come to the north with a vengence."^^ •
Attempts to reduce social status inequities between white and
minority Americans over the last ten years has included a preponderance
of domestic- social legislation and its unparalleled pouring of federal
monies (in the billions of dollars) into areas of "urban blight." Yet
for ail of the countless programs and projects which have gutted our
cities, data on the economic status of minority citizens, achievement
by black and Hispanic children in school, and the physical conditions in
which minority Americans still live (health, housing, etc.) reflect a
stagnation that induces despair. All of the money funneled into our
cities over the last decade as a solution to the ills of urban conditions
offers evidence that American institutions have missed the point and badly
misread the problem.
As beneficiaries of a situation of oppression, the oppressors cannot
perceive that if having is a condition of being , it is a necessary
condition for ail men. This is why their generosity is false.
Humanity is a "thing" and they possess it as an exclusive right,
as inherited property. To the oppressor consciousness, the humani-
zation of the "others," of the peopi^, appears not as the pursuit
of full humanity, but as subversion.
^^
The Boston Glob e, Dec. 30th, p. i.
^^Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1970), pp. 44-45. (Emphasis in the original.)
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Racism has been a pervasive and ruthless reality for America. It has been
the tool to allow for the sustenance of power by the brokers whose hold
has never been loosened— they are mostly wealthy; they are mostly white.
Broadening the Definition of Urban Education
When Americans refer to "education,” they typically are alluding
to schooling in some form, be it "grammar school" or "high school" or
college." Beyond this near automatic association, we even assign priori-
ties to their form, be it "elementary education," or "secondary education,"
or "higher education." A substream of the opinion in Brown versus the
Board of Education (1954) was the "right" of every American to an educa-
13tion as fundamental to their opportunity for success in our society.
The dictum that aimed at achieving the equalizing of this opportunity was
a consistent and open access to public schooling as offered by the state
to every American, regardless of race or heritage. As the federal judi-
ciary has become increasingly involved in educational affairs over the
last two decades, the definition of education as "schooling" has been
further embedded in the American mind. Add to this the billions of federal
dollars allocated to school programs by the Congress under the designation
of "educational legislation" and the association is further cemented.
While "education equals schooling" is a fair assumption in today s
American society, the connection is limited and precarious. ..lore than
semantic, 'the discomfort with the circumscription stems from the resulting
^^United States Supreme Court, Broivm Versus the Bo ard of Educati^,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)
.
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<iifficulty to achieve fundamental reform of education—reform that is
needed to eliminate oppression in our society. Comprehensive evidence
clearly elucidates the failure of public schooling, even in diverse and
innovative form, to progress our peoples to equality of cognitive achieve-
^ment
,
xncome, or power.
In 1972, the state of Massachusetts enacted Chapter 766 of the
legislative acts of 1972. The law substantially reformed the state's
educational program by greatly broadening the state view of the eligible
audience. Now included in the state's purview as being entitled to edu-
cational services are all citizens between the ages of three and twenty-
15
one years old. This new legislation guaranteed access to learning pro-
grams regardless of a person's ability to participate or function in a
public school. Specifically an amendment to special education statutes,
the bill projects far reaching implications. Cities and towns in the
state must now serve thousands of physically and mentally handicapped
voungsters heretofore neglected at home without enabling services, or
concealed behind the walls of state institutions. Tne Commonwealth, of
its own legislated volition, now assumes responsibility for all children s
educational needs, not simply public school management.
Though not on a voluntary basis, the state of Pennsylvania now
has similar responsibilities. As a result of a state supreme court
de-
^^See James Coleman, Equality of Educational ^Onportuni^
(Washington
G.P.O., 1966) and Christopher Jencks , Inequality (New York:
Basic Boo^o
,
1972).
^^Massachusetts General Laws, "Chapter 766 of the
Acts of 1972."
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cision, the state was forced to recognize the constitutional rights under
the fourteenth amendment of all young people, not only those capable of
participating in the available public school programs.
The expansion of special educational services is a good example
of an increase in the scope of education. Increasing attention is being
given to providing services to developmentally disabled citizens. In the
past this constituency was excluded from public education. The recent
attempts to include them in the educations], system represents a growth
in the concept of what public education means. The incentive for a wider
vision of education grew, as it often does, from the abysmal failures of
the institutions in our cities. Though Chapter 766 does not claim the city
as its initial inspirational touchstone, some of the clearest evidence of
the failure of special education finds root in urban schools. The special
class has often been used as a "dumping ground" for disruptive students.
18
Too often these students are poor and minority children. The need to
change this reality includes a consideration of a broader range of services
for a wider segment of the urban population.
^^Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children, Nancy Beth Bowman,
et al versus Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, David H. Kurtzman (1971)
.
^^President's Committee on Mental Retardation and the United States
Office of Education for the Handicapped, The Six Hour Retarded Child
(Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1970).
^^Roger Hurley, Poverty and Mental Retardation; A Causal Relationshj^.
(New York:. Random House, 1969).
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The Urban School Bureaucracy
That urban schools have failed to educate poor and minority Americans
is clear.
The dream is for public education to enable each individual to realize
his potential and prepare himself to find his most useful and congenial
niche in society. The reality is the double track system . . . (and)
children from middle income areas go to "better" schools or "fast"
classes, which feed into special programs in the later elementary or
junior high years and into specialized college preparatory high
schools. In contrast, urban children in low-income areas go into
poorer schools (or, in heterogeneous neighborhoods, into the "slower"
classes in regular schools) which lead into "regular" . classes in
junior high or separate junior high schools, and they end up in
catch-all commercial and voj^tional high schools where students are
low and dropout rates high.
Many educational researchers have offered disturbing evidence about
the scope of the urban school bureaucracy. David Rogers in 110 Livingston
Street
^Q provides
an account of the techniques of crisis management, the
fiscal and human resources wasted, the deteriorating lives of urban poor
and minority citizens in the New York City School System; and the futility
of change strategies despite the efforts of thousands, that is a disparaging
indictment. With an annual budget of over two billion dollars and serving
over one million students, 23^ New York City
has long been the focus for a
study of urban school problems. New York need not monopolize the citations
^^Eleanor Leacock, Teaching and Learning in City Schools (New
York
Basic Books, 1969), p. 146.
^^David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street .
21
Ibid
. , p . 211
.
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for an understanding of the debilitating nature of urban school bureaucra-
cies. Boston is offering continuing evidence of urban school failure.
Even our nation’s smaller urban areas suffer correlative problems of
failure in their educational efforts. Baltimore, Maryland; St. Louis,
Missouri; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;^^ and New Haven, Connecticut^^ are
some among many trying to combat the problems of educational failure that
their centralized and unresponsive institutions have helped to create and
still maintain.
Internal and External Change Strategies for
Urban Education
An on-going debate among school reform advocates is whether internal
or external change strategies are more useful. Internal change mechanisms
are those aimed at the behaviors of administrators, teachers, and students,
attempting to alter them in some prescribed way. They focus on the pro-
grammatic regularities of the school operation attempting to restructure
or reshape them. External change strategies are those aimed at the larger
view of education, attempting to create alternative methods of learning
and instruction. These focus on efforts outside of the existing public
education system. To determine which approach is best suited to resolving
the issue of public exclusion from decision-making, a brief review of
existing internal and external change attempts would be helpful.
^.^Marilyn Gittell and Edward Hollander, Six Urban School Districts
(New York: Center for Urban Education, 1967.)
^^Cleo Abraham, Urban City (New York: Carlton Press Co., 1972.)
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Among the many indictments of public education, Charles Silberman's
is one of the most comprehensive summations. ^ His account, along with
several others, basically contends that the defects of American schools
range from being fundamentally ill-defined as the optimum learning en-
vironment through insensitive in present function for a large segment of
the population. Change strategies of recent years often focus on the
latter without ever seriously challenging the former. Silberman refers
25to this as the "mindlessness" of education. In working to change the
dysfunctional aspects of public schools, reformists have utilized internal
change mechanisms in order to reshape existing regularities.
Internal change strategies, inspired by a decade of prolific
26
attacks on school performance, have includes the "open classroom,"
the "integrated day," "self-paced curriculum," "diagnostic reading pro-
grams," "open campus," "management by objectives," "team teaching," and
so on. The discouraging problem has been the failure of so many of these
innovations, too often presented as panaceas, to meaningfully change the
basic inequalities of education or the failure of schools.
^^Charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New York: Random
House, 1970).
^^For example, see John Holt, How Children Fail, How Children j^e^rji,
,
The Underachieving School Paul Goodman, Compulsory rlis-E^ucation, ^Jonathan
Kozol. Death at an Early Age ; Herbert Kohl, 36 Children , Tb^pen Classro_(^ ;
George Dennison, The Lives of Children ; and George Leonard, Education
and
Ecstacy .
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Open classroom has proven an effective approach in some communities but
has failed to have meaningful Impact on others. This is true of each new
strategy advocated. In terms of outcomes, open classroom, team teaching,
at al, introduced into many urban classrooms, have not reached for the
root causes of school failure for poor and minority. students
. Despite the
efforts of urban school administrators and teachers, urban schools are not
vsry different from what they were ten years ago,
,
Part of the problem and a cause for discouragement among urban
school reformists is the failure to understand the underlying causes for
the inadequacy of so many innovative efforts. Social and political reali-
ties can be cited for the inadequacy of internal change strategies in effect-
ing real change in urban schools. Racism is one cause. A more nebulous
presence, which is a part of racism, is the effect of teacher and admini-
strator attitudes on children. Ample evidence exists showing a dramatic
correlation between teacher attitudes and student achievement. As pointed
out earlier, Rosenthal and Jacobsen’s work is most notable. Ray Rist’s
27
study, more focused on urban schools and their minority children, adds
depth and strength to the theory. The introduction of open classroom or
self-paced learning will be rendered futile if the teacher, consciously
or unconsciously, harbors negative attitudes about the potential of cer-
tain students. Predictably in a city school where the teacher is white
and many or most students black, the negative attitudes are most likely
held for the minority student’s abilities and potential. If there is a
.^^Ray C. Rist, "Student Social Class and Teacher Expectations:
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Ghetto Education," Harvard Educational
Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, August 1970.
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problem of attitudes on the teaching staff, innovations of curricula and
format are hampered. Rosenthal and Jacobsen point out in their research
that negative attitudes can overcome the differences in curricula material.^®
The political problem with internal change strategies is best illus-
trated in the New York City attempt to decentralize their school system.
years of struggle over the issue of community control, which gained
attention with the controversy of Ocean Hill Brownsville,^^ New York re-
structured their system from an administrative monolith to a network of
30 * •31 districts. The decentralization, a weak and compromised attempt to
end the demand for community control, teaches a discouraging lesson about
the problems of reform. After five years with decentralization, there is
little evidence to suggest that the New York City School system is notably
improved for poor and minority children. There is little indication that
power and real decision-making have been decentralized so that poor and
minority citizens are more involved in the goal setting process in educa-
tion. The teachers’ union supports a block of candidates for many commu-
nity school elections and backs them with their resources. Black and
Puerto Rican neighborhoods still have a majority of white teachers, white
administrators, and white board representatives. Things have not changed
28
Rosenthal and Jacobsen, op. cit.
^^For background on the struggle and an account of the events of
Ocean Hill-Brownsville , see Berube and Gittell, Confrontation in Ocean
Hill-Brownsville (New York: Praeger, 1969).
30New York Decentralization Law, 1969.
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measurably in New York City as a result of the decentralization law. The
political power of the American Federation of Teachers, the central office
bureaucracy, and the Council of Supervisors Association is a great obstacle
for the internal change strategist to overcome. Beyond a teacher developing
an effective classroom or the principal developing an effective school,
substantial change of urban school systems is extremely difficult. Recog-
nition of this has turned many school change advocates outside the system.
Change mechanisms initiated from outside the educational system
have often involved a school program established as an alternative to the
public schools. This is an old approach reflecting attitudes of both
despair for public schools and hope that their approach to school develop-
ment will serve as exemplary models for public schools. Today there are
approximately ten percent of the nation's school children enrolled in non-
31
public schools, over five million students. Of these, ninety-three
percent are in church related schools reflecting a long-felt need for
religious value instruction for children. The remaining seven percent
are a growing collection of alternative schools, most aimed at implementing
some kind of reform either not practical or not possible in a public school.
But the hope of reform proponents to see a viable network of alternative,
non-public schools seems a long way from being realized. The prospect of
a strong alternative or independent series of schools competing effectively
with the public system is remote from the present outlook. A major reason
^^The President's Panel on Nonpublic Education, Nonpublic Educ_q5_|^
and the Public Good (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
19/-).
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is the difficulty in finding adequate financial resources to sustain the
operation of a school program. To the consternation of alternative school
advocates, many projects close almost as quickly as they open. Rising
costs all but prohibit a solvent management without government or phil-
32
anthropic subsidy.
Public school officials often encourage and praise the endeavors
of reformists functioning outside their system. One reason perhaps is,
given the difficulties in organizing and operating a non—public, alterna-
tive school, they have never posed a serious confronting force to the
public schools. A second reason for tolerance of alternative programs
involves the costs saved by the public with the existence of non-public
schools, particularly the church affiliated schools. Tne Nucifero report
on non-public schools in Massachusetts concluded that:
From the standpoint of the taxpayer, the most significant effect of
enrollment decline in nonpublic schools is cost. Nonpublic enroll-
ment has declined steadily in Massachusetts since 1965. Mready
this drop has cost the taxpayers . . . $66 million. If the decline
continues at its present rate, it will cost the taxpayers an average
of $75 million a year for the i^^^t five years and hundreds of
millions each year after that.^
With public school costs already very high, cities and tov'/ns are
presently not in a position to readily absorb several million dollars more
into their budget should the nonpublic schools collapse." By law they must,
but the fiscal implications of nonpublic school failure justly cause con-
cern among public officials.
1970, over two-thirds of the independent, non-public schools
in Massachusetts reported that their expenses exceeded their income.
See
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Special Commission to Study Public Financial
Aid to Non-Public Primary and Secondary Schools, Nonpublic Educa^o^in
Massachusetts (New York: Institute for Educational Development, 19/1), p.
1^+
^^Ibid.
,
p. 65.
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Recreating schools, developing better schools, or remaking schools
are all part of the objective of the initiator of the alternative school
project. As external change strategists, they are variably successful.
But if part of their objective is to inspire or instigate public school
change by the example of their model, they are limited in their chances.
They have neither the widespread, consistent resources to force recognition
by the public system, not the clarity of collective purpose with which to
mount an organized challenge to failing public schools on a widespread
basis.
The external change agent who limits his perspective of the pro-
blem to that of public school ills and how to better perform independently,
is narrowing his vision of educational change. The beginning awareness that
public schools fail could more productively be followed by inquiring into
better ways of educating, not better ways to run schools or construct
curricula. By simply remaking a school, the problem of public exclusion
from shaping education is still left unsolved. An alternative school,
unrealistic as a large-scale reform strategy and too limited as an educa-
tional change process, offers parents one choice apart from inadequate
public school programs. The ans^^;er lies deeper than alternative schools.
The countless intangibles that systematically objectify minority children
as targets of failure in school mitigates against any curriculum or pro
grammatic success certainties. Add the lack of real understanding about
teacher attitudes cited earlier, and caution is in order against
overcon-
fidence in an alternative school initiative.
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While public school reform is understood to be a desirable goal,
the public must be included within the decision-making process as major
shareholders. To be effective, a strategy must address the central pro-
blem of public isolation from public educational institutions. Such
strategies must provide a mechanism for rejected peoples to (re)enter
the public system of education. A local community disenchanted with
their public schools must be guaranteed redress by an external change
strategy.
The Urban Educational Advocacy Group:
Creating the Option for Participation
The oppressive character of large school bureaucracies in the
urban community traced in this chapter echoes the need for new avenues
for public participation in the decision-making process. With all pub-
lic services managed by complex bureaucracies, challenging their work
requires professionals who are versed in the jargon and issues of that
system. This requires a competency beyond the time and interest of most
citizens. Tlie advocacy group can provide a mechanism which represents
the interests of the conmiunity by using the skills of professionals who
can effectively challenge the bureaucracy. Such representation provides
the option for people to participate in the decisions that bureaucracies
make. It also allows citizens who do not wish to become actively involved
to have representation of their interests by professional advocates.
The advocacy group as a brokerage mechanism can minimize the
forced exclusion of the public from institutional decision-making.
In
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an age of widespread alienation, especially in the urban community, such
political brokerage is a significant prospect. Developing an organizational
model for the advocacy group for urban education would serve a useful pur-
pose for change agents seeking new methods for urban school reform.
CHAPTER III
UTILIZATION OF ADVOCACY GROUP STRATEGIES:
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSES
Rationale for Group Selection
In order to effectively develop an application of advocacy to urban
education, it is useful and important to analyze other applications of
group advocacy methods. There are innumerable "citizen action", "consumer
protection," and other "advocacy" organizations functioning at almost every
level. The task at hand is to identify a representative sample useful to
the study's purposes.
The study hopes to develop a theoretical basis for group advocacy
and extract a generalizable methodology. This objective helps narrow the
field of scrutiny. Advocacy groups that were oriented to a single issue
or specified concern were not considered for analysis. Being so narrowly
defined, it would be difficult to isolate those methods based on a replic-
able approach to institutional change.
Even with this limitation, there are many large advocacy organiza-
tions that address more than one audience about more than one issue.
For
the purposes of the goal of this study, method generalizability
will be
attempted by limiting the scope further to identify broadly
defined advo-
^Examples of such organizations in Massachusetts,
would include the "Miassachusetts Taxpayer's Association,
Energy Coalition," or "Parents Against Busing .
for instance,
the "Alternative
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cacy organizations which do not focus on any one, or even any set of speci-
fic issues or audiences. Those groups selected are oriented toward a com-
prehensive issue, such as citizen involvement in government or institutional
decision-making
.
The groups were selected according to three specific criteria:
1. Advocacy groups whose principle interest is sociai policy
reform as distinguished from consumer protection groups, legal
services organizations, and "issue oriented" advocacy groups.
2. Advocacy groups with an identifiable geographic base to
include a national, state, and urban focus.
3. Advocacy groups whose data were accessible to the writer.
Three advocacy groups meeting these criteria were identified:
Common Cause: A national organization committed to public under-
standing of and access to government processes. Their primary activity is
lobbying the Congress on major issues of social policy.
Massachusetts Public Interest Pvesearch Croup (Mass PIRG) : A state
organization which functions as part of a national network of PIP>.G affili-
ates. Founded by Ralph Nader, they utilize a variety of methods to influ-
ence public and private institutional practices specifically related to
accountability to the citizenry.
^For example, the "American Civil Liberties Union" is a
broadly
defined advocacy group focusing on the judicial system of government.
There are, however, advocacy groups which have an even
broader focus and
a more comp'rehensive constituency.
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Massachusetts Advocacy Center (MAC): A Boston-based advocacy group
which emerged from the "Task Force on Children Out of School". It has be-
come an organization addressing a broad range of social policy reform
issues. The group has been active at both the city and the state level in
education, mental health, and public institutional policy change.
Criteria for Analysis
The development of the "advocacy for change" process that has
groxrm over the last decade represents among other things' a struggle for
an appropriate organizational strategy for public mobilization on issues.
Tom Bums, the British sociologist, describes the advocacy group as an
"organismic" type of organization. Such organizations are "adapted to
unstable conditions when new and unfamiliar problems continually arise
which cannot be broken down and distributed among existing specialist
roles." The unique needs of the advocacy group, with their focus often
on transitional, controversial social issues, include an organizational
design which does not lend itself to a facile comparison with standard
organizational models. The advocacy organization is still evolving into
an efficient, workable mechanism for change. Despite its budding stage,
it has proven its force as a catalyst for social change. I’Hiat is not
known, however, is the consistency of its ability or the formula for its
successes
.
S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, and C. R. Hinings , Writers on Organiza-
tions (New York: Lyon Grant and Green, 1971), p. 28.
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The expansion of educational research activity over the last
thirty years, along with the concurrent emergence of computer capability,
has resulted in a narrowing of the range of acceptable methodologies.
Peter Clark's study on "action research" addressed this development;
During this period of increased financial support for research there
was a tendency for research leaders to go for the kinds of projects
which relied on using the potential provided by improved analysis of
data by computer technology. This provided projects that were rela-
tively easy to operate and apparently satisfied the sponsors. Unfor-
tunately, those methods of research based upon multiple research tech-
niques such as the comparative case study were slighted as unscienti-
fic, and those establishments which advocated, for example, the case
study investigation as a form of training were regarded as 'soft'.
"It is no wonder," as Sarason states, "that field research, to the labora-
tory researcher at least, is usually viewed as a messy business."^ The
limitations, however, are primarily due to the newness of the method's
application and lack of evaluation on the field study as a method. The
Rand study alludes to this problem, saying "the organizational approach
is relatively undeveloped . . . (and) although case studies flourish in
educational research and elsewhere, evaluations of the method are very
difficult to find."*’
While the lack of internal and external validity in the case study
is vexing, the study is structured to "provide an extensive
description of
^Peter A. Clark, Action Research and Organizati onal Char^ (London;
Harper & Row, 1972), p. 7.
Change
^Seymour B. Sarason, The Cu l ture of School and the
Problems o^
(Boston; Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 32.
^Harvev A. Averch , et al.. How Effective Is
Schooli^
Review and Synthesis of Research Findings (Santa
Monica; The
Corporation, 1972) , p. B.
A Critica l
Rand
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behavior (and)present hypotheses for testing in other contexts."^ The
development of the categorical components utilized was undertaken after
reviewing summative literature on organization theory and analytic method.
Adaptation was obviously necessary in that most of the literature focused
on either private, industrial, or public service institutions. Each com-
ponent utilized will be presented with its rationale and, where applic-
able, its research precedent.
. The style of the research is aligned with that typically preferred
by the sociologist who is "concerned with understanding the interplay of
forces in complex systems and . . . the relative importance of the in-
gfluences operating within a given social system." In the preface to his
anthology on organizations, bitterer observes:
We can study the subject from a detached, outside point of view where
organizations are studied by type, shape, products, inputs . . .
Or, the subject can be approached from the point of view of a person
planning or operating an organization, who is concerned with what an
organization can do, what problems or issues develop relevant to an
organization, what alternatives are open in coping with these issues,
and what the consequences of these alternatives are.^
This investigation is primarily concerned with the latter sets of issues.
The categories developed as a basis for analyzing the three advo-
cacy groups followed a review of selected literature on organization
^
Ibid
.
,
p. 98.
^David K. Cohen and Michael S. Caret, "Reforming Educational
Policy with Applied Social Research", Harvard Educational Review (Vol. 4o,
No. 1, February 1975), p. 30.
^Joseph A. bitterer. Organizations , Volume I, Second Edition
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969), p. vii.
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theory. Early writers on the classical doctrine of organization, such as
James D. Mooney (1931),^^ through more recent work in the same vein, in-
cluding E. F. Brech (1957), outline four major elements which have
ssrved as a universally acceptable framework for organization design.
These elements are the division of labor; scalar and functional processes;
structure; and span of control. The categories identified for this study
address each of these principles. Their sequencing, however, is juxtaposed
for the purposes of clear and even presentation. The four categories from
the literature have been expanded to nine new elements in order to facili-
tate the analysis of the advocacy groups. This adaptation into nine cate-
gories does not indicate the addition of new elements to the existing four,
but merely represents the need to subdivide some of these elements to help
scrutinize the advocacy groups with greater depth and precision.
Within each categorical description the probable effectiveness of
the organizations will be evaluated. James Price's inventory of proposi-
tions on organizational effectiveness is used as a basis for the analyses.
James D. Mooney,
Harper and Ros
,
1931).
The Principles of Organization (New York:
^^E. F. L. Brech, Organization (London: Longmans, Green and
Company, 1957).
James L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness: An
of Propositions (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. In^in
,
^^Inc
.
This inventory is an "extensive analysis of 50 studies, p.
Inventory
,
1968).
,6 .).
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There are nine categories used to analyze the three advocacy groups.
History and Organizational Structure will offer background on the
group s origins, and will outline its structure for operation. It relates
directly to the element of structure referred to above.
Organizational Goals and Mechanism for Institutional Change looks
at the groups’ objectives. This category will isolate a statement describ-
ing each group’s mechanism for institutional change. It is related to
scalar (hierarchical) and functional processes that are the activities or
operationalization of organizational goals.
Staffing will investigate the relationship between roles and ta~ks
within the organizations. It is related to division of labor and the degree
to which tasks are compartmentalized.
Organization and/or Project Funding will analyze the bases for
resources and support for the advocacy group. It will be scrutinized in
terms of its conflict, if any, with group purpose and effectiveness. This
category_ addresses issues of structure.
Issue Identification Procedure will focus on the methods of deter-
uiining agendas for the groups and the extent to which constituents of the
organization participate in this process. This section is related to scalar
and functional processes.
Methodologies will collate the strategies and tactics of each group
as they pursue institutional change. This category is concerned with
organizational methodologies rather than reporting on specific tactics
used for specific issues. Analyzing organizational methods xs
also
related to scalar and functional processes.
-46 -
Constituency Identification and Participation considers in detail the
role of constituents in the advocacy organizations. This concern relates
to the span of control that exists in each of the group's leadership;
i.e., the scope of their decision-making responsibilities.
Organizational Evaluation Components is seeking the mechanism used
for analyzing and judging the effectiveness of the group in relation to its
ability to accomplish goals and the extent to which activities correlate
with constituent priorities.
Common Cause; A National Focus
Brief History and Organizational Structure
Common Cause (CC) is the largest public advocacy group in the
nation, boasting a membership in excess of 300,000 people;
Common Cause is a national citizen's movement working for the public
interest at all levels of government ... It focuses on the cen-
tral issues that threaten our very existence as a self-governing
society . . . We are working to eliminate corruption in our poli-
tical and governmental institutions, and to reduce the influence of
special students.
Common Cause was founded as a national organization in 1970 under
the direction of John Gardner who has been Board Chairman since that time.
The initiative for the CC concept is tied closely to Gardner's experiences
and frustrations in Washington politics. The former Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare has built an organization whose primary agenda,
despite broad commitments to public participation issues, is governmental
accountability.
Common Cause is directed by a Goveiming Board elected at large by
CC members. Each year 20 Board members are elected to serve three year
terms. The 60 elected members choose up to 20 additional members to serve
one—year terms to insure a balance of the body racially and geographically.
Board elections typically receive a 20 to 25% response from members. The
The 1975 elections, for example, solicited over 66,000 votes of a total
^Common Cause, "^.'Ihy You Should Join Common Cause" (Washington,
D.C., 1975), p. 2.
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registered membership of 325,000. Resignations from the Board remain
the next election unless the members wish to appoint people
to those vacancies to create needed diversity on the board. Presently,
as shown in Table I, the 57 members represent 24 states with the eastern
states accounting for 57.8% of the total membership.
The Governing Board has final authority for and exercises active
control over all organizational and project matters. Their decisions are
carried out by the full-time and volunteer staff in the Washington, D.C.
headquarters. All projects focusing on federal issues in the Congress,
executive or judicial branches are carried out by the Washington office
with support from local affiliates.
The national organization uses the Congressional District (CD)
as base for its local structure. Supervised by four Program Managers,
the 435 Congressional Districts are monitored through representatives
for Common Cause. This system is mobilized for telephone and letter
writing campaigns across the nation on Common Cause issues needing con-
stituent support. Through their newsletter, Washington Connection,
Common Cause maintains continuous contact with CD’s about current matters
they are pursuing.
In addition to the national organization, separate state affili-
ates serve as conduits to CC members within their state. Their primary
function, however, is to parallel the role of the national
organization
^Common Cause, "The Governing Board of Common Cause, 1975,
Report from Washington , Vol. 5, No. 3, February, 1975, p.
3.
—TABLE I
COMMON CAUSE
GOVERNING BOARD
MEMBERSHIP GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION^
California 6 New York
Connecticut 1 North Carolina
Delaware 1 North Dakota
Florida 2 Ohio
Hawaii 1 Oregon
Illinois 3 Tennessee
Iowa 2 Texas
Kentucky 1 Vermont
Maryland 2 Virginia
Massachusetts 4 Washington
Montana 1 Washington, D.C.
New Jersey 3 Wisconsin
^Ibid.
5
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
2
11
1
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by pursuing issues in state government, i.e., lobbying state legislature,
informing the public about state issues, initiating litigation around state
issues, etc. These state organizations utilize the national network of CD
representatives, but must concentrate on the smaller geographical divisions
carved out by their state’s legislative representation scheme.
The Washington Office of Common Cause is the most ambitious organi-
zational effort in the public advocacy group arena. The scheme outlined in
Figure I indicates that with a staff of over 80 professionals, CC dissemi-
nates its work through a complex, professional model. Their Governing
Board, through its Chairman, John Gardner, actively participates in the
work of the organization. Their large and growing membership demands
such sophistication.
Organizational Goals and Mechanism
for Institutional Change
Common Cause determines its goals on the basis of its annual
membership referendum. The referendum of 1974 provided CC with the
goals they carried through the fall, 1974 elections. These priorities
include four basic issues:^ 1) Governmental Reform: Open Up the
System” Issues, 2) Environmental Safety, 3) Energy Conservation, 4) Con-
sumer Protection.
^Common Cause, "Common Cause Referendum,” Report from
Washington,
February,* 1975.
-51-
FIGURE 1
ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL OFFICE
Source: Conmon Cause National Office, January 1975.
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Common Cause concentrates most of its energies on the seven points
of its "Open Up the System" issues:^
Campaign Finance Reform — Common Cause supports publicly financed
elections at the local, state, and national level. Their proposal
would mix public funds, through a "check-off" on the federal income
tax statement, with small private contributions.
Campaign Finance Monitoring - Candidates for elective office at ail
levels are encouraged by CC to reveal the sources of their campaign
funding. This monitoring would allow for analysis of giving patterns
by private contributions and special interest groups.
Anti-Secrecy - The Congressional Committees which have worked in
secret are being pushed to open their doors to the public. This
open meeting effort extends to state legislatures and executive
agencies
.
Lobby Disclosure - The plethora of special interest lobbyists working
on Congress spend large sums of money for unclear purposes. CC is
pursuing rigid disclosure laws for lobbyists on Capitol Hill.
Financial Disclosure - Common Cause pursues the elimination of con-
flict of interest by seeking public disclosure of personal finances
by legislators.
Congressional Reforms — Some long-standing institutions in Congress
are under attack by CC: The seniority system and the Senate fili-
buster rules were in the CC view two of the procedural roadblocks
to accountability. Also being advocated is the end of secrecy in
party caucuses and conference committees.
Depoliticizing the Justice Department - Political decisions now
within the purview of the Justice Department would be part of an
independent "Office of Public Prosecutor" if CC has its way. Such
an office could better solve problems of official misconduct and
violations of campaign and ethics laws.
Concerned with environmental safety, Common Cause has become
in-
volved in the mass transportation problem through its
work on redirecting
No. 7,
^Common Cause, "Campaign 74 Issues," Report from
Washin^^, Vol
July, 1974, p. 2.
f
>
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priorities away: from massive highway construction. They have also concen-
trated on energy programs and land use problems.
The crisis of energy supply and demand has led CC members to
direct organization efforts toward promoting conservation and more equit-
able tax programs for energy producers as part of its concern for energy
conservation. A much debated question in the Congress is whether or not
to establish an independent consumer protection agency in Washington. As
part of its commitment to consumer protection, Common Cause has been a
leading advocate of such an institution to serve as the public’s ombuds-
man in the federal government.
The CC state organizations have developed their own program pri-
orities. They have focused on one or more of these five issues at the
state level: Campaign Finance Reform, Lobbying Disclosure, Conflict of
Interest Disclosure, Open Meetings of Legislative and Executive Bodies,
and Freedom of Information Laws.
Unlike advocacy group focusing on equitable implementation of
existing policies. Common Cause is committed to fostering new government
policies and priorities by direct intervention at the decision-making
level. The Common Cause mechanism for institutional change could
be
articulated as: Developing an open membership organization which
sys-
tematically solicits constituent identification of social policy
priori-
ties, and applies these mandates accordingly toward
influencing decision-
making processes of government.
^CoBTOon Cause, "Wave of Reform Sweeps the
States on Common Cause
Issues," Report from Washington , Vol. 5, No. 4,
tiaroh, 1975, p. 11-
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Staffing
While Common Cause maintains a staff of 80 to 85 full-time pro-
fessionals in its national office, it has generated enthusiastic voluntary
commitment to complement its paid staff. In 1974, CC reported over 440
volunteer workers assisting their national office as: 2900 hours a week -
equivalent to 77 paid staff people - that is the contribution volunteers
Q
in the Washington, D.C. office make to Common Cause. The CC paid staff
and the personnel costs consume 34.3 percent of the organization’s annual
9
operating budget. Compared to other large membership organizations, this
is a relatively conservative figure. With nineteen bureaus in their
headquarters, the CC staff works within clearly defined areas of competence.
While the Governing Board, through the Chairman's Office, directs the
activities of the organization, the daily management of staff functions
flows from the President's Office. In addition to the President, CC's
full-time professional staff consists of 46 administrators; 8 secretaries;
2 researchers; 3 writers; 3 attorneys; 5 law clerks; 3 lobbyists; 2 public
relations experts; and other consultants.
^Common Cause, "Common Cause Organization," Unpublished document,
January, 1975.
^Common Cause, "Hail to the Volunteers," Report from Washington ,
Vol. 4, No. 4., April, 1974, p. 3.
^Common Cause, "Statement of Revenue, Expenditures and Changes in
Fund Balance," Fiscal Year 1973.
^°The Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group for
example used
69 percent of its budget for personnel expenses.
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The individual departments of Common Cause assume carefully and
rigidly specified responsibilities. Under the direction of Department
Directors, each staff member has clearly defined responsibilities. This
hierarchical structure leaves little room for lateral responsibility by
staff members, but it allows for a more facile process of monitoring work
flow and efficiency. With this division of labor carefully maintained,
CC's Governing Board is able to affect greater control over organizational
progress. Decision-making is limited to select individuals in the organi-
zation. This is a departure from the model typified by other advocacy
groups where staff members generally participate heavily in organizational
planning, internal operation, and project implementation.
Organization and/or Project Funding
In 1974, Common Cause expected its expenditures to exceed $6.8
million. This represents an increase of over 50 percent since 1972.
Hie source of Common Cause revenue is almost exclusively small contribu-
tions from members.
Over 90 percent of all Common Cause income is received from members'
dues and contributions of less than $100. Less than 4 percent is
received from contributions of $500 or over. To assure that no con-
flict of interest is involved, every contribution of $5,000 or more
must be reviewed and approved by a committee designated by the
Governing Board.
^^Common Cause, Financial Information , 1975, p. 4.
^^Common Cause, "Statement of Revenue, Expenditures
and Changes in
Fund Balance," Fiscal Years 1972 and 1973.
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Contributions of $500 and over are reported quarterly to the Clerk
of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate as
required by the law. All contributions of $100 or more are included
in the report voluntarily. These reports are a matter of public
record
.
The CC Governing Board approves the annual budget. The Board's Committee
of Finance and Administration submits a quarterly review of income and
expenditures. In addition, their annual statement is independently
audited by Price-Waterhouse
,
Inc. The revenue and expenditures for Fiscal
Years 1972 and 1973 are shown in Table II.
The breakdown of expenditures, as indicated in Figures 2 and 3,
shows CC channels over 60 percent of its monies into program activities.
As a large membership organization, CC must commit over one- third of its
resources to retaining membership and recruiting new subscriptions. For
every dollar collected through dues and small contributions, almost 28
cents is spent on these efforts. The largest share of program activity
resources is used for lobbying and monitoring in Washington, as shown in
Chart II; These activities also include $1.2 million spent on state re-
form issues funneled through CC state affiliates.
Common Cause accounting procedures provide for calendar year re-
porting and its transactions are accounted by the accrued method. There
is separate revenue and expenditure reporting for five organizational
14
programs
:
^^Common Cause, Financial Information , 1975, p. 1.
^^Common Cause, "Notes to Financial Statements," 1972, 1973
Financial Information
,
1975, pp. 2-3.
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FIGURE 2
ACTUAL SPENDING
$6,872,137
-59
ACTUAL
-
PROGRAM
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General Operating Programs. All membership renewal dues, $15 per
member, provide revenue for all recurring expenses of CC administration
and general program operation. This revenue will exceed $3.5 million for
fiscal year 1974.
New Member Acquisition Program. All initial year's dues of new
members are allocated to this program. They may, in tuim, only be used
for the solicitation of new members to Common Cause.
Readiness Alert Program. These projects are for those unforseeable
events when CC must initiate spending to effectively follow through on
its commitments and priorities. A sudden attempt to amend CC supported
legislation, for example, would require action not anticipated when plan-
ning the year's budget. Revenue for these programs is limited to new mem-
ber contributions exceeding the $15 required dues. In addition, CC sponsors
special fund raising efforts for the Readiness Alert Program. Its expendi-
tures are limited to special high priority projects as designated by the
Governing Board.
Regional and State Offices Programs. State funding is coordinated
by the national office:
The financial plan is simple: The national office will ask every re
newing member in a state to voluntarily contribute an extra S5 for
that state's reform program at the same time the member renews his
national membership; as it begins this system, it will also begin to
give the state program account a line of credit ^gual to $1.50 for
every national Common Cause member in the state.
^^Coirinon Cause, Financial Assistance to Common Cause State
Organizations^,
1975, p. 1.
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Expenditures within these categories are limited to various approved state
projects and activities.
State Reserve Program. Renewing members often make general contri-
butions above their required dues. These funds are made available to this
program as advances or "lines of credit" to qualified state program action
committees (PAC's). These committees are the initial organizations that
anticipate developing into full CC state affiliates. The lines of credit
are limited to $1,50 per member and are used to help defray program costs,
especially start-up expenses.
While these categories define account reporting, funds may be trans-
ferred between programs to meet specific objectives of the organizations.
Such fund transfers are subject to approval by the Governing Board and
occur only as required.
Issue Identification Procedure
An important guide for determining issues in CC’s commitment to
non-partisanship:
As a non-partisan citizens’ lobby. Common Cause devotes itself to
issues and not candidates. Over the years ue have learned that
our legislative goals often require a long-term approach. As
part of this long-range effort, Common Cause . . . will lobby
federal and state candidates of both parties—incumbents and
challengers—urging their support of our key legislative issues.
While others are busy seeking to influence elections , Common Cause
members will be harj^at work trying to influence candidates^ to
support our issues.
l^Conmon Cause, Campaign Action Manual '74 (Washington, D.C.:
Common
Cause, 1974) , p . 4
.
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Deterraining these issues is called "agenda setting": (CC) raises issues
with the press and public, questions candidates on them, and follows up
with a lobbying campaign.
Common Cause pursues issues identified by its membership in
periodic referendums. From among the priorities established by the
referendums, the CC Governing Board makes the final decisions' on what
will be the organization’s program for the year.
While the membership votes on priorities for CC, the Governing
Board has broad discretion in establishing specific goals within those
priority areas. The referendum questions seek support for a CC stand on
general social issues rather than CC’s specific agenda. Each referendum
is a process of member ratification of past priorities to establish future
program commitments.
Methodologies
Goramon Cause has had a clear sense of organizational goals since
its inception in 1970. Its means for achieving these goals have also been
self-evident. Pursual of issues allowed for a logical unfolding of appro-
priate tactics and strategies. It was not until September, 1972, however,
that the Common Cause Governing Board, in attempting to analyze the
impact
of the growth of state and local affiliates, set out to
articulate, among
^^Conmon Cause, "Common Cause Develops New Ways to
Organize and
Lobby on'Issues," Report from Washington , Vol. 5, No. 4,
.larch, 19; , p.
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Other things, its organizational methodologies. While not the principle
objective of the endeavor, the "Study of Field Organization" queried:
"How should issues be selected and managed?"^® In their attempt to re-
solve the question: The Study Committee discussed the four major arenas
in which a Cor.jnon Cause battle will usually find itself: the legislature,
regulatory agencies, the courts, and initiatives and referenda. These
"arenas" can be outlined into three major categories of CC's organizational
methodology.
1. Service Evaluation ("regulatory agencies")
2. Lobbying ("the legislature")
3. Confrontation Strategies ("courts, and initiatives and re-
ferenda")
Service Evaluation . CC literature repeatedly emphasizes their
monitoring role. When focusing on regulatory agencies, CC attends to a
process of continuous evaluation of public services guaranteed by law.
Primarily, their evaluation efforts focus on the actions of legislators
in managing the nation’s affairs. Tlieir service evaluation commitment
concentrates on process issues, i.e., open and accountable decision-making
that affects the social services our institutions render to the citizenry:
1 ft
Common Cause Board Committee on Organization, "Continuing
Development of Field Organization," Memorandum, September 13, 1972.
Common Cause Board Committee on Organization, Study of Field ,
Organization, Memorandum, June 8, 1973, p. 20.
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Since the beginning. Common Cause has put its major legislative emphasis
into what we call 'process issues'—issues concerning the way legislation
20is developed and decisions are made.
One recent example of agency monitoring started in 1974 when CC
began to "monitor the proceedings of an executive agency, the new Federal
21
Energy Administration." They also closely analyze the work of Con-
gressional Committees which assume major responsibility for such service
arenas as health care, environmental policy, transportation, and campaign
financing. Hie evaluation of these decision-making processes helps CC
assess whether the decision-makers respond to special interests or the
public interest. CC's role in service evaluation is unique among advocacy
groups. Its monitoring function is focused on the pre-delivery or develop-
ment stage of social services rather than assessing existing public ser-
vices. Officials in Washington, whether members of Congress or bureau-
crats, have become accustomed to being watched by Common Cause.
Lobbying . Influencing legislation in Congress and state legisla-
tures is the core of the CC methodology. Their own descriptions of Common
Common Cause, "Common Cause 1975 Legislative Summary, Frontline,
Voi. 1, No. 2, 1975, pp. 4-5.
^^Common Cause, "CC Calls for Open Doors in Energy Office,"
Report from Washington , Vol. 4, No. 4, March-April, 1974, p. 1.
^^Comraon Cause, "Congress Moves Towards Openness and
Accountability,
Report from VJashington , Voi. 5, No. 4, March 19 75, p. 5.
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Cause activity almost always refer to lobbying. As a "citizen lobby," CC
has exerted much of its energy and resources on legislators and their
voting. In congressional reform, where they have been most active, CC
lobbyists attacked the seniority system which allowed pwerful committee
chairmen to remain in office almost perennially. The results of their
efforts included;
-A House decision in 1971 that seniority need not govern the selection
of committee chairmen.
-Provision in 1973 for automatic, individual election of each House
chairman.
-Defeat in 1975 of three well-entrenching chairmen. Senate Democrats,
tX'/o years behind the House, voted for individual election of chair-
men. 23
Common Cause lobbying also secured votes in the Senate and House to open
committee meetings to the press and public. Presently, they continue to
press for strong lobby disclosure-conflict of interest laws.
On a local level, CC lobbying by the state affiliates, with help
from the national office, have been energetic forces in state legislative
reform. As pointed out in "Organizational Goals and Mechanisms for Insti-
tutional Change", the focus for Common Cause lobbying in the states was
one or more of these five issues: Campaign finance reform, lobbying dis-
closure, conflict of interest disclosure, open meetings of legislative
-
. . . .
24
and executive bodies, freedom ot information laws.
23
Ibid.
“"^Common Cause, "Wave of Reform Sweeps the States on Common Cause
Issues," Report from Washington , March, 1975.
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Through CC's full-time, professional lobbyists, legislators are made aware
of the Common Cause position on key matters before them. The national
office publishes how each representative votes on the CC priority issues.
In the fall of 1974, two months prior to the elections, CC send to its
300,000 members a breakdown of each representative's voting performance
key issues during the previous session. With this organizational
power, CC lobbyists carry a potent voice to legislators who respond to
their position on issues:
Lobbying, historically, has been associated with business, and the
association has been less than flattering
. . . lobbying and corrup-
tion have become virtually synonymous with the unsavory side of
politics
.
Yet, the public conception of lobbying is changing—and for good
reason. A growing number of citizens who do not represent the
business world are becoming lobbyists for a multitude of causes
covering every conceivable activity. To the extent that lobbying
describes an activity aimed at getting legislators and legislatures
to conduct themselves in a certain manner, lobbying is central to
citizen action. And this remains the case whether that action
takes the form of pressure groups, st^^ies and reports on the
legislature, or working on elections.
Lobbying is central to Common Cause.
Confrontation Strategies . Common Cause has engaged in confronta-
tions with institutions, but these mechanisms are used sparingly. Their
confrontation strategies typically follow a three step sequence:
1. Problem Identification and Substantiation
^^Common Cause, "Voting Summary on Common Cause Issues," Report
from Washington, Vol. 4, No. 9.
^^Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, How Citizens Can
Improve the Massachusetts General Court (Kansas City, Mo.:
C.C.S.L.,
1974)
,
p. 9.
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2. Public Exposure to Build Public Pressure
3. Litigation
Problem Identification and Substantiation is essentially service
evaluation which is geared for confrontation. When CL's monitoring pro-
cess reveals a problem related to an organizational priority, their staff
functions as an investigative unit to define the nature and scope of the
malady. Their belief that the congressional seniority system was dysfunc-
tional, for example, required substantiation. By determining the inequi-
ties that placed senior congressmen at the head of powerful committees,
regardless of competence. Common Cause could verifiably connect this
system with the breakdown of congressional accountability.
A similar problem was the structuring of congressional committees,
CC discovered that: The Ways and Means Committee, which works out sub-
committees, thus enhancing the power of the chairman, has far too large
27
a workload. As a result, it neglects urgent public business. Common
Cause continually monitors government. In doing so, they systematically
pinpoint and document breakdowns in the decision-making machinery.
Public Exposure to Build Public Pressure can be a powerful weapon
in confrontation. CC uses two potent avenues to arouse broad public
sentiment against identified intransigence by decision-makers. Tlieir
primary public arousing vehicle is their membership. Through their
re-
^''common Cause, "House Fights Over Plan to Revise
Committees,"
Report from Washington , Vol. 4, No. 4, March-Aprti, 197 , p.
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gular publication of newsletters and special organization literature, CC
is in constant touch with its constituency. When they foresee an inevitable
confrontation, their 300,000 members are alerted within weeks. In addition,
CC uses special telephone and direct-mail campaigns to alert the members
to the need for contacting their own representatives about that issue.
The second major vehicle for arousing public opinion on a given
problem is through the press and media. Common Cause’s press office over-
sees a network of local affiliates who are in immediate reach of every
major media component in the nation. From the television networks to the
local weekly, CC’s public information system is comprehensive and tightly
28
managed
.
While litigation is often effective, since 1970 CC has used the
courts selectively. Their most notable venture into adjudication came
with their suits against the Republican, Democratic and Conservative pa-
ties for violating campaign laws. They also sued the Committee to Re-elect
ti29
the President for "ignoring requirements to report major contributors."
In emphasizing the need for pragmatism, CC's Governing Board Com-
mittee on Organization cautioned:
^^For an outline of their publicity program, see Common Cause,
Publicity Manual (Washington, D.C.: Common Cause, 1974).
^^Common Cause, "The First Four Years," Report from Washington,
Vol. 5, No. 4, March 1975, p. 1.
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Specifically
,
on the litigation front, Comnion Cause has gained a
hard-won right to sue which, in order to be a creative and flexible
instrument, cannot be abused.
On national issues, the temptation arises less often. CC monitoring and
lobbying has developed into a force that can resolve most issues before
litigation becomes necessary. On the state level, however, the CC Program
Action Committees (PAC)^^ wield less political power and occasions for
confrontation on state issues arise more frequently. To avoid over-using
the legal process for problem resolution, the Board Committee on Organiza-
tion begged further for prudence:
The purpose of Common Cause litigation is to force an agency or the
legislature to respond, to correct a malfunction in the procedures of
public institutions. As long as this purpose is shared by state liti-
gation committe^^, the approval requirement should not result in a
rash of vetoes
.
The courts are an important tool for any advocacy group. Common Cause
stresses temperance in the use of litigation, opting for rigorous pursuit
of the initial steps in the confrontation process.
Constituency Identification and Participation
The Common Cause constituency developed through an open, voluntary
membership. The $15.00 annual dues is paid by a still growing body counted
Common Cause Board Committee on Organization, Study of Field
Organization
,
June 8, 1973, p. 21.
^^Program Action Committee are local CC affiliates organized at the
Congressional District level. They serve the national effort as well
as
focus on state issues. PACs have developed into full^CC state
organization^
in a growing number of states. See Section entitled Organizational
Structu
^^Common Cause Board Committee on Organization, Study of
rield
Organization
,
June 8, 1973, p. 31.
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327j000 ci.ti.z6ns* CC iimlccs no ov6irt spp66X to sny specific seg-
ment of the population. The constituency that their reputation has in-
advertently recruited, however, is primarily the same white, middle-income
o/
group supporting the work of Ralph Nader. This is reflected in the issues
CC pursues which include opposition to U.S. involvement in Indochina, support
for the 18-year old vote and the Equal Rights Amendment. These issues, while
finding sympathy among poor and minority citizens, are major priorities
within the middle-class population. CC has not undertaken an active role
on issues that plague the disenfranchised American, such as the housing
crisis, urban school failure, institutional racism, hunger in America, etc.
CC member participation is in agenda development. Through their
referenda, CC membership concerns are polled. The concerns identified
through this mechanism are molded into an annual program or CC platform.
Beyond this input, it is clearly impossible for broad participation in the
implementation of this program at the national level. Participation by
members, however, is developed at the local level both for national pro-
jects and state efforts. CC maintains a telephone network where members
are asked to make contact with their congressional representatives support-
ing the Common Cause position on a crucial issue. \'Jhen activated, this
^^Coimnon Cause, Report from Washington , Vol. 3, No. 10, August,
1974, p. 1.
^^Interview with CC/Massachusetts staff. May 7, 1975. See also
Nader and Ross, Aetlon for a Change (New York: Grossman
Publishers,
1971), p. 61.
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system becomes a massive lobbying and pressure mechanism with widespread
member activism. CC has the power to mobilize an impressive portion of
the population through their telephone and mail solicitation of members.
More meaningful constituent participation can occur at the state
level. With issues of local flavor, CC members relate more closely with
the work of their organization. One example of optimum participation
was in California in the fall of 1974:
California members of Common Cause, with help from the national office,
spearheaded in 1974 one of the greatest citizen drives for political
reform that the nation has seen. Voters of the state approved, by
69 percent to 31 percent, ballot Proposition 9 which Common Cause
had helped draft, gather petitions for and publicize throughout the
state
.
Proposition 9 was an 11 chapter reform statute which required disclosure
of lobbyists’ spending; limited campaign spending; full financial disclo-
sure by office holders, including personal finances; and established a
Fair Practices Commission to oversee compliance with the law. The effort
to advocate for Proposition 9 involved participation by large numbers of
CC members
.
In this and other local and state CC organizations, members have
many opportunities to join the efforts of the full-time staff in all CC
activities
.
Organizational Evaluation Components
There is no evidence of any identified, systematic process
of
organizational evaluation within Comm.on Cause. Responsibility
for the
Act tt
^^Common Cause, Proposition 9: California's Political
Reform
Report from Washington , Vol. 5, No. 4, March 1975, p.
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self-examination CC does pursue resides in their Governing Board and its
committees. Monitoring CC progress and performance on specific projects
is the function of the staff and the Board. Their review of projects serves
as a check and balance system with CC.
For involved evaluation of organizational efficacy, the Governing
Board's Committee on Organization analyzes the structure of CC to deter-
mine its utility
. Their Study of Field Organization offered a series of
recommendations on improving the growing CC local affiliates
. They also
advised the Governing Board on methods for improving the structure of the
organization to respond more effectively to constituent needs. Beyond
this semi-formal evaluative process, CC engages in informal continuous
program monitoring.
The CC administrative offices are staffed by professionals v;hose
management responsibilities allow for analysis of program status and
37development. The Coordinators or administration and programs work in
the President's Office, advising him on the overall status of organization
programs. In addition, the operations office receives regular input from
the Field Director, the Issue Development staff, the Legislation Office,
and the Program Office. This constant feedback through the system offers
multiple stopping points and project reviews, but an objective process
for organization analysis is absent from the CC scheme.
Common Cause, Study of Field Organization , June 8, 1973.
^^See "Organization of the National Office, Figure I.
-73-
Major Activities and Accomplishments
The Common Cause "Organizational Goals and Mechanism for Institu-
tional Change" indicated the four basic categories of CC's concern. These
included government reform, the environment, the energy problem, and
consumer protection. Of these areas, CC has directed most of its energies
toward the first one, government reform. To offer a summary of CC accom-
plishments, this same breakdown serves as a useful outline.
Government Reform; "Open Up the System: Issues , CC has become
a highly visible force in both Congress and state legislatures. They
have a clear sense of their mission:
When we began in 1970, Common Cause did not choose at random from
the thousands of tasks we might have tackled to correct govern-
mental deficiencies. We have clear, explicit, and limited concerns
with respect to government. We believe it should be accessible,
accountable, and responsive. They key word is accountability.
Shortly after beginning in 1970, CC pledged to work for the reform of
election financing laws. To that end, in 1971 CC sued the three major
political parties for violating campaign laws. They also sued the Com-
mittee to Re-elect the President for its failure to disclose major contri-
butors to the Nixon campaign. Concurrently, CC successfully lobbied for
the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, as well as its 1974 Amendments
covering Presidential primary and general elections funding. These
laws
^^John W. Gardner, "Together, Citizens Can Win," Report
from
Washington, Vol. 5, No. 4, March 1975, p. 21.
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provlde subsidy of major elections with public monies through the income-
tax one-dollar "check-off," and limit the amount of money individuals may
contribute to a candidate.
Once CC helped the proposals become law,
. . . over 1,000 Common
Cause volunteers monitored compliance with the new law in the 1972 cam-
paigns. (They) filed complaints against 286 violators from both major
39
.P^^ties . In their efforts to change congressional procedure, CC under-
took an ambitious task as their first major lobbying endeavor: reform of
Congressional seniority system. The CC critics "predicted a miserable
flop" claiming the system was "too entrenched for reformers to budge.
Nevertheless, in January 1971, House members of both parties dented
the system; two years later, they set up rules for challenging com-
mittee chairmen; and in January 1975, House Democra^^ did the un-
thinkable: They unseated three incumbent chairmen.
On a related front, CC has exerted leadership in the opening of congres-
sional committee sessions to public view. CC recorded the votes of com-
mittee members, whose work was behind closed doors, and published their
votes on the opening or closing of bill-drafting sessions.
During the 1974 election campaigns . . . (CC) asked candidates if
they would vote for open meetings of conference commi^^ees . . .
over a majority of elected candidates answered "yes".
^^John Gardner, letter to prospective CC members, 1975. See
Appendix A.
Common Cause, "The First Four Years," Report from Washington,
Vol. 5, No. 4, March 1975, p. 1.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid
. ,
p. 5
.
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In 1975, the House and the Senate's party caucuses voted for the opening of
these committee meetings
.
The CC effort to influence reform of the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act of 1946 is yet unresolved. Legislation introduced into the
1975 session being vigorously supported by CC would require disclosure of
both the revenue and expenditures of lobbyists in the Congress.
The Environment . With the growing concern over short energy sup-
plies, rigid environmental safety legislation passed in the late 1960 's
and early 1970's is in jeopardy. Strong lobbies by the nation's energy
producers and automobile manufacturers are pressuring Congress to relax
some of those standards.
Both the House and Senate are considering proposed amendments to the
Clean Air Act. These amendments which would weaken the Act have been
proposed by the Ford Administration and various interest groups.
Common Cause opposed the five-year freeze on auto emission standards
and any amendments whi^^ weaken the existing system for enforcing
air quality standards.
CC's proposal is for mandatory energy conservation in order to:
. . .
enable America to examine without panic the difficulty (environ-
mental) questions involved in offshore oil drilling and nuclear energy.
While CC has lobbied environmental issues when they surface in the Congress,
this is not their highest priority. They do not actively generate discus-
sion, or create issues on environmental problems.
^Common Cause, "1975 Legislative Summary," Frontline , 1975, p. 4.
Common Cause, "A Search for Answers to a Crucial Question; 'U"ho
pays?' and 'Who gets?'. Report from Washington , Vol. 5, No. 4,
March, 19 /o
p. 7.
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The Energy Problem
. Lobbyists from CC helped lead the passage of
a tax bill in Congress that virtually eliminated the 50 year old oil deple-
tion allowance. This exemption for oil producers saved almost $2 billion
in tax payments for the oil industry. With this and similar pressure on
the energy institutions, CC has established leadership in this arena with
their support for three measures:
-imposition of oil import quotas with a fair system of allocation
-imposition of a substantial gas tax with equitable rebate provisions
-enactment of a stringent automobile efficiency tax linked to strict
gasoline efficiency standards^^
Consumer Protection . CC's role in consumer protection is focused
on use and abuse of taxpayer's dollars by the government. In monitoring
government processes
,
they have challenged Congress and federal agencies
on issues such as subsidies to the dairy and cotton industries; operating
and construction subsidies in the maritime industries; and cost overruns
I
within the Defense Department s contracts.
45
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Common
Ibid.
Cause
,
"1975 Legislative Summary," Frontline . 1975.
Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group:
A Statewide Focus
Brief History and Organizational Structure
The Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (Mass PIRG)
,
founded in 1971, "is a non-profit corporation, inspired by consumer-
advocate Ralph Nader and devoted to issues of public concern."^ It is
one of 23 similar state groups operating throughout the nation'. The PIRG
is an advocacy group which uses college students as its basis for support.
Mass PIRG, the focus of this analysis, was consolidated from two separate
organizations: Western Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group
(WMPIRG) and the Eastern Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group
(Mass PIRG-East) . PIRGs were formed to "generate research, legislation,
and legal action in areas such as the environment, public health and
2
safety, civil rights, and consumer protection."
While individual state PIRGs are uniformly structured, there is
no national PIRG organization which oversees the state affiliate PIRGs.
PIRG does- not pursue national issues in the federal government. Although
Ralph Nader is an active individual advocate in Washington, D.C. and in
national policy affairs, PIRG as an organization has a state focus.
In its first three years. Mass PIRG has grown to include member-
3
ship from 17 colleges numbering over 40,000 students. I'Hiien the two
Hlassachusetts Public Interest Research Group, 'H'Jhat is
Mass PIRG?", 1975, p. 1.
^
Ibid .
Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, Local Board
Hand-
book. Fall 1974, p. 3.
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PIRGs (WMPIRG and Mass PIRG-East) consolidated in 1974, the new group main-
tained two offices in their original form at Amherst and Boston as seen in
Table III. This merged organization is now one of the largest of the 23
PIRGs across the nation. With seventeen supporting schools, it is second
to Minnesota (MPIRG) in membership; its twelve full-time professionals
give it the second largest staff (Connecticut Citizen Action Group has
thirteen); and its $150,000 budget makes it the third most ambitious group
behind Minnesota and New York.
In order for a school to become a member of PIRG, the student
governance structure of the institution, with the approval of the admini-
stration, must consent to the development of a PIRG local board on their
campus. Once the approval of the institution has been given, PIRG is
free to solicit individual membership from within that institution.
There is both an institutional and an individual commitment to PIRG.
PIRG is structured to provide a constant flow of work from its
constituency through its professional staff. As seen in Figure 4. the
flow of this process can be divided into three levels: the Local Board,
the State Board of Directors, and the professional staff.
Every participating school forms a Local Board made up of students
from that school. The Local Boards meet on a regular basis, usually on
a weekly or biweekly basis. The Meetings are open to the public and
focus on any pertinent activities of PIRG. Agendas usually include pro-
ject reports, status of current project activities, new project ideas
and suggestions, reports on the activities of State Board,
funding and
financial status, publicity, and other appropriate problems.
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TABLE III
THE PIRGS NATIONWIDE
There are twenty-three PIRGs now operating in the United States,
brief look at these:
PIRG
CalPIRG
CalPIRG-LA
CoPIRG (Colorado)
CCAG (Ct. Citizen Action Group)
Conn PIRG
DCPIRG
FlaPIRG (Florida)
INPIRG (Indiana)
ISPIRG (Iowa)
MainePIRG
MaryPIRG
MassPIRG
PIRGIM (Michigan)
MPIRG (Minnesota)
MOPIRG (Missouri)
NewJerseyPIRG
NYPIRG (New York)
NorthCarolinaPIRG
OPIRG (Ontario)
OSPIRG (Oregon)
SCPIRG (So . Carolina)
TexPIRG
VPIRG (Vermont)
f other states. The following is a
' SUPPORTING SCHOOLS STAFF BUDGET
8 ' 2 $ 20,000
organizing
9 2 12,000
13 100,000
5 2 25,000
5 3 24,000
organizing
1 5 30,000
12 6 42,000
6 3 34,000
8 1 4,000
18 11 150,000
5 6 70,000
22 9 180,000
2 4 32,000
9 4 45,000
10 9 165,000
5 5 23,000
1 4 25,000
13 10 125,000
2 3 7,000
5 2 8,000
6 5 45,000
NOTE: The above data continually changes as PIRGs grown and new ones
organize.
SOURCE: Local Board Handbook, Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group.
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FIGURE 4
THE PIRG SCHEME
THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF
— -
- -
-
--
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
STATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
NUMBER OF STUDENT DIRECTORS
/
_tI'h E L 0 C A L B A R |d S
N.B. Each school, regardless of its size, is entitled to at least one
member on the Board of Directors. However, for every four thousand
students above the first four thousand, each school is entitled to
an additional member on the Board.
SOURCE: Combined from Nader and Ross, Action for a Change, p. 44;
and Mass PIRG, Local Board Handbook, p. 4.
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The Local Board fulfills two basic functions: First, on a substan-
tive level the Local Board should serve as an information center for PIRG
activities
. . . Secondly, on an administrative level, the Local Board
is in part responsible for the perpetuation of the PIRg/ More specifically,
the Local Board assumes responsibility for four tasks; 1) The generation
of public interest research and action on campus, 2) the communication of
the results of PIRG work to the campus community, 3) the protection and
enhancement of the funding mechanism, and, 4) the maintenance of close
cooperation with the regional offices.^
State Board of Directors. Each Local Board supplies, from within
its rank, student representatives who form the State Board. This State
Board is responsible for ail organization policy; hiring and firing of
staff; disbursement of funds; and the selection of PIRG projects. Member-
ship on the Board is determined by the Local Boards. The number of stu-
dents sent to the State Board of Directors is proportionate to the size
of their institution. Each school, regardless of its size, is entitled
to at least one member on the State Board. For every four thousand
students above the first thousand, each school is entitled to an additional
member on the Board. The number of representatives to the Board cannot
exceed five from any one school.
Slass PIRG, Local Board Handbook , p. 6.
^Ihid.
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Due to clear logistical difficulties, the State Board cannot meet
on a regular basis. The Executive Committee, comprised of State Board
members selected by the State Board as a whole, does meet on a regular
basis between full Board meetings. It consists of the PIRG student officers,
(Chairperson, Clerk, and Treasurer), plus two "student at-large" members.
This committee must be "geographically representative" and its bi-monthly
meetings are supplemented by regular, informal telephone communications.
Executive Committee members are expected to acquire a more intimate, timely
and comprehensive knowledge of the PIRG’s activities than the average Board
member. Their responsibilities include: 1) taking primary responsibility
for staff related matters including interviews, review of staff performance
for salary decisions and firing, of the staff; 2) making policy decisions
that arise during the daily operation of the PIRG and cannot await the
Board meetings; 3) authorizing allocations of PIRG funds; 4) establishing
agendas for Board meetings. All Executive Ccmmittee decisions are subject
to review and reversal by the full Board.
The professional staff is the final link in the PIRG scheme. This
staff implements whatever began with the Local Board and went through the
State Board to them. A detailed description of the staff is provided in
the third section of this analysis.
^Ibid., p. 5.
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Organizational Goals and Mechanism for Institutional Change
The goals of PIRG are an outgrowth of Ralph Nader's attempt to
formulate a viable mobilization of student activism on social issues.
The aim of the PIRG goals is to provide an effective change level for
students and at the same time offer a unique learning experience for parti-
cipants in social action. Specifically, there are four goals of PIRG:
1. To develop a new sense of citizenship in students based on
practical, experiential participation in social action projects.
(This) new kind of work is a new kind of citizenship. The word
"citizenship" has a dull connotation . . . But the role of the
citizen is obviously central to democracy, and it^is time to face
up to the burdens and liberations of citizenship.
2. To involve students in a meaningful way in the social policy
reform process
.
More and more students today are realistic about power . . . The
vast majority (however) are languishing in colossal wastes of time,
developing only a fraction of their potential . . . Student PIRGs
can inspire with a large array of projects which demand ^he develop-
ment of analytic and value training for and by students.
3. To develop a coalition of students and professionals to en-
gage in social activism thereby providing expertise and continuity
to student mobilization.
Students now need the help of professionals in their social efforts.
Professionals can bring not only their expertise for example, their
credentials to practice law in a court—but also the continuity of
^Nader and Ross, Action for Change , p. 5.
®Ibid.
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full-time work on the problems. A coalition of students and pro-fessionals can provide a workable vehicle for students to pursuetheir Ideals and apply their talents. At the same time, pro-fessionals—la\jyers
,
economists, scientists, and engineers—can
provide the direction and staying power, as well as the specialized
knowledge that is required.^
4. To utilize university resources, channeled through the PIRG
mechanism, to serve the public—consumer in the areas of govern-
mental responsiveness, industrial integrity, environmental balance,
etc. "Acting as a 'xizatch dog' for the consumer
. . . the PIRG
. would begin to provide some 'balance in the public interest
PIRG does not clearly articulate a theoretical basis for the mech-
anism of institutional change. From their literature and individual re-
sponses, however, enough elements of a change theory emerge to form a
tentative statement about their theoretical assumptions. Three levels of
the PIRG concept of change seem to emerge: First, PIRG is an institution
for students to mobilize on social issues. Secondly, student mobilization
is facilitated by a professional staff. Third, it is a mechanism for ini-
tiating citizen participation in institutional decision-making. Collating
these elements into a statement about PIRG's organizational mechanism for
institutional change, the PIRG concept is that:
Developing an institution collaborating university resources with a
full-time staff of specialists, students can mobilize for participation
in decision-making processes on their own behalf, and on behalf of tne
public-at-large to effect fundamental social change.
^
Ibid
.
,
p. 28.
^^Mass PIRG, Local Board Handbook, p. 1.
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Staffing
Mass PIRG employs twelve professional staff members between its
Boston and Amherst offices. In addition, there are numerous part-time,
volunteer student interns who participate in various projects, as well as
sharing office responsibilities. These personnel expenses consumed sixty-
nine percent of the organization’s budget^^ in fiscal year 1974-75. Re-
sponsibilities are delegated to one or more of the nine specialists from
the three administrators.
The administrative staff consists of three administrative positions:
the Executive Director and two office managers. The Chief Administrator
of Mass PIRG, the Executive Director, implements decisions of the local
boards. He is the responsible professional for all corporate obligations
incurred by the organization including "bookkeeping, tax reporting, salary,
12
unemployment reports, etc." He actively monitors and assists in project
development; staff evaluation and quality control; and is often involved
directly in specific projects.
The Amherst and Boston offices are supervised by office managers.
Their duties are to provide for the smooth operation of their office which
includes ensuring availability of supplies and materials necessary for all
^Hlassachusetts Public Interest Research Group, Local Board Handbook ,
p. 40.
12
Ibid.
,
Appendix D.
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project functions, managing clerical responsibilities and volunteer office
staff; meeting all visitors and students who come to the regional office;
and the publication and distribution of the internal newsletter.
The organization has eight specialists on the staff assuming the
following responsibilities: The Project Coordinators oversee the develop-
ment, progress, and direction of all PIRG projects. They also function as
tutors for non-professional, voluntary (usually student) workers enlisted
for a particular project. In this capacity, they typically become the on-
site supervisors for a number of students participating in PIRG projects
for an internship for college credit. The Project Coordinators oversee and
direct the on-going project and organizational evaluations. Their skills
are in the management aspects of public interest research organizing.
The Staff Attorneys are full-time Mass PIRG lawyers whose responsi-
bilities encompass a broad range of supervisory as well as specialty tasks
on PIRG projects. Tliey serve as advisors to the Director and other staff
on legal issues involved in project implementation. They also assume full
responsibility for all litigation initiated by or against the organization.
The Environmentalist has primarily research responsibilities in
problems of air and water pollution as well as to oversee related projects
undertaken by PIRG.
The Consuraerist is charged with overseeing all projects addressing
consumer issues. He researches areas of consumer problems
not being pur-
sued by the group and advises the staff on all related
matters. In addi-
tion, he supervises the diiily, Individual consumer
Issues arising in any
project, or initiated by an individual.
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The Health Research Director responds to all health related issues.
Like the environmentalist and consumerist, the Health Research Director has
input to all projects as expertise is required or requested. As with the
other specialists, the Health Researcher’s responsibility includes new
areas of all health-related concerns, not only those being pursued.
The Journalist directs all PIRG publications, reports, and other
P^iiited material. o.he Journalist also functions as the public relations
expert who works on press releases, press conferences, and public state-
ments by the group. This also includes investigative research and report-
ing, as well as advising staff on related issues.
The Student Action Coordinators (SAC’s), responding to the need
for a more effective liaison between the PIRG staff and the Local Boards,
are new additions to the organization staff. The handbook for the Local
Board describes their responsibilities as: "Informing, serving, and
13
stimulating local boards." SACs are the link to the staff and the central
office resources, and closely follow the activities of each local board
to help in its day-to-day operations. With an overview of all the schools
and direct contact with the staff, the SAC suggests ways to strengthen
the local board and make the staff responsive to needs.
Specifically, the SACs articulate to the staff the needs and
interests of the local boards; explain the staff projects to the local
13
Ibid.
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boards; help local boards define and meet their campus organizing responsi-
work with individual students at the local board schools on sub-
stantive projects; and help develop leadership and public interest skills
of PIRG students.
Organization and/or Project Funding
Mass PIRG is an organization of college students. As such, their
funding source is readily identified and efficiently accessible. Every
student at each member institution is asked to contribute two dollars to
PIRG each semester. This annual four dollars donation is voluntary and
paid through the tuition and feel bill of the university.
Although the Western and Eastern groups have merged, funding solici-
tation is still handled regionally. In the Western region, for example,
the description-solicitation material distributed to students refers to
"WIPIRG", or W’estern Massachusetts PIRG.
The Eastern region anticipated collecting $93,400.00 from the 37,870
students in its eleven institutions. Western Massachusetts looked for
14
$79,800.00 from 30,900 students at six schools. For 1975, PIRG collected
just over $150,000.00.^^ Tlie PIRG funding system is unique among advocacy
groups for two key reasons. First, the constituency is clearly defined
^^See "Anticipated School Revenues 1974-75", p. 22.
^^Xpterview with PIRG Amherst staff, April 28, 19/5.
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and accessible. PIRG does not require large amounts of literature that
seeks contributions from the public-at-large. Advertising costs are thus
minimal. The second reason PIRG has a unique funding mechanism is the
institutional commitment of its member schools. As pointed out previously,
membership and its subsequent contribution has more than an individual
commitment. Each school opts to affiliate with PIRG as an institutional
commitment.
From the anticipated total revenues of $173,200.00 for 1974-75,
PIRG developed a budget of $155,399.00 for their operation. The use of
the revenues contributed from small donations is "designed to ensure that
the students would get what they paid for, and pay for what they get."^^
The coalition of institutions concept of PIRG allows for greater
financial capabilities as well as a broader source of political power:
Except in rare cases, a single campus PIRG is undesirable ... A
PIRG at a single campus is unlikely to command either the financial
resources of a larger group or the attention of the press and the
support of state and local government that are essential if the
PIRG's work is to be of any value.
The coalition of universities approach also provides a more stable and
secure funding base for PIRG:
Sporadic and uneven contributions from dances, solicitations, or
cafeteria contributions a la the March of Dimes can contribute
^^See "Mass PIRG Projected Budget 1974-75", p. 23.
^^Ibid., p. 1.
^^Ralph Nader and Donald Ross, Action for a Change, p. 33.
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money to a Public Interest Research Group, but they are not suitable
as sole or even primary sources of revenue . . . These devices are
gambles; one cannot predict their success . . . Second, even if these
promotions were successful, they would not supply enough money to
support a professional staff. Third, each requires a vast, wasteful
expenditure of time, energy, and money.
PIRG's funding is stable and secure through its utilization of the normal
fee-collecting processes of the university to raise its revenues.
Issue Identification Procedure
The identification of issues to be pursued involves a process of
developing what PIRG calls "cookbooks". This activity is focused at the
Local Board level and are a scries of once-a-month local board projects
devised by students and staff. The cookbook is a small, clearly defined
activity proposal that includes a statement of the purpose, a concise
methodology with tactics and strategies, and a defineable, achievable goal.
The cookbook is designed to allow students to follow-up on issues with only
a minimum time commitment.
The cookbook is a technique that is both an issue identification
and methodology. But in the larger sense, the cookbooks, which are often
surveys to collect data, provide the basis for the ambitious projects under-
taken by the professional staff. It is the primary vehicle the PIRG student-
constituency has for providing input to the organization’s tasks.
19
Ibid., p. 34.
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TABLE IV
ANTICIPATED SCHOOL REVENUES 1974-75
SCHOOLS ENROLLMENT
EXPECTED
CONTRIBUTIONS
Eastern
Boston College
U Mass - Boston
*Boston State
Salem State
Brandeis University
Merrimack College
Clark University
B . U . Law
New England Law
**Lowell State
***Simmons College
8,700
6,000
5,300
5,170
2,500
2,500
2,000
1,100
800
2,000
30.000
15.000
16,500
17.000
3.000
7.000
1,400
600
1,900
1.000
?
TOTALS 37,870 $ 93,400
Western
U Mass - Amherst 23,000 $ 62,000
Westfield State 2,500 9,000
Hampshire College 1,200 4,800
Mt. Holyoke 1,900 2,000
Williams College 1,700 1,300
Western New England Law 600 700
SUB TOTALS 30,900 $ 79,800
GRAND TOTALS 68,770 $173,200
^Funding conditional on successful referendum in October 1974.
**Provisional funding from student government in anticipation of a
successful vote of the new Board of Trustees of Lowell University
in early 1975.
***Funding second semester if Trustees approve in October 1974.
SOURCE: Local Board Handbook, Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group.
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TABLE V
MASS PIRG
PROJECTED BUDGET 74-75
(September 74 - August 75)
I. Salaries (12 Staff Members)
(Executive Director, Staff Attorney, Health
Research Director, Environmental Attorney,
Consumer Attorney, two Project Coordinators,
two Student Action Coordinators, two Office
Managers, and a Journalist)
$ 91,000
II. Social Security (5.85% of Wages) 5,200
III. State Unemployment (4.5% of Wages) 4,095
IV. Federal Unemployment (3.28% of Wages) 2,984
V. Rent 11,220
VI. Telephone 9,600
VII. Travel 8,400
VIII. Postage & Shipping 3,600
IX. Health Insurance 2,640
X. Liability and Fire Insurance 200
XI. Office Supplies 3,600
XII. Xerox Copying 1,800
XIII. Newspapers Subscriptions 360
XIV. Books 400
XV. Annual Reports 800
XVI. Newsletters (2 issues of Mass PIRG reports) 3,000
XVII. CPA Audit
600
XVIII. Office Equipment 1,500
XIX. Office Equipment Maintenance Agreements
400
XX. Summer Internships - '75
(8 (2 $50 per week for 10 weeks)
4,000
$155,399
SOURCE
:
Local Board Handbook, Massachusetts Public Interest
Research Group
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The issues that have been pursued by PIRG during the first three
years of operation have fallen into three major categories: 1) Consumer
protection, 2) environmental safety, and 3) public health. More detailed
information about PIRG's efforts in these areas appears in "Major Activities
and Accomplishments." These areas have been, however, and continue to be
the focus for the PIRG’s active constituency.
The issues undertaken by PIRG, but not proposed by local boards,
are identified by the professional staff. If a specialist wishes to pursue
an issue, it must be approved by the State Board if it is to become a major
PIRG project. The purpose and methodology are presented, and the Board
is kept informed of the progress of the project.
Although the professional staff's activities and projects are closely
monitored by the Board, this is more for information than a "check and
balance" system. While the Board has the authority to veto a PIRG project,
the identification and pursual of issues is not a regemented procedure.
By keeping abreast of staff activities, the Board is alerted to sensitive
issues where a project’s existence might be questioned.
Theoretically, the decision on what issues are to be pursued is an
interplay between the priorities of the constituency through the Board
structure and the judgment of the professional staff. In fact, staff mem-
bers admit to the internal debate over these issues of project priority and
20
constituency representation in prioritizing PIRG tasks. In other woras
,
20
Interview with Jonathan Souweine, April 30, 1975.
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the PIRG staff even debates whether constituents ought to have input into
priorities at all. But the decisions are determined through a flexible
process that has the safeguard of Board authority.
Methodologies
PIRG literature addresses methodology primarily at the project
level. Little has been developed at PIRG that addresses overall organiza-
tional methodology. The concern of staff over methodology is likewise
oriented toward tactics for achieving project goals. Project methodology
is described by its literature as a six step procedure by PIRG:
1. State the hypothesis.
2. Do the initial research to prove your hypothesis—research
the issue in the library; interview other groups or individuals
with knowledge of the issue; determine what action, if any, had
already been taken in the area; investigate the legal/legislative
implications
.
3. Delineate the issues. For example, utility companies are not
]70presenting the public's interest in the construction of more
nuclear power plants; such safety questions as sabotage, trans-
portation or radioactive wastes, and the possibility of a nuclear
"meltdown” have not been resolved; nuclear power plants have not
always proved efficient in the past. These are separate issues
within the larger consideration of energy development. These are
easier to define and address.
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4. Delineate your goal. Raising public awareness to these safety
questions and mobilizing citizens to halt further construction and/
or filing legislation representing these interests would be a next
Step.
5. Define why there is a need for the project. For example, there
is no proof that the utility companies or the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion is acting in the public interest without adequate citizen re-
presentation.
6. State the means of implementation to prove your hypothesis and
accomplish your goal—determine the strategy, budget, manpower needed
21
and the time sequence.
The organizational methodology of PIRG can be outlined as a process
of three components: 1) Service evaluation, 2) lobbying, and 3) confronta-
tion strategies.
PIRG commits itself not only to social change, but to "education
22for social change." Especially with a student constituency, which is
isolated on the campus from many social maladies, the need to develop aware-
ness of issues is a PIPvG priority. The organization's structure allows
students the opportunity to engage in the change process by actively parti-
cipating in needs assessment and problem identification projects for PIRG.
^Hlass PIRG, Local Board Handbook , p. 48.
7 7
Interview with Atty. Jonathan Souweine, April 30, 1975.
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Exposure of malpractice and negligence is an essential element in the PIRG
methodology. The PIRG research function is a basic to their purpose as
their name itself implies. This educational tlirust yields projects that
substantially document public concerns and needs. This component involves,
in essence, performing investigative needs assessment in the community as
an on-going process
.
Lobbying is a significant part of the PIRG methodology. Much of
the work of the staff and the Local Boards results in collection of data
that is usable to decision-making. Assembling information on environmental
impact of nuclear power, for example, provides a solid basis for discussion
of energy sources and options. Tne studies that PIRG undertake prove to be
a valuable asset to their efforts in legislative monitoring. Lobbying be-
comes the logical follow through activity. Mass PIRG is active in the state
legislature. They are often asked, or they initiate, to offer testimony
to legislative committees. In addition, they advise, cajole, or confront
individual representatives relative to their stand on relevant issues.
In addition, PIRG has worked closely with some of the legislators who draft
and file new legislation in the interests of PIRG commitments.
The PIRGs obtain nost of their visibility and exposure through
their confrontations with institutions. These episodes follow the Nader
tradition which came to public notice through challenging conflicts with
23
large industrial organizations. This component of their methodology can
^^For example, see Ralph Nader, Unsafe At Anv Speed: The Designed
In Dangers of the American Automobile.
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be followed as a three step procedure: 1) Problem identification and
Substantiation, 2) public exposure to build public pressure, and 3)
litigation.
Problem identification and substantiation is essentially part
of the "service evaluation" component of the PIRG methodology. Within
projects using a confrontation strategy, however, the data collection and
research activity is geared toward assembling evidential information prov-
ing a contention of negligence, wrongdoing, or malpractice.
Public expousre to build public pressure is used often by PIRG.
Once a problem has been documented, proving it to exist, PIRG releases
reports or survey results to the media. Effective use of the public media
is crucial to the PIRG's success. . . .the eventual success of the PIRG will
depend in large part on its ability to inform the public of the PIRG's
24
actions and to influence public opinion. By obtaining wide exposure to
their research on the hazards of nuclear power, for example, Mass PIRG
has aroused public interest to a point where the issue is a major debate.
PIRG's activity on this issue has been a major influence on the develop-
ment of public awareness.
PIRG's legal staff allows them to consider and pursue litigation.
The culmination of the confrontation process is adjudication. The judicial
mechanism is a powerful tool in the advocacy arsenal. When other attempts
9 /
Nader and Ross, Action for a Change, p. 61.
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of persuasion and pressure fail to achieve the desired change, the court
suit forcing an action is a method of impressive finality. This tactic is
limited by costs and time requirements and its use requires discretion.
But when other means are exhausted, the advocacy group in court forces
challenged institutions to seriously respond to the issue at hand. Mass
PIRG has used legal action challenging the public utilities' rate setting
procedure and construction of a new interstate highway through the state.
With full-time legal service resources at their disposal, PIRG uses liti-
gation as a basic part of their methodology.
The use of tactics by PIRG is not a rigid process. There is no con-
scious procedural flow determining whether evaluation, lobbying, or con-
frontation is appropriate. There is a constant interplay of method in
PIRG activity. No formal decision-making process exists to designate
strategy along the lines drawn above. Isolation of these components is
presented for the first time here.
The distinction warrants repetition: These components represent
"organizational" methodologies as compared with "project" methodologies.
Constituency Identification and Participation
The PIRG structure allows for easy identification of their primary
constituency. Having direct financial input from college students, they
represent the concerns of those students. The system of Local Boards
pro-
vides visible access to the PIRG decision-making process by their
consti-
tuency. Constituent participation is theoretically guaranteed
through the
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Board system. PIRG needs only to keep students informed of their ability
to participate. Tliey have an identifiable audience and methods for reach-
them through campus newspapers, radio, mailing lists, etc.
PIRG, however, sees its constituency as larger than their student
supporters. They claim to represent the values and needs of the Nader
constituency
. . . white, middle- income Americans. PIRG sees that the
needs of the two groups are comparable. The hazards of nuclear power, or
the danger of secretive government actions are the concern of a wider
than students. PIRG attempts to "strike a balance" by focusing
on issues relevant to students as well as a larger constituency of consumers.
Whereas the student population has direct access to the PIRG decision-
making, issue-identification process, the larger "secondary constituency"
has no available avenue for participation in PIRG. The organization
relies on an assumption of the relevance of their projects to their broad
public constituency. It is improbable that this assumption could be
tested for its accuracy. The student constituency, however, could con-
ceivably be reached for the determination of their priorities on issues.
Participation of the student supporters in PIRG projects is unique
for an advocacy organization. The assumption of support by a larger, unde-
termined "middle-class" constituency of consumers is more typical of advocacy
group method.
25
26
Ibid
.
Interview with Jonathan Souweine, April 30, 1975.
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Organizational Evaluation Components
PIRG s system of organizational evaluation is a continuous process.
Directives to their Boards refer to "quality control" being crucial to PIRG
credibility, stability, and success. Responsibility for quality control is
assumed by the professional staff with all Local Board projects being closely
monitored by the State Board. PIRG offers several reasons for this tight
control system In the practical, political world, just one real mistake
can seriously impair your effectiveness. The PIRG's credibility with the
public, the media, and the legislature is its strongest and most precious
tool . . . and the one thing most often attacked.
The staff seeks to ensure that every student will receive a worth-
while experience through his/her PIRG work, proportional to the amount of
time and effort they put into it. Simply stated, PIRG tries to avoid
wasting anyone's time— it's bad for them and bad for the PIRG.
The staff has been selected because of their specific abilities.
If they are not consulted, these abilities cannot be employed, and the
27
PIRG work product may suffer. PIRG's primary objective in their organiza-
tional evaluation process is preservation of the public image and credi-
bility they see as critical to their survival. Tlie overall monitoring
activity is a systematic procedure designed into the PIRG structure.
There is no evidence of any method for individual project evalua
tion. l-Jhile project outcomes are relatively easy to identify, PIRG does
^^Mass PIRG, Local Board Handbook , pp. 16-17.
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not undertake any documentation of a project's achievement of stated objec-
tives. There are at least two reasons for this: First, the objectives for
many PIRG projects are nebulous or broad and defy behavioral terminology.
It is difficult to objectively measure the degree to ^,*ich a project suc-
ceeds or fails. PIRG, for example, is opposed to development of nuclear
power because of serious questions concerning their safety. The goals of
PIRG range from legislation to ban their construction to informing the
public about their imminent danger. Achievement of PIRG goals, then,
while they are observable (the passage of such legislation, for instance)
they are rarely clearly articulated at the outset allowing for systematic
evaluation.
A second reason for the absence of organized project evaluation is
that goals are seldom static. Projects respond to changing political
developments, adjusting strategies as the staff deems necessary. A project
aimed at eliminating reliance on nuclear power, for example, might begin
focusing on the legislature, but become involved in pushing for the develop-
ment of an alternate, safer energy source. Projects do not typically have
an end, but are priority concerns of the PIRG. They are therefore continuous
projects which deny the organization a facile approach to objective achieve-
ment analysis. This echoes the previous point concerning constituency
participation. While encouraged to work on projects, PIRG programs are
the special concern of the professional staff and are often beyond the
constituents' control. This further minimizes the probability of sys-
tematic organizational evaluation in PIRG.
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Major Activities and Accomplishments
Mass PIRG has undertaken thirteen major projects since its incep-
tion. Of these, seven have been in the area of consumer protection. Four
of the PIRG projects have focused on environmental or ecological problems;
and the remaining two have addressed development of more responsive govern-
ment processes. Briefly, the activities have include the following projects:*
Consumer Protection:
1. The Bottle Bill. Non-returnable beverage containers are
environmentally and economically unsound. Mass PIRG has joined other
environmental groups presenting testimony before the Committee on Natural
Resources and Agriculture, in an attempt to implement a strong bottle bill
in Massachusetts similar to those of Oregon and Vermont. Future plans call
for state wide education on the issue in an effort to get the bill through
the legislature this year.
2. Furniture Sales Fraud. In the spring, 1974, Mass PIRG began
a study aimed at documenting some of the ways consumers in low-income areas
axre victimized when shopping for furniture. Such practices as bait and
switch" advertising schemes, misrepresentation of the composition and
origin of the furniture products, high pressure sales tactics, and decep-
tive pricing were found in a number of retail furniture stores in Boston,
Springfield, and Lowell. Tlie results were published in the winter of
1975
and received wide public exposure through the media. The report
instigated
a number of counter-suits against Mass PIRG by the retail
stores named in
the report.
*A11 summaries of Mass PIRG projects are taken from the
Mass PIRG
Local Board Handbook, pp. 42-44.
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3.
Doctor Directory. Recognizing that it is difficult for a
consumer to obtain essential information about physicians, and that citi-
zens are often not assisted in selecting their physician, Mass PIRG will
publish a first Directory of Massachusetts Doctors. The Doctor Directory
will list office hours, fees, qualifications, availability of housecalls,
hospital affiliations, and other similar data. It also will promote on-
going efforts designed to de-mystify the subject of health care by including
a glossary of medical terms, a bill of patient rights, and a general discus-
sion of selected consumer health issues. In addition, the Directory will
address the issues of public accountability of health care providers and
the education of lay people so that they may participate with professionals
in making decisions about their own health care.
4. Hearing Aid. Massachusetts hearing aid dealers are not li-
censed to sell and fit citizens with hearing aids. High pressure tactics,
inflated prices, unregulated and largely untrained salespeople, potential
conflicts .of interest, and invalid "hearing examinations" spurred Mass PIRG
to introduce legislation designed to regulate dealers in a meaningful
fashion. An industry-led lobbying movement defeated the bill last year,
but is hoped that the research accumulated in support of that bill
will
help get strong legislation enacted this year.
5. Bank Interest. A fall, 1973 survey of 470
Massachusetts banks
uncovered widespread violations of Massachusetts’ Truth-in-Lending
Law.
Tliis law requires banks to disclose uniform information
regarding interest
rates of consumer loans. Following the release
of this report, rulings
from the. agency (i.e.) responsible for overseeing
enforcement of the
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Federal Truth-in Lending Law, and a sharp warning from the Mass. Attorney
General were made public. The PIRG may resurvey the banks to document in
greater detail those who are still violating the law, and then to take
appropriate legal action against the violating banks.
6. Toy Safety. In each of the past two years, students working
with Mass PIRG completed surveys which indicated the fact that unsafe toys
were being sold in retail stores throughout the state. On the basis of
these results, released in two separate Mass PIRG reports, specific recom-
mendations were suggested, of which few were heeded. Mass PIRG attorneys
are presently studying what avenues of legal action are open to the PIRG.
7. Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMECO) . Two years ago
Mass PIRG filed suit requesting that the state system for determining
utility rates be overturned because it violated the due process rights of
the consumer. In the specific hearing in which Mass PIRG was involved, no
participant had the money needed to challenge adequately the utilities'
position that it needed a massive rate increase. Mass PIRG’s claim that
the state should pay for someone to represent the consumer is presently
before the State Supreme Court. Follo^^?ing PIRG’s action, $5.2 million was
denied WMECO.
Environmental and Ecological Safety:
1. Interstate Highway Route 7. Mass PIRG organized a successful
legal challenge to a fourlane interstate-standard highway planned to run
from Long Island through the Massachusetts' Berkshires up to Burlington,
Vermont. In line with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
,
Vermont's Judge Oakes decided that before any further construction of the
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proposed highway, the State Highway Department must conduct a total environ-
mental impact study. His decision is currently being considered on approval
by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
2. Clean Air. In an effort to monitor closely the state's imple-
mentation of the 1970 Federal Clean Air Act, Mass PIRG opposed Boston
Edison's application to burn high sulphur oil and Northeast Utilities' re-
quest to burn coal. The PIRG provided information from a recent EPA study
which details the health hazards of suspended sulphates (thus far an unre-
gulated form of air pollution) . PIRG researchers also prepared formal com-
ments on the state's AQ^IA program and the federal non-degredation proposal.
Future plans call for close observation of various transportation control
plans—the state implementation of its AQMA program, its enforcement, and
of its stationary source regulations.
3. Clean Water. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act established
a national permit program requiring all individuals to apply for permits
if they were discharging polluting material into navigable bodies of water.
These permits will prescribe compliance schedules which should bring all
polluters into compliance with applicable federal standards regarding water
quality. Over the past months. Mass PIRG has monitored several aspects
of this program, and plans to take action in the future designed to ensure
that permit specifications are respected. In addition, Mass PIRG will
focus more attention on the purity of our drinking water.
4. Nuclear Power. Shortly after the announcement of plans for
construction of two nuclear power plants in Montague, Mass PIRG issued a
report calling for a moratorium on nuclear power plant construction
in the
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state (and In the nation) because of the many unanswered questions related
to the safety and economics of these plants. The PIRG continues to confront
the problem in a variety of areas. In the legislature, the PIRG supported
several bills designed to involve the state in the control and regulation
of existing and/or proposed plants. In the communities, U Mass students
canvassed Montague in an attempt to educate citizens about Issues prior to
a town referendum on whether to construct the plant. In the state, staff
and students have undertaken a state—wide effort to involve citizens in
lobbying state legislators on the issue. Future plans include participation
in the referendum scheduled to be held in Franklin and Hampshire Counties
in November, and an intense campaign to educate students so that they can
be more effective lobbyists.
Responsive Government:
1. Open Access to Records. With the enactment of federal legisla-
tion guaranteeing access to records kept on individual citizens, Mass PIRG
has monitored compliance in the state with this "Privacy Act". Schools
systems, hospitals, courts, and other public institutions are monitored
for violations including refusal of access to records and illegal maintenance
of records on individuals
.
2. Small Claims Court. One of Mass PIRG’s earliest projects, the
"see Project" has seen the publication of the first extended "How to Sue"
booklet in Massachusetts, and the subsequent establishment of counseling
services to advise citizens of the use of the small claims courts. Mass
PIRG may file legislation this fall in an attempt to reform the courts as
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a forum for individual consumer disputes. Students will provide the docu-
mentary information to support the need for reform by docket searches,
court watching and an analysis of the problems faced by individuals wishing
to use the courts. In addition, students trained in the use of small
claims courts will provide community groups with the skills and resources
to counsel citizens about small claims courts.
Massachusetts Advocacy Center:
An Urban Focus
Brief History and Organizational Structure
The Massachusetts Advocacy Center (MAC) is an outgrowth of the
"Task Force on Children Out of School, Inc.". Begun in 1968, the Task
Force was organized to expose the problem of children who were involun-
bS-tily excluded from the Boston Public schools. The project culminated
in a report that resulted in implementation strategies which brought
reform of policies and programs at the state and city levels, including
passage of a statute making Massachusetts the first state to provide
bilingual education as a matter of law. In 1973, the Task Force reorgan-
ized as the Massachusetts Advocacy Center which immediately focused on
implementation and enforcement of the Bilingual Education Act for the
3
13,000 non-English speaking children in Massachusetts. Since their
growth into an advocacy group, MAC has been a highly visible, controver-
sial, and politically active organization. They have been the subject
of over "three hundred newspaper articles, magazine stories, and book
4
reviews which have been written about (their) work." They undertake
children's issues and monitor public services provided to them.
^Task Force on Children Out of School, Inc., The Way We Go To
School: The Exclusion of Children Out of School (Boston: Beacon Press,
1971)
.
^Massachusetts Advocacy Center, First Annual Report , March 1974, p
^
Ibid .
^Ibid.
,
p. 35
.
. 11 .
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MAC functions with a professional staff under a 23 member "Board
of Directors
. Structurally, MAC Is a simple organization. The Board of
Directors is comprised of a cross-section of Boston's business and com-
munity leaders. They represent a wide array of disciplines including phy-
sicxans, attorneys, business executives, educators, and leaders from
various community agencies. They are not active overseers of MAC policy
or projects. The Board exists for three purposes: First, to assist in
the initial organization; second, to add credibility to the group; and
third, for fund raising."^ Sometimes the professional skills of Board
members are tapped and utilized for projects, but this is not the norm.
The complexity of the MAC structure is not in their work-flow scheme. As
indicated in Figure 5, all decisions are made by the professional staff,
all projects carried out by them.
When MAC launches an ambitious project on a major social issue,
or on a technically complex one, they often assemble a "task force" or
"project staff" of community leaders and professional experts, not affilia-
ted with the center, to undertake a major role in that project. This opera-
ting format was successful with the initial project on the exclusion of
children from school in Boston, and subsequent work on the danger of lead
paint poisoning;^ the malades within the Massachusetts Department of Mental
^Interview with Barry Hock, MAC staff. May 5, 1975.
^Massachusetts Advocacy Center, State of Danger: Childhood Lead
Paint Poiso~ning in Massachusetts (Boston: MAC, 1974).
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Health; and the development of a handbook for parents, students, and educa-
tors on the solution of school problems.®
On all of their projects, MAC advises their Board of Directors of
thexr activities and progress. They are not required to seek advanced
approval for the performance of group tasks. In addition, they (the Board)
have never disagreed with a staff project, (and)
. . . only once did we
run into a problem with the Board on our work.^
mac's structure, then, is its professional staff which utilizes
^^^il^ble human resources as necessary or useful to complete individual
projects. The Board of Directors functions in little more than name. They
operate under no strict assumptions of management or policy decision-making
responsibility. Neither do they mandate tasks for the staff. They are
there if needed, invited (but not obligated) to participate.
^MAC, Suffer the Children: The Politics of Mental Health in
Massachusetts (Boston: MAC, 1972).
g
MAC, Making School Work: An Education Handbook for Students
,
Parents, and Professionals (Boston: MAC, 1973).
9
Interview with Barry Hock, MAC staff. May 5, 1975. The one
occasion a problem arouse was a minor incident involving only a few
Board Members. The details were not related to the writer.
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FIGURE 5
MASSACHUSETTS ADVOCACY CENTER
ORGANIZATION SCHEME
*"Child Advocacy Unit"
Organizational Goals and Mechanism for Institutional Change
MAC asserts that through continuous monitoring of the administrative
performance of state social service agencies, they are able to direct the
attention of policy makers, the public, and community /professional organiza-
tions to the utmost needs of Massachusetts citizens, particularly children.
The special attention to children's issues stems from MAC's predecessor,
the Task Force on Children Out of School. They list three reasons for
limiting their activities to children’s services and rights:
1. The history of the Task Force on Children Out of School was
exclusively child oriented.
^^MAC, First Annual Report , op. cit., p. 3.
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2. With limited resources and a constellation of problems within
the human services delivery system of Massachusetts, time would
best be spent on preventative projects rather than on efforts which
add to the casualties of present programs.
3. By building on strategies and techniques developed by the Task
Force on Children Out of School, a properly staffed organization
with an exclusive focus on children's issues could make major pro-
gress in securing rights and services.
MAC defines itself broadly as "A countervailing advocate in the
private sector designed to monitor and encourage regulatory and administra-
12tive agencies to pertorm their tasks in the public interest.” ^'rtiile
they do not detail organizational goals, MAC defines six priority concerns
that it pursues
:
1. The Right to Education. Acting on this priority, MAC monitors
compliance with the Bilingual Education Act; school census regula-
tions; and student record regulations. This includes investigating
harmful educational policies and practices; and incidences of child
exclusion.
2. Special Education: Labelling/Misclassification. At the fore-
front of this priority is MAC’s concern with compliance with the
Special Education Law, "Chapter 766”, both in spirit and in letter.
^^MAC, Second Annual Report (To Be Published, 1975), pp. 1-2.
^^MAC, First Annual Report , op. cit., p. 3.
-113-
3. Child Health: Mental and Physical. The concern over lead paint
poisoning of children in Massachusetts is a major priority of MAC.
MAC closely monitors the Department of Mental Health for their atten-
dance to regulations and the quality of the services for which they
are responsible.
Protection of Children Used as Research Subjects. The Center
continuously investigates the use of psychotropic drugs on school
children in the Commonwealth. This and other programs which aim to
control children's behavior artificially are closely watched and
exposed to the public.
5. Juvenile Justice System: Standards and Services. MAC is
beginning a major research effort into the status of justice for
juveniles in the state. This includes investigating both the
juvenile court process itself, as well as the agencies allied with
the juvenile welfare system as a whole. The state's Department
of Youth Services is the major overseer of juvenile offenders,
and is the custodian of children remanded for correction or reha-
bilitation by the courts.
6. Access to Public Information. Under the Freedom of Information
Act, MAC pursues full and open disclosure of legislative processes,
such as committee meetings and hearings, in state government. It
also pressures public school systems to allow free access to school
records by parents and students with clear procedures for changing
or eliminating inaccuracies, untruths, or irrelevancies
.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 7.
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MAC s organization does not have a tangible mechanism for consti-
tuent participation in decision-making. Its staff makes all decisions
about project choice and implementation. MAC literature describes their
model as unique in several ways. It undertakes advocacy in the administra-
tive process. MAC does not concentrate on new legislation, but the enforce-
ment of existing statutes. The Center is not limited to a single area of
concern such as mental health or education, but focuses on the spectrum of
human services and related administrative concerns. MAC brings together
under one organization persons from a variety of disciplines to address
critical public policy issues in the Commonwealth. Finally, the Center
14
employs a broad range of advocacy tools to implement reforms. All of
these tasks are the sole^responsibility of the staff and any other human
resources they gather for assistance. MAC's mechanism for institutional
change could be described as:
Developing an independent, privately funded organization of pro-
fessionals who systemmatically monitor implementation processes of
laws, and regulations governing services to children.
Staffing
MAC employs a staff of six full-time administrators/professionals
and utilizes the services of 30 to 40 student interns and volunteers.
Between staff salaries and consultant expenses, MAC used 73 percent of
its total operating budget for personnel costs in their fiscal year 1973.
With a small professional staff, there is little clarity of job role.
14
Ib id
. , p . 3
.
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Although each staff member assumes prime responsibility for a speciality area,
project management is an interplay of staff skills and participation. The
job titles of Director and Deputy Director indicate some sense of hierarchi-
cal leadership within the organization. Daily operation, however, allows
for wide discretion and assumption of major responsibility by the staff.
There is little assignment of roles in MAC's staff. Project decisions are
the perrogative of the staff member in charge through a loosely defined
process of consulting with other staff and the Directors.
The administrative staff consists of the Executive Director, Deputy
Director, Special Education Specialist, Desegregation Specialist, and
Organizer. The principal spokesman for MAC, the Executive Director, is
in charge of the overall operation of the Center and assumes final responsi-
bility for all MAC projects and decisions. He answers to the Board of Direc-
tors for all organization activities and writes the Annual Report to that
body. He also maintains full charge over the spending of appropriated
monies, and is the final authority on all administrative decisions, i.e.,
personnel matters, fiscal management, etc. He maintains routine and on-
going contact with the Board of Directors individually and collectively.
The position of Deputy Director is analagous to that of an office
administrator or manager, whose role is primarily that of assistant to the
Director. He assumes full authority in the absence of the Director over
the work of the staff.
Although not a formal title, the Organizer assumes general staff
responsibilities while serving as the Center's specialist on project
organization strategies. The deirianding tasks of collating resources
-116-
necessary for project follow-through are within the Organizer’s special
skills and area of expertise, and he serves as an advisor and active parti-
cipant in most Center projects.
The Special Education Specialist manages the Center’s Child Advo-
cacy Unit on issues relating to implementation of Chapter 766. It includes
overseeing the monitoring of compliance by school systems and the state
special education regulations. The Center was a key participant in draft-
ing these regulations, and the Special Education Specialist manages
overall Center involvement in the rectitude of related problems brought
to their attention. In addition, the Specialist organizes the Center’s
reports on the progress of implementation of Chapter 766 by the state’s
cities and towns
.
The Desegregation Specialist is the staff’s authority on school
desegregation issues. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has had a school
desegregation law since 1965, the "Racial Imbalance Act." After a decade
of controversy, the state’s cities are now being forced to bus students
to achieve such balance in their school populations. In monitoring com-
pliance with this state law, as well as similar federal requirements, the
Desegregation Specialist is in charge of the Center’s Child Advocacy Unit
on desegregation which takes referrals on related problems from the public.
With the Center staff in a continuous state of flux, with job
responsibilities and roles constantly adapting to daily needs, the Secre-
tary-Receptionist often functions as an office coordinator and staff link.
^^The results of the Center’s report on the Massachusetts Department
of Mental Health, M.A.C., Suffer the Children (Boston: Massachusetts
Advocacy Center, 1972).
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The MAC staff is almost completely the essence of the organization.
With the staff assuming responsibility for project determination, financial
management and project implementation, they function under no guidance or
constraint
.
Organization and/or Project Funding
MAC has an annual operating budget of $120,000. The sources for
their funds are all private, local, and national philanthropic organiza-
tions. A grant from the Ford Foundation provides most of the MAC funding.
In addition, they receive approximately $10,000.00 in corporate contribu-
16 '
tions. Local support comes from seven sources: the Permanent Charity
Fund, Hyams Trust, the Cabot Foundation; the Gardiner Howland Show Founda-
tion; Bartlett Trust; Alice P. Chase Grant; and the National Edna McConnell
Clark Foundation. For individual projects, other small sources of funding
have been secured. For "project interaction", MAC received monies from the
Boston Globe and the AMW Corporation.^^ A $10,000.00 contribution came from
Stride Rite Corporation, the Polaroid Foundation, and the United Steel
Machinery
.
The operating budget for the first year the group was organized
as the Massachusetts Advocacy Center totaled $120,000.00 as detailed in
Figure 6.
^^MAC, Second Annual Report , March 1975 (unpuglished draft).
Ibid
.
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Staff Salaries $ 84,000
Consultants 4 qqq
Rent/Utilities 8*500
Operating Expenses 9,500
Publications 14 nnn
total
SOURCE: MAC, First Annual Report, p. 34 .
Each year MAC has been able to maintain the shrinking Ford funding with
matching grant monies from various sources to sustain their efforts. With
the controversial content of their projects, securing financial support
is a tedious and difficult problem. MAC is currently planning to change
Its structure to a membership organization. ° Although this change is not
anticipated for about two years, it is a sign of the organization's belief
in the financial benefits of direct public support.
For specific projects the organization pursues, MAC has looked
to collaboration with other interested organizations. The obvious bene-
fit is the sharing of financial resources to minimize the impact on the
organization. MAC's publication about schools, Making School Work - An
Education Handbook for Students, Parents, and Professionals
,
1973, was
19
a joint effort with the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute. MAC will
20
continue this direction of inter-organizational project collaboration.
18
Interview with Barry Hock, M\C staff. May 5, 1975.
^^MAC and The Mass Law Reform Institute, Making School Work: An
Education Handbook for Students, Parents, and Professionals (Boston: .M\.C
& MLRI, 19-73).
20
Interview with Barry Hock, May 5, 1975.
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As a non-profit corporation with a tax exempt status, Mass Advocacy
is forbidden from engaging in any legislative lobbying activities. While
their tax exemption is a financial asset, this lobbying restriction poses
a methodological disadvantage. As pointed out earlier, MAC does not work
for the creation of new services, but the effective functioning of existing
programs. There are times, however, when even this work required involve-
ment in legislative processes. State lawmakers engage in decision-making
that continuously effect the existing services MAC monitors. For these
issues, MAC must encourage other groups or organizations, not so restric-
ted, to carry out lobbying activities on issues they consider important
to their goals.
Issue Identification Procedure
MAC has no formal or creditable procedure for defining issues
to be pursued. Through their six priority concerns, the Center has essen-
tially pre-defined its issues. Beyond these concerns, MAC utilizes no
established mechanism for expanding into new areas. All responsibility for
determining issues rests with the staff. Drawing on their individual
interests and expertise, potential project areas can be developed and
presented for staff concensus by an staff member.
Determining priorities has been more a process of unfolding than
a rational development of a new project. The results of the Task rorce
on Children Out of School uncovered the magnitude of problems faced by
developmental ly disabled children who were involuntarily excluded from
school. This work resulted in evidence of administrative problems in
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the State’s Department of Mental Health. The special education work thus
precipitated MAG's priority in monitoring this institution. Connections
b®l'('^6en projects can be made throughout the MAC agenda. Each project’s
pursual spawns new areas of concern, uncovers new problems, requires new
involvement. The issue identification procedure for the Center is a process
of continuous unfolding of project elements to form new areas of interest.
Given the flexibility of determining organizational priorities
and ensuing projects, MAC staff members follow through on those areas
within the purview of their skills and background. New project areas in
special education, for example, would logically be identified by the Special
Education Specialist, who is responsible for existing projects in this area.
While there is generally broad participation by the staff as a whole, re-
sponsibility for a project becomes the special task of one or two individuals.
Project suggestions from outside the staff have no direct assurance
of consideration. Public input or Board of Director involvement has in-
direct influence at best. The Chairman of the Board, the founder and
leadership force of the Center, has exerted strong influence on their pro-
ject priorities. Others not on the staff, however, have not participated
in any meaningful way in the shaping of liAC issue priorities and projects.
Methodologies
MAC project methodology is a fluid process that unfolds with the
development of that project, llieir organizational methodology, however,
is easier to delineate. It consists of three key elements.
1. Service Evaluation
2. Confrontation Strategies
3. Program Development
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From earlier observations, it was noted that MAC limits its activi-
ties to monitoring compliance with existing, publicly provided children's
services. A major element in their organizational methodology is thus on-
going evaluation of those services. MAC maintains contact with state
agencies responsible for these programs. They also collaborate with other
private organizations to keep abreast of all developments and problems that
arise within the sphere of children's services.
Their service evaluation process typically takes the form of an in-
vestigative task force assembled to gather information about a particular
program. MAC has used this format since their first days as the Task Force
on Children Out of School. Under the direction of Larry Brown, the project's
director, they modeled their effort after the hunger inquiry group. Hunger
21
USA. Rather than collect data evaluating services themselves, MAC forms
a group of community leaders, professionals from higher education, business
and industry, and experts from the field under scrutiny. This group engages
in the collation of information, solicitation of testimony at open hearings,
and other investigative mechanisms. They are provided resources, technical
assistance, and financial support from the Center to compile their findings
into a report. The report outlines in detail the status of the services
being provided within the spectrum of their focus.
^^Citizen's Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the
United States, Hunger, USA (Washington, D.C.: The National Council on
Hunger and Malnutrition and the Southern Regional Council, April, 1968)
as cited by -Peter E. Edelman, "The Massachusetts Task Force Reports:
Advocacy for Children," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 43, No. 4.,
November, 1973, p. 642.
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This method not only fulfills their service evaluation function,
but provides a vehicle for community leaders to participate in the process.
A significant advantage to this Task Force method is the ability to generate
publicity for the project. With a Task Force of notable individuals, their
work is almost guaranteed generous coverage by the media. Wide public ex-
posure is an important element in the service evaluation process. Unless
the larger public is aware of the quality of public services and any short-
comings in these services, an advocacy group such as MAC is seriously limited
in its potential to follow through on change strategies. MAC not only ac-
tively evaluates services for children, but their "Task Force" vehicle has
been an effective advocacy.
As with other advocacy groups, MAC has found it necessary on occa-
sion to stand in challenge against an institution. As a result of their
continuous service evaluation, they often uncover problems of negligence,
inefficiency, or other functional maladies. When such a problem is dis-
covered, mac’s action sequence can be divided into four steps: Problem
identification and substantiation; administrative negotiation; public ex-
posure to build public pressure; and litigation.
The controversial issues that MAC pursues necessitate care with
the allegations they make and positions they take. Having solid, irrefu-
table data to substantiate their public accusations against an institution
is crucial to their credibility and success. MAC's organizational structure,
which is so. staffed centered, denies them the power of broad member support
for their public stands on issues. Their position is somewhat vulnerable
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for its solitude. This first step in the confrontation process (problem
identification and substantiation) is therefore most important. MAC's Task
Force approach, which they have used in three of their major projects, has
been an effective tool for assembling credible and accurate data substanti-
ating problems in the delivery of children's services. Their reports on
the State Department of Mental Health, ^ the excluded school age children in
23 24Boston; and the dangers of lead paint poisoning ^ have utilized task force
groups in substantiating allegations about institutional malpractice.
The targets of most MAC confrontations are city and state agencies
who oversee children's services in the Commonwealth. kTien the Center, by
its staff or through one of its task groups, uncovers and substantiates a
problem within one of these agencies, they have enough information to pub-
licly expose the wrong. MAC has built into thier organizational methodology,
however, an intermediary step referred to as "administrative negotiation."
Before publicly accusing the agency of malpractice or neglect, MAC takes
their findings to the agency itself. In most instances, alerting the
administrators to the problems they have uncovered suffices to remedy the
situation. If resistance is met, MAC further notifies the agency of the
steps they will take to force action. Presentation of hard evidence,
^^MAC, Suffer the Children: The Politics of Mental Health in Massa-
chusetts
,
op. cit.
^^The Task Force on Children Out of School, The Way We Go To School :
The Exclusion of Children in Boston , op. cit.
^^MAC, State of Danger; Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning in Massachuseti-s
,
op. cit.
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along with tha recognition of Mac's confrontation potency, is usually
enough to initiate a voluntary solution. There are times, however, when
the agency Ignores this attempt to cooperative resolution. In their re-
port on the dysfunctions within the State Department of Mental Health, for
example, MAC describes in length the meetings held with Department officials.
The report shows the hostility and defensiveness of the Department admini-
strators to mac's evidence and inquiry. When administrative negotlon
proves to be fruitless, follow through confrontation is warranted.
Publicity and public pressure remains MAC's major vehicle for
publicly exposing failure in the child service delivery system is their
publication of comprehensive reports. Coupled with organized releases to
the media, the reports describe in factual detail the failures found within
institution. Their reports have been given wide exposure by newspapers
and television. One reason is the reports themselves, which are compell-
ingly written and graphically sophisticated. Another reason for the generous
media response is the local appeal of their targets and findings. Their v7ork
on the dangers of lead paint poisoning, for example, was of interest to
thousands of parents. Likewise the Center's expose on the use of thera-
peutic drugs on school children caught the attention of a large audience.
Legal expertise within the Center staff allows them to utilize the
courts when other strategies fail to initiate change. They are reluctant
to file suit because of the time and expense it details. It is the practice
of the Center to exhaust all possible administrative remedies before initiat-
^^MAC, Suffer the Children , op. cit., pp. 75-84.
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^
26
court action. MAC has pursued litigation when it becomes clear that a
dysfunctional agency is resisting redress. Two class actions the Center
pursued ware on behalf of developraentally disabled children against the
Boston School Department, the State Department of Education, and the State
Department of Mental Health. In Stewart vs. Phillips et al
,
MAC initiated
a class action against the Boston School Department alleging denial of equal
protection and due process in the placement of, and provision of services
to, children in classes for the mentally retarded in Boston. AMIC vs.
Greenblatt et al was formally filed by the Association for Mentally 111
Children. The suit charges that the Boston School Department and the State
Department of Education and Mental Health fail to provide equal educational
27
services to emotionally disturbed children as a class. \-Ihen the culmina-
tion of the confrontation process is used with restraint and orchestrated
with other MAC strategies, the overall impact is a potent methodology for
change.
There are occasions when MAC projects reveal the need for extended
community services beyond the jurisdiction of public institutions. Examples
include instances where the public needs a better conduit for information
about child services, improved access to service agencies to receive help
for special problems, or the establishment of a new program not provided by
26
MAC, First Annual Report, op. cit. , p. 18,
27
Ibid.
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public or private institutions. MAC’s Annual Report offers some examples
of their work in program development. While functioning as the Task Force
on Children Out of School, it was discovered that there was no orderly
vehicle for individual parents to seek help from the Boston Public School
System. In response, the Task Force established the alliance for coordinated
services. The alliance consists of thirty—seven agencies in the Roxbury-
North Dorchester area of Boston which, together with school officials and
parents, provide services to individual children and address school problems
which limit the educational opportunities of children. The alliance is com-
posed of fourteen separate councils, eight at the elementary level and six
at the middle or junior high level. Some councils focus primarily on ser-
vice issues—tutoring, health care, counseling; Others concentrate mainly
on programs—dental care, sickle cell anemia testing, and recreation. In
July 1973, the alliance became a separate, independent organization. The
Center helped the alliance to incorporate, to establish its own board, and
28
to obtain local funding. It now has a staff of six full-time persons.
In another case, MAC's inability to lobby for the special education
law they helped draft led to helping formulate the Coalition for Special
Education. This body was comprised of the plethora of state groups who were
working locally for special needs children. "Tlie coalition was instrumental
in passage of the new act” (Chapter 766).^^ The coalition continues to func
tion as a "watch-dog” of the law’s implementation.
^^Ibid
.
,
p . 13
.
29
Ibid., p. 18.
- 127-
This coalition concept was also utilized as a follow-up on the lead
paint poisoning issue MAC helped to expose.^® In these and other areas,
the Center has worked to provide for the delivery of children's services
independently when other mechanisms are not appropriate or practical. It
is a part of their organizational methodology for change.
Constituency Identification and Participation
An earlier section pointed out that the MAC staff has total control
over determining projects the Center will undertake. This effectively sums
up the latter point of the present consideration, i.e., constituency parti-
cipation. The organization's methodological process is reserved exclusively
for the Center's staff. This is not necessary because the staff consciously
decided to function in this way. The reason might be tied to the other
part of this section—constituency identification. Neither MAC literature
nor interviewed staff clearly identify who, in fact, MAC represents. Re-
ferences to "children" permeat MAC's rationale, but there is no clear de-
lineation of how this population participates in the determination of issue
priority.
The established goals of the Center minimize the problemmatic in-
consistency that often occurs when a constituency has no direct vehicle for
participation in the organization's decision-making process. Their focus
liAC, Suffer the Children, op. cit.
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is on the quality and even distribution of publicly provided services for
children in the state of Massachusetts. This narrowed scope carves out
the appropriate population and draws parameters for their role. The re-
striction on lobbying precludes their involvement in prioritizing new
areas of child needs which would require knowing what the constituency
needs and wants. When ad advocacy group is pursuing this agenda, the
absence of strong public participation in their decision-making poses
a fundamental contradiction within their organizational model. MAC,
however, does not purport to be engaged in the determination of unanswered
public needs. It, therefore, can operate with limited constituent in-
volvement and still logically claim that they are representing, or advo-
cating for children in the state.
This present model of staff-centered organization will be phased
out over the next two years. MAC has begun working toward establishing a
membership organization.^^ The financial benefits are clearly one reason
as pointed out in the section on funding. A more compelling reason is the
political potency of an organization that lays claim to a large member con-
stituency. While there was no suggestion of relinquishing their federal
tax exempt status, MAC, as a membership organization, would have impressible
lobbying power in the legislature. If MAC intends to pursue the membership
model, it is conceivable that the Center will in fact either surrender the
tax protection or seek a tax exemption with permission to pursue legislation.
^Hiac, Second Annual Report , op. cit.
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MAC could become one of the state's leading lobbyists for children's Issues.
MAC would, under their anticipated structure, develop a visible defineable
,
constituency for whom the Center would speak and advocate.
®^8^*^^2ational Evaluation Components
MAC has no defined, systematic method of self-evaluation. While there
may be an informal process of organizational evaluation there is no obser-
vable evidence available. Staff members work with all Center projects and
are involved in planning and strategy sessions. In addition, contact is
maintained with Board members about the progress of activities and the
proposals for new projects. In this way, the evaluation of their work is
continuous through the interchange within the staff, and between the staff,
the Board, and other involved parties, such as task force members, con-
sultants, etc.
The recognition of their own political vulnerability serves as a
basis for careful planning and project implementation. The problem with
an informal self-evaluation system is that it can allow situations to go
astray. One such incidence occurred in the Center's efforts to monitor
compliance with the implementation of Chapter 766. After investigating
how each city and town in Massachusetts was spending state allocated money
for special education, MAC released a statement charging 15 cities and
towns with diverting a total of $2 million of a $26 million allocation to
non-educational purposes. The accusation received wide exposure in the
32
press, and heated reaction from the communities named. In most instances,
32
Cindy Weiss, "City Protests Accusations of Fund Misuse," Daily
Hampshire Gazette
,
January 14, 1975, p. 1.
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it was learned that the allegations were not true. Complicated municipal
budget procedures, confused answers to MAC Inquiries, and lack of Informa-
tion combined to create a major embarrassment for the Center. MAC for-
warded letters of explanation and apology to the cities and towns mistakenly
33
accused. but their credibility was hurt by the error. It was caused, in
part, by MAC’s failure to follow their own prescribed methodology. MAC
usually engages in administrative negotiation to attempt to seek resolution
of a problem. In this case the omission of this step was a costly and
embarrassing error.
The lack of a systematic organizational evaluation procedure in-
creases the possibility of project malfunction, as was found with the
special education statement. A careful review of a report’s procedure,
data and interpretations would have avoided such an occurrence.
Major Activities and Accomplishments
The six priorities that the Center defines for itself serve as a
basis for presenting their "major activities and accomplishments."
1. Right to Education. This priority began with the Task Force
on Children Out of School. MAC has monitored compliance with the
Bilingual Education Act which they helped to draft. They have
challenged the Boston Public Schools on numerous occasions and
succeeded in forcing the system to spend $400,00 for Bilingual
(and Special) Education programs.
^^Interview with Barry Hock, MAC staff. May 5, 1975.
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In their child advocacy units, MAC received nearly 200 referrals
from children excluded from school or denied appropriate services
34
'within school. Of these, MAC helped 92% to be reinstated or to
35
receive services tney were denied. For the thousands of other
children in the state who do not utilize the advocacy unit, the
Center collaborated with the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute to
36publish 10,000 copies of an education handbook. Making School
Work serves three purposes
:
To describe the obligation of schools to children they serve; to
describe practical steps to obtain educational rights; and to
prevent denial of educational opportunities by informing of
officials of their responsibilities under the law.^7
Under the "right to education" priority, MAC worked on behalf of
the special needs children who were involuntarily excluded from
school. Through their efforts, the Alliance for Coordinated Ser-
vices was founded as a child referral agency.
MAC worked for a more accurate identification of the state's eli-
gibility for school population. They convinced the Department of
Education to create the Task Force on School Attendance Census.
The body of state and local officials, parents and MAC staff repre-
^^Ibid.
,
p. 12.
^^MAC, First Annual Report , op. cit., p. 13.
^^MAC & Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Making School
Work:
__^
Education Handbook for Students, Parents, and Professionaj^, op. ext.
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sentatives developed a draft of census regulations for the Connnissioner
and Board of Education. These stiff, mandatory regulations were pro-
mulgated as a result of Center pressure on the Board.
In the area of school records on students, MAC initiated an effort
to draft new regulations concurrent with a legislative mandate on
the Department of Education to do the same. In 1973, the Legislature
enacted a law that eliminated the school's right to maintain secret
records on individual students. These records often contained hear-
say information, irrelevant personal matters, or other damaging docu-
ments and information.
Under this priority, MAC is currently preparing reports on the
schools' system of classification and tracking, disciplinary poli-
cies, and exclusion. They are also preparing a report on vocational
education in the state.
2. Special Education. MAC was involved from the beginning in the
passage of Chapter 766, the state's special education law. They have
been actively and continuously leading the state in monitoring com-
pliance with the law by the cities and to\ms. The Center helped
to establish, and now works with, the coalition for Special Educa-
tion as they systematically investigate and evaluate implementation
of the statute.
3. Child Health: Mental and Physical. Two activities
dominated
the Center's agenda under this priority. First,
MAC has taken
the lead in exposing the dangers, especially to
children, of lead
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paint poisoning in Massachusetts. It is estimated that in
Massachusetts alone, 20,000 children are lead poisoned and
nearly "75,000 children under the age of six are living at
38
risk of lead poisoning." Their report precipitated more
conscious attention by the state to enforcing a 1971 federal
law designed to address this hazard. A second area of child
health MAC pursued was the dysfunctions of the State Department
39
of Mental Health. Following publication of their report,
the Commissioner of Mental Health resigned. The Center parti-
cipated in the selection process for a new Commissioner by
working on the revision of job qualifications (heretofore
limiting candidacy to psychiatrists). Upon selection of the
new Commissioner, Mft.C maintained close contact with the De-
partment as both a "watch-dog" and a cooperative partner.
4. Protection of Children Used as Research Subjects. A growing
trend toward using psychotropic drugs for the "treatment" of
"socially maladjusted" school children is a major concern of
the Center. The National Institute of Mental Health sponsored
an experimental program in Boston that MAC discovered and
vigorously opposed. Their work resulted in the passage of a
regulating the use of such drugs for individual medical
needs
.
^SlAC, State of Danger. Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning
in
Massachusetts , op. cit., p. 17.
^^HAC, Suffer the Children , op. cit.
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On another related front, Mac's exposure of a threat to the civil
liberties of juveniles by a federal drug program won another
vxctory. The Client Oriented Data Acquisition Processing Program
(CODAP) called for computerized information on potentially delin-
quent children. Failure to cooperate carried the threat of losing
federal drug education grants. When Boston began to capitulate to
these requirements (for fear of losing $1,200,000 in drug treatment
funds), MAC stepped into the controversy. After securing support
from state officials
,
a coalition of eight legal organizations
assembled by the Center obtained veto power over the CODAP Program
in Massachusetts.
5. Juvenile Justice System: Standards and Services. The Massa-
chusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS) became the first youth
system in the nation to eliminate institutions for children under
their jurisdiction. MAC interested other organizations in support
of this reorganization. They have actively evaluated and monitored
the deinstitutionalization of DYS, and continue to work with its
administrators in developing new, substitute programs for the
departments wards
.
6. Access to Public Information. Nineteen seventy-three and
nineteen seventy-four witnessed important legislation in the
Congress and Massachusetts pertaining to public access to public
information. The state's omnibus legislation. The Freedom of
Information Act," was modeled after the federal legislation.
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Pursuant to these statutes, MAC has become increasingly involved
in monitoring compliance by various record-keepers on children.
After a fruitless seven month battle through the state's admini-
stration appellate process to force release of the results of a
statewide fourth grade reading test, MAC went to the press with
the matter. This pressure forced a new hearing by the Commissioner
of Education and the scores were finally released.
The Center has also worked to inform parents of their right to
review records on their children by schools, the courts and
government agencies. In their handbook on education, MAC devoted
a section advising parents of their rights and instructing on pro-
40
cedures to force recognition of those rights.
The Massachusetts Advocacy Center has been a prolific public informer
about need reform of public bureaucratic institutions. The above are high-
lights of their active agenda.
^^MAC and MCRI, Making School Work, op. cit., pp. 50-55.
CHAPTER IV
THE ADVOCACY GROUP AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
APPLICATION TO URBAiJ EDUCATION
Organizational Structure
^
Among the criterions used for judging the effectiveness of the
organization’s structures are: The degree to which decision-making is
centralized; the autonomy of the groups; and the communication mechanisms
within the organization.^
Common Cause (CC)
CC's Governing Board structure maintains a highly centralized
procedure for both tactical (daily) and strategic (long-range) decision-
making. The departmentalization of tasks and responsibilities shows CC
is a hierarchical structure where all decisions are tightly monitored by
the President and the Board.
With their program funding coming from their o\m constituency's
contributions, CC is a highly autonomous organization. All matters of
funding, goal-setting, project implementation, etc., are controlled by
the structure itself.
^James L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness (Homewood, Illinois
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 60, 96, 163.
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CC s conscientious attendance to dissemination of information to ail
components of their organization indicates a high degree of communication.
Report From Washington and Frontline publications keep the staff and
constituency abreast of most developments CC relates to as an organization.
In addition, the decision-making control exercised by the Board insures a
constant flow of information throughout CC.
The analysis of the organizational structure of CC produced no
concrete evidence of weakness. With tight controls on budget and program
decisions, and a prolific communications system, CC has developed an effec-
tive format for their operation.
Massachusetts Public Interest
Research Group (MassPIRG)
The Board of Directors' power over strategic decisions indicates
high centralization within Mass PIRG's long-range program. Major projects
cannot proceed without their study and approval. This centralization mini-
mizes the chance of rash implementation of poorly conceived or ill-timed
projects*
Mass PIRG is highly autonomous in both its funding and program
development. The organization is not responsible to anyone beyond their
constituency, nor is it dependent on any other agency.
Mass PIRG does not have a centralized system for tactical decision-
making. Once a project has been approved by the Board, the staff has the
power to act freely in carrying out the details of implementation. Daily
actions are not monitored thus increasing the probability of tactical errors
by individual staff members.
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Massachusetts Advocacy Center (MAC)
MAC s organization is the most centralized of the three groups
studied. The Board of Directors functions in little more than name, and
their staff has complete control over tactical decisions. While reliance
on outside funding sources limits their power and strategic decisions, MAC
operates every facet of their programs autonomously.
Although MAC has a centralized system of strategic decision-making,
they are limited in their range of issues because of their financial de-
pendency. mac’s fiscal resources are provided by large corporate contri-
butions making MAC the least autonomous of the groups.
Unlike CC and PIRG, MAC has no membership to serve as a primary
constituency. Their communication system is therefore limited to the in-
formal interactions within the staff. This lack of systematic communica-
tion, coupled with the absence of program monitoring, presents the danger
2
of errors in project conceptualization and implementation.
Organizational Goals and Organizational Mechanism
for Institutional Change
The advocacy groups analyzed all have strong, clearly identified
organizational goals. Hie primary basis for evaluating their goals and
change mechanism is the congruence, priority, and conformity of their
^For example, MAC "Organizational Evaluation Components".
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ideology as expressed through those goals. The more the organization's
priorities meld with those of the public—at—large
,
the more achievable
4
are their goals
.
Common Cause
The CC Constituency consists of predominantly white and middle
class citizens, who represent the dominant faction of the American public.
CC's ideology thus finds wide support among the population. Accountability
within the government is an important public priority since the "Watergate
Scandal" of the Nixon administration and this is a stated goal of Common
Cause. Their other goals, including environmental safety, effective energy
policies, and consumer protection, are also congruent with public priori-
ties. Armed with objectives which conform to public priorities, CC approaches
the decision-making process with a strong and pursuasive voice. CC insures
the potency of their organization by providing broad input to their goal
setting process, and selecting issues reflecting the sentiments of a signi-
ficant portion of the population.
The care with which CC objectives are matched to constituent pri-
orities effectively minimizes the chances of superfluous pursuits and
disjointed goals. The weaknesses in CC's organizational goals are minimal.
^James Price, op. cit., p. 104. Priorities are defined as "beliefs
publicly expressed."
^Ibid
.
uo-
Maas PIRG
The constituency represented by Mass PIRG is essentially the same
as that of Common Cause. The focus of PIRG goals have been centered
around consumer and environmental issues. They have also established
objectives which coincide with a broad segment of the population. Their
ideology is consistent with the priorities of their constituency, for
example, advocating caution with nuclear power and pressuring the business
community to comply with fair market practices. With a membership limited
to college students, their impact on decision-makers is not as potent as
that of Conunon Cause. Nevertheless, the PIRG "secondary” or "assumed"
constituency is theoretically closely aligned ideologically to the Common
Cause membership.^ Their organizational goals and mechanism for institu-
tional change, which closely conform with the priorities of a sizable
populus
,
are indicative of their probably effectiveness as a social reform
advocacy group.
Tlie clarity of PIRG's goals and their conformity to a broad consti-
tuency provide evidence of PIRG’s effectiveness in this area. The support
for PIRG's priorities is not as verifiable as it is with Common Cause,
which points to over 300,000 persons for goal ratification. There is,
however, enough evidence through PIRG's achievements to warrant a positive
evaluation of their goals and change mechanism as it relates to constituent
priorities
.
^See Chapter III, Conunon Cause "Constituency Identification
and
Participation."
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MAC
mac’s ideology is the most strongly expressed of the three groups.
Their goals are developed by their ovm staff, yet are clear and defintive.
With a focus on childrens’ issues, MAC’s objectives are congruent with
public priorities which are sympathetic to childrens' advocates. The con-
stituency MAC typically represents is unlike those of Common Cause or Mass
PIRG. While it is not easily identified, MAC’s constituency is generally
a disenfranchised poor and minority populus. This is evident by the issues
they pursue. Their work against the mislabeling of special needs children,
for example, centers on urban areas where poor and minority children are
the most frequent victims of such abuses.^ Their organizational goals and
change mechanism find support from both the poor and minority urban popula-
tion whose concerns they most often represent, and to a lesser degree the
more affluent sectors of the populus who are sympathetic to most of their
positions
.
The target of most MAC challenges are public agencies and their
decision-makers. By representing a politically powerless constituency
in most instances, MAC is hampered by the lack of active constituent input
to their goal-setting process. Although they evoke sympathy from a wide
public, mac’s objectives do not always conform to those issues influential
citizens pressure decision-makers about. Consequently, MAC more often
engages in confrontation strategies than the other advocacy groups in
order to achieve their stated objectives. They cannot rely on aroused
^Current evidential data on special needs children in
Massachusetts
were analyzed in Peter Willner's, Chapter 766 of the Laws of
th^Com^2^a_jd-
of Massachusetts: Implications for . Urban_J^c^i^ (Unpublished docto
dissertation; Amherst, University of Massachusetts, 1974), pp.
16 21.
-142-
participation by a powerful constituency in their efforts to induce change.
An important careful usage, then, is the absence of a clear correlation
between MAC's goals and the support each goal will find with the public-
support which is crucial to achieving those goals.
Staffing
Determining the effectiveness of an organization's staffing is
based on its suitability to meeting the group's objectives. The three
advocacy groups are therefore evaluated on their division of labor; the
degree to which tasks are departmentalized; the degree to which decision-
making is "rational-legal," i.e., assigned to specified roles; the level
of horizontal communication; and the "spatial mobility" of the staff, i.e.,
the ability of staff to systematically move from one role to another as
their skills can be applied to differing needs.
^
Common Cause
The division of labor and the departmentalization of tasks is most
pronounced in the Common Cause organization model. Every staff memoer
functions within one department pursuing specific tasks. CC s decision-
making is highly "rational-legal." The staff in the Personnel Office, for
example, has limited interaction with the staff in the Legislation Office.
Each department has designated tasks and specific decision-making responsi-
bilities.® The departments, while distinct and separate, are not
isolated
^Jaraes Price, op. cit., pp. 16, 24, 55, 167 and 192.
®See Chapter III, "Common Cause Organization.
'
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entirely from each other. CC has a fairly high level of horizontal communi-
cation allowing each office access to information about overall operations.
Through staff meetings and written communications, the staff is kep informed
of the progress of CC programs.
The division of work in CC insures efficient management of projects.
The liability of this departmentalization is the rigidity of the roles indi-
vidual staff members assume. The staff's low spatial mobility tends to freeze
individuals in their specialized roles. It becomes difficult in this kind of
system for the Legislation Director, for example, to collaborate his percep-
tions to the maximum degree on organizational needs with the Personnel Office.
CC's scheme minimizes the benefits to be gained by allowing the staff to
share a sense of total project development and implementation.^
Mass PIRG
The hierarchical control exerted over major group projects in PIRG
indicates a fairly high level of rational-legal decision-making. Although
it is a more flexible system than Common Cause, PIRG's staff does work under
guidelines of individual role responsibility. The real strength of the PIRG
staff is in the role mobility allowed each individual. Each staff member
participates to varying degrees in each group orject while still assigning
final responsibility to one or two people. This provides for maximum use
of total staff talent and helps generate fluid horizontal communication.
^Ibid,
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Mass PIRG staff members, while assigned some specific responsibilities,
do not always maintain clarity in their roles. PIRG's role flexibility is
an asset to a degree. However, the lack of a clear division of labor risks
confusion in project progression. Aligned with the danger is the absence of
any departmentalization of tasks. In an organization such as PIRG, where
the issues and goals are diverse and encompassing, the ability to monitor the
competencies of the group’s personnel and evaluate the development of projects
is hindered.
MAC
The staff of MAC has the highest degree of spatial mobility of the
three groups. Each individual actively participates and shares in the direc-
tion of every project. An issue being pursued by MAC follows no consistent
pattern in individuals to roles on vice versa. Every staff member has input
to decision-making. The responsibilities a staff member assumes depends on
the project, its needs, and the time the individual has to offer. Conse-
quently, there is a very high level of horizontal communication in MAC.
Each worker maintains a sharp sense of the total organization, its programs,
and the direction of the group.
MAC has almost no departmentalization. The decision-making process
is therefore nebulous and ill—defined in MAC. There is division of wortc,
but it follows no set pattern. The role a staff memoer assumes depends
on the individual project, the x/orkload distribution at the time of imple
mentation, and the willingness of the person to take a leadership role for
that specific project. It is difficult to determine who is in charge of
what program at any given time. The dangers in such a confused
staff scheme
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are that active responsibility for a project by an individual is often missing,
leadership in a project is not always correspondent to competency and unclear
decision-making authority increases the probability of error.
Organization and/or Project Funding
Fiscal stability is critical for any non-profit organization. Without
dependable financial support, the resources necessary to function effectively,
such as competent professional staff, administrative material, etc., cannot
be found. For an advocacy group, there is a second significance in funding.
Given the often controversial nature of their work, the advocacy group needs
funding which is free from restrictions. Support which demands or expects
certain organizational behaviors in return limits the effectiveness of the
group. This analysis will use the "autonomy" of the organization as a basis
,
10
for evaluating their funding sources.
Common Cause
Common Cause is funded almost totally by the small contributions
of its over 325,000 members. By generating their resources from such
solicitation, CC has a very high degree of autonomy for an advocacy organiza-
tion. With members providing the impetus for CC's actions through referenda,
the Governing Board assumes responsibility for the use of their monies.
The
funds are raised with few restrictions on how they are to be used, or
on the
nature of the issues they support or challenge.
James Price, op. cit., p. 96.
^^See Chapter III, Common Cause "Organization and/or
Project Funding
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A problemmatlc weakness in the CC funding system is their need to
expend a substantial portion of their budget on generating new funds.
With 25 cents from every dollar directed toward sustaining financial support
CC finds a large share of its energies diverted away from their primary
objectives
.
Mass PIRG
As a membership organization, Mass PIRG’s funding comes from the
small dues of the constituency. PIRG enjoys a high level of organizational
autonomy for two key reasons: First, their use of college and university
record systems allov/s ready access to a membership body with little cost.
PIRG does not use its resources for recruitment or fund-raising. Secondly,
the Board of Directors and professional staff have wide latitude in defin-
ing issues and determining expenditures for the organization. There are
virtually no restrictions on their budget from outside sources.
PIRG's funding mechanism provides a lucrative source of revenue
that is easily collected. The annual membership fee of four dollars is
low and presents a minimal burden on the students. The one perceivable
weakness in their model is the same as that in Common Cause: The expense
necessitated in the accountability to membership process. While it is a
much preferred system philosophically, the need to interact with a large
membership group drains resources. Beyond this minor drawback, PIRG's
funding is reliable and strong.
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MAC
The problem of accountability to a membership in CC and Mass PIRG
does not exist for MAC. There is no formal or informal monitoring of group
goals and strategies to occupy staff time. With funds eminating solely from
corporate and philanthropic grants, MAC enjoys high autonomy at one level:
budgeting their resources, or organizational management autonomy. While
they are plagued with no interference in developing their budget, MAC has
more limited autonomy in goal-setting and organization! direction. The
reliance on grants and donations in large amounts is dependent on the bene-
factor’s belief in MAC’s work. Their often challenging posture narrows the
range of willing supporters. As a result, MAC exerts much of its energy
seeking new sources of money, and cajoling prospective givers who are unsure
of mac's purpose and tactics.
Another important limitation in operating with grants is the neces-
sity to pre-determine allocation -of certain parts of the money. Although the
actual dispersal of funds is performed without interference, identification
of budget categories is usually demanded. An advocacy group may not know
at the outset, for example, how many staff members will be needed to imple-
ment a project. Yet securing funds will usually require them to decide this
figure at the proposal stage.
Issue Identification
Advocacy groups purporting to represent the public interest
need
a mechanism for determining what that interest is, and a
rationale for
identifying issues they pursue. For membership advocacy
groups, the means
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for determining constituent priorities is available. Without a membership,
an advocacy group operates on the assumption that they can identify valid
public needs to represent. This is a contradiction when an advocacy group
claims to represent the public interest and in fact acts on one particular
point of view. School integration offers one example. Because the public
is polarized on this issue, an advocacy group defined as representing the
public interest is denied a logical stand on forced busing to achieve
balance in schools. There is no simple public interest in that case.
While the underlying purpose of an advocacy group
,
whether recognized or
not, is a special interest representative, advocacy methodology can be
successful in effecting change regardless of the organization's sense of
purpose or issue identification procedure. The issue identification of
the groups under scrutiny will be evaluated on the basis of the representa-
tion which operates in arriving at their goal determination.
Common Cause
Common Cause has the strongest vehicle for securing input from
members on their priority concerns. CC is also the most energetic group
in searching out member concerns on issues. Their "Referendum on Issues
conducted periodically allows CC to connect their activities in reform advo-
cacy with a clear and stated public mandate. .Uthough the Governing
Board
is responsible for the final shaping of the CC stand on these
issues, there
is no evidence of conflict between their interpretation
of constituent
interests and referenda results.
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There is no available information which would suggest any contradic-
tion between CC issues and their members' priorities. Although there are
often suggestions for CC activities forwarded by members which conflict with
other member sentiments, an advocacy group could never hope to resolve such
diversity at every turn, t^ile this is a weakness, it it one that vexes
every democratic process
.
Mass PIRG
PIRG's issue identification process is not as participatory as
that of Common Cause. As a membership organization, however, there are
ample opportunities for constituent input to goal-setting. Tne key differ-
ence is that PIRG members must initiate such participation on their own.
Member initiative will be honored in PIRG, but the group does not develop
such interest to the same degree as CC. PIRG's greater strength is that
for those members who do not avail their energies, they can participate
in issue determination in depth. Through their "cookbook" activity,
PIRG members not only help define an issue, but become responsible for
13designing and implementing a project to attack the issue.
The power PIRG staff members have over decision-making and setting
direction for projects suggests the possibility that member priorities
may not always be reflected in PIRG activities. While there is no clear
evidence that this has happened, PIRG's full-time staff makes all daily
^^See Chapter III, Mass PIRG: "Issue Identification."
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decialona with only limited conaiderationa for constituent concerns. There
is no process for solicitating board member opinion on what issues PIRG
should pursue or on how they feel about project implementation.
MAC
There are no contributing members in MAC. In addition, the Board
of Directors functions in name only.^^ Consequently, all issues are identi-
fied by the professional staff. As previously stated, the "advocacy method-
ology can be successful in affecting change regardless of the organization's
sense of purpose or issue identification procedure
. The strength of
mac's issue identification process is not in its consistency with their
purpose as a public interest group, but the efficiency with \>7hich they can
pursue projects. The staff has complete responsibility for deciding goals.
Their strength is in the freedom they have to determine their objectives
and strategies.
Another strength of MAC's issue identification is the uniqueness
of the issues themselves. Tliey are the only group which concentrates on
problems affecting poor and minority people, particularly those in urban
areas. By limiting their work to challenging public agencies to provide
equitable distribution of services, MAC does not purport to define new
areas of public need. They are committed to insuring delivery of services
based on already identified needs.
^^See Chapter III, MAC" Issue Identification."
15
See Page 148.
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MAC functions completely on the essumptlon that their issues ate con-
sistent With public priorities. With a constituency defined as "children."
connecting client priorities with organizational objectives is indeed a pre-
carious process for MAC. MAC's major weakness in issue identification is
their inability to conclusively demonstrate that they are advocating for
children-at-large in Massadxusetts
.
Methodologies
This category addresses the most important organizational component
for the purpose of this study. It is the generalizability of advocacy
methods, and the replicability of their strategies that is most useful for
the application of these techniques to change in urban education. The
following is an evaluation of the groups’ methodologies in a form consistent
with the total organizational analysis. Further treatment of these method-
ologies as they can be applied to urban education will be developed later
in the chapter.
The basis for analysis of methodologies is the completeness of the
group's change mechanism. Representing constituent interests can consist
of lobbying, confrontation strategies, service evaluation, or program
development. Tlie strength of organized advocacy is the ability to utilize
all of these mechanisms in a synthesized and synchronzied fashion.
Common Cause
All' three groups studied have impressive, effective methodologies
for change. CC utilizes three elements and has the strongest synthesis
in its methodology. Tliere is a high degree of integration between their
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service evaluation or monitoring process, lobbying activities, and confronta-
tion strategies. CC’s experience has shown that by vigorously monitoring
government processes, for example, the need for active lobbying has decreased.
As decision-makers have become aware of CC's influence and effectiveness,
they are more respondent to the CC position on various issues. Further, the
success CC has enjoyed when they have lobbied Congress has reduced their
need for frequent confrontations with decision-makers.^^ This pattern has
resulted in CC being involved in fewer instances of publicly challenging
public officials. It is indicative of the success of CC's methodology which
has earned them wide respect in five years.
Tne one gap in CC's methodology is in program development. CC is
usually in a reactive position on issues whereby they support or oppose a
proposed action, or develop a remedy to an identified social ill. CC does
not seek out new avenues for improving social conditions. For example,
they do not participate in the development of programs aimed at clearning
the environment, but respond to the proposals of others having an impact
on the environment whether positive or adverse. This gap is not a signi-
ficant weakness in the organizational methodology. By not directing ener-
gies toward developing new programs related to their commitments, CC is
missing an opportunity to round out their service delivery to their consti-
tuents .
Mass PIRG
PIRG's methodology is very similar to that of Common Cause. Each
of the elements PIRG includes has been developed into a successful effec-
^^See Chapter III, Common Cause: "Methodologies.”
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tiv6 component. PIRG s organizational methodology is more comprehensive
than that of Common Cause. PIRG engages in service evaluation, lobbying,
confrontation strategies, and program development. They have a more com-
plete arsenal of strategies than either CC or MAC.
The PIRG methodology is not as highly synthesized and integrated
as Common Cause. There is little sequence to their follow-through on
issues. Monitoring and evaluating services is not as systematically con-
nected to lobbying efforts. There is some integration between their evalua-
tion and confrontation functions, but this is not a predictable or consis-
tent process. Aside from the lack of strong methodological synthesis,
PIRG’s overall program is disjointed at times. With a strong staff hold-
ing virtually all decision-making power, there is little evidence suggest-
ing collaboration among projects. Pursual of programs involves decisions
made as need arises with little planning or consultation. Despite a
successful methodology, PIRG activities lack the organization and careful
planning evident in Common Cause.
MAC
The focus of MAC advocacy methodology is distinct from both CC
and PIRG. MAG's strategy elements are not highly synthesized, but their
individual activities are the most vigorously pursued of the three groups.
mac's service evaluation process, confrontation activities, and
program
development component are stronger when compared individually
with simi-
lar elements in the other two organizations. Tae depth of
I-h\C's investi-
gations into services is significantly greater than PIRG's
and more meti-
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cuious than the CC’s. They have been involved in more confrontations than
either group by repeatedly exposing in the press institutional malpractice.
MAC has also been involved in more litigation than the other two organiza-
tions.^^
mac's activities have included program development to a substantial
18degree. They have often organized collaborations which provide for the
independent delivery of services when there is no public source for them.
The two key weaknesses in the MAC methodology are the absence of
lobbying activities and the lack of strong integration among their methodo-
logical elements. MAC s inability to influence legislation places them at
the disadvantage of having to respond to already completed decisions. The
result is that when the legislature creates programs that counter to MAC's
ideology, there are powerless to fight for amendment or abolition. They
are relegated to public criticism or working around the program.
The lack of synthesis in their methodology is not as problematic
in MAC as it is with PIRG. The power that is centralized in the MAC staff
provides opportunities for strategy coordination, but it often does not
materialize. There are so few clear delineations of decision-making re-
sponsibility within their staff that MAC's programs risk becoming disjointed.
Their embarrassing and erroneous accusation of misappropriation of special
education funds by Massachusetts cities and towns was an example of this
lack of coordination.
^^See MAC investigative reports detailed in Chapter III, MAC
"Major Activities and Accomplishments."
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Constituency Identification and Participation
Advocacy groups are often guilty of acting contrary to the purpose
they expound for their organization. Claiming to represent the "public
interest by acting for change on their behalf is contradictory because
there is no unified public interest. An advocacy group represents the
view of a constituency which may have popular sympathy, but never total
support by the public-at-large. Identifying a constituency for whom to
advocate becomes increasingly important when the issues are controversial.
In such matters the advocacy group represents one of usually many sides of
the public's opinions. Constituent participation in formulating organiza-
tional policy is the most effective vehicle to identify for whom the group
speaks. The three groups being analyzed will be evaluated on the clarity
with which their constituency is identified, and the dgree to which they
are participants in decision-making. The basis for this evaluation is
both the level and type of constituent representation evident in organiza-
19
tional processes. The degree of vertical communication within those
20
processes is also a significant factor.
Common Cause
The membership of Common Cause is the largest of the three
groups at over 325,000 citizens. Despite the size of the organization,
the CC membership is the most clearly defined and most highly
represented
constituency found in the study. The CC membership is the group's
prim.ary
James Price, Organizational Effectiveness , op. cit., p.
116.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 167.
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constituency and by participating in the goal-setting process through
the Referendum on Issues," their priorities are vividly reflected in the
CC goals and objectives.
Another significant strength of the group is the prolific vertical
communication through CC publications. Members receive numerous data about
activities, program progress reports, and other information filtered down
from the CC headquarters. The Report from Washington and Frontline news-
letters join a plethora of memoranda, letters, and reports which constantly
inform members of CC work and induce further, less passive participation
in local activities.
The state affiliates provide still another avenue in CC for con-
stituent participation. State-level activities provide innumerable oppor-
tunities for members to contact decision-makers on behalf of the CC posi-
tion, or volunteer to work in the local CC office. CC has maximized
participation by a well-defined constituency.
The available evidence indicates CC has a solid rationale for
advocacy with a clear grasp of whom they represent. Issues are readily
connected to the stated priorities of their members. With so many oppor-
tunities for constituent participation in goal-setting and implementation
processes, CC is strong in all aspects of this area.
Mas s P IRC
PIRG is also a membership organization with an identifiable con-
stituency. Its members can actively participate in goal-setting to
some
degree and project implementation to a very high degree. Students are
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sought to develop projects and are provided with professional assistance
in carrying out those projects. While their information dissemination is
not as voluminous as CC's, their Mass PIRG Reports newsletter keeps members
up to date on group activities and project progress. PIRG's system of
constituent participation and vertical communication is a major organiza-
tional strength.
PIRG staff members, who hold major decision-making power in the
organization, tend to neglect the priorities of their key constituency of
students. They opt instead to act on issues perceived to be aligned with
21
a larger, Nader-oriented audience. The problem is that these priorities
can, at times, conflict with those of their student supporters. Further,
they are at a loss to substantiate that these priorities in fact have wide
support among a larger constituency. For example, PIRG used its resources
to help defeat a proposal for construction of a highway through Western
Massachusetts. With no student members from the affected area, it is
unlikely that this was a major priority of the PIRG membership. In addi-
tion, there is no evidence to suggest that PIRG used any means to determine
the sentiment of people who would have been most affected by the construc-
tion. PIRG’s assumption that they were acting in the "public interest"
is questionable. This incident is indicative of the danger an advocacy
group risks with a poorly defined constituency.
21
Ibid.
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MAC
There is limited evidence of strength in MAC's constituency
identification and participation. James Price’s research contends that
an organization can be effective with representation by an "elite consti-
tuency." This is one area of strength in the MAC scheme. They have
gathered support for their work among a diverse group of community and
state leaders, as well as people of notariety from ost of the professions.
bactic of assembling taks forces to participate in their investiga-
tive and confrontation activities is a good example of this. As a result,
MAC has shown itself to be a potent agent for change in urban problems.
Without the support of this select clientele, however, it is unlikely MAC
22would have achieved as much as they have in two years.
MAC is the only non-membership organization studied. The most
fundamental weakness is the vagueness of their constituency. Identified
as "children," MAC functions on the presumption that they do in fact speak
for a broad segment of this group. MAC has little evidence justifying
their stand on many issues they pursue. They are not able to point to
any group and verify that they represent them. The priorities MAC deter-
mines are done so without any connection to the priorities of a constituency.
While the issues they engage are usually significant. MAC’s inability to
connect them to a stated public need hinders their credibility as an ad-
vocacy organization.
^^See Chapter III, MAC: "Major Activities and Accomplishments."
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with no membership, MAC has no vertical communication. They inform
their public through the exposure their work receives in the media. MAC
has virtually no participation by anyone from their loosely defined constl-
tuency. Most of the volunteers working for them are students, and Task
Force members are typically a collection of influential citizens represent-
ing the professional community.
The activities of MAC have earned them a reputation as a tenacious
and confronting organization. As long as the issues they pursue find
some public sympathy MAC is ill-defined but effective. The dangerous
flaw is that such issues are decided by their own staff and can be carried
out to affect change even without any broad public support. The title
of advocacy group is thus of questionable justification for MAC.
Organizational Evaluation Components
The process of organizational internal evaluation is not systematic
in any of the groups investigated. The basis for analyzing the evaluation
components that do exist is the type of internal communication the group
uses. The communication system shows how information flows through the
organization, and, consequently, how critical the self-inspection process
can possibly be. Price’s work suggests that communications systems which
are instrumental (transmit cognitive information), personal (exchanged in
face-to—face interaction)
,
and formal (official transmission of information)
are more effective than those which are expressive (transmit normative or
23
affective information), impersonal, and informal.
^^James Price, Organizational Effectiveness , op. cit.
,
pp. 175-177
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Common Cause
CC's internal communication system is the most sophisticated of
the three organizations. With their departmentalized structure and marked
division of labor, their system is highly formal. The limited spatial
mobility of the CC staff also necessitates an instrumental form of communi-
cation. CC is the best able to evaluate their operation because of the
fluid exchange of information required in a large, departmentalized organize'
tion. Their Governing Board’s active m.onitoring of programs requires staff
members to keep them well informed and respond readily to their mandates.
The result is that CC has not been guilty of serious persistent program-
matic errors.
The only clear weakness in the CC internal communications system
is that there is only minimal information transmitted personally. With
such a comprehensive, diverse staff, constant face-to-face interaction is
impractical. This limits their ability to enjoy a free and in-depth ex-
change of information, viewpoints and suggestions on various programs. It
is difficult to determine the degree to which this is a problem. There is
little evidence that CC’s self-evaluation is weak or that their communica-
tions system is splintered or disjointed.
Mass PIRG
PIRG’s evaluation process is a similarly informal one. Unlike
Common Cause, however, PIRG’s system is more expressive and personal.
The communication within the staff is informal, but bet^^een the staff and
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other organizational components, such as the local or statewide board,
communication is highly formal and instrumental. Consequently, the boards
are able to effectively oversee PIRG programs to evaluate their progress.
The expressive and informal nature of inter-staff communications
sacrifices some degree of clarity in the transfer of information. There
is a higher probability in PIRG that staff members may not always be in-
formed of the status of projects or the work of the other staff members.
This elevates the risk of duplication of work or program error. PIRG*s
record of success, however, suggests that this problem has not posed a
major hinderance to their ability in monitoring projects through effective
completion.
MAC
The organizational evaluation in MAC is the weakest of the three
groups. Their major strength in this area is the highly personal nature
of interaction among the staff. Each staff member fully participates in
program decision-making, and is continuously informed of project status
and direction. This offers some opportunity to evaluate progress and
anticipate difficulty. Objective self-evaluation, however, is virtually
non-existent in MAC. Project effectiveness is dependent upon the accurate
perceptions of the staff in analyzing them.
mac's internal communication is entirely expressive and informal.
There is no active board or other organizational element which can offer
objective, independent analysis of project effectiveness. MA.C runs the
highest risk of ill-conceived and poorly implemented projects. In effect,
they have no process of organizational evaluation at ail.
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Generallzlng Advocacy Methodology
When an advocacy group is functioning in the community, they begin
with the evaluation of their constituents' needs and the services provided
them by public service institutions. This process is the only continuous
activity of the organization. Advocacy, as an organized strategy for
change, must be constantly aware of what warrants the pressure of their
efforts. It is the most essential element of their methodology. From
the evaluation of needs and services, all other components of the strategy
find impetus. The assessment of services offered to the community enables
the advocacy group to determine the appropriate strategy to be utilized in
changing the shortcomings of these services and their delivery.
The evaluation of existing services includes the substantiation
of institutional neglect. As often happens in an urban community, the
people, especially if poor and non-white, are denied services to which
they are clearly entitled. If state or federal legislation gives the
right to certain services, the eligible population often does not partici
pate. In some cases, ignorance of the service or their eligibility is the
cause. Not all poor children, for example, take advantage of the free
breakfast or lunch programs offered them in school because they are not
aware of the availability. But in other cases, the children who
do not
participate are being denied access to the programs. The advocacy
group
must determine not only who is not participating in
available programs,
but why they are not participating. If the cause
Is Ignorance, Che advo-
cacy group might organize an informational campaign
to encourage eligible
people CO participate. However, if the cause
is denial of these services
the strategy is one of confrontation with
the negligent institution.
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The evaluatioa function includes examination of the constituents,
unmet needs, and documentation of the problems surrounding the absence of
services. The analysis of the constituent needs will serve as a basis for
effectively calling for solutions. For example, the immigration into the
United States of large numbers of Puerto Ricans, Columbian, Mexican, and
other hispanic peoples has created a difficult problem for schools. With-
out the language skills required for success in schools, Spanish-speaking
children were either vegetating in classrooms or dropping out completely.
After years of inaction, the substantial documentation of the problem has
begun to move lawmakers to guarantee bi-lingual instructional programs for
non-English speaking children.
Striving for a legislated guarantee of services is not always
possible or practical. In cases where a community’s needs, although
deeply felt, are not endemic to a broad segment of the population, there
is small possibility of the passage of legislation to offer such services.
Following the passage of Chapter 766 in Massachusetts, for example, educa
tional services were guaranteed to special needs citizens between the ages
of 3 and 21. Yet the adult (over 21 years old) development ally disabled
have critical educational and rehabilitative needs as well. To
consxder
lobbying for legislation to provide services to this constituency,
however,
in light of the comprehensive Chapter 766 would be politically
and finan-
cially impractical. The evaluation task of the advocacy
group can serve
as a basis for the investigation of alternative
avenues for the fulfillment
of such needs.
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Whaix the evaluation mechanism functions thoroughly and effectively,
perceptive recognition of the appropriate follow-up strategy will be
assured. And as in the case above, where lobbying and confrontation are
not appropriate, the evaluation of needs can become a rationale for the
solicitation of independent resources for independent delivery of services.
This function is the most critical for the success of the advocacy group
as a change agent. It is the process of determining not only what consti-
tuent needs are, but of choosing the most appropriate vehicle for satisfying
those needs
.
Confrontation Strategies
When a service is guaranteed by law, its delivery is entrusted to
a specifically designated institution. Whether the service is health care,
education, or police protection, it is transformed from idea to activity by
the "organs of society." Although it is predictable that bureaucracies
will on occasion fail, the inexcusable pattern has been that institutions
consistently malfunction for poor and minority citizens. ^'Jhen such an in-
stitutional malady, whether it is born of malice or ignorance, victimizes
the disenfranchised, there has seldom been an avenue of recourse readily
available. The advocacy group, however, presents one mechanism available
to the urban poor to seek redress when their rights have not been satisfied.
If an agency has been negligent in providing a service, or it has
denied access to a service by an individual or group Chaving a right to
inclusion), an advocacy group, acting on behalf of that individual or
^Peter Drucker, Management , op. cit.
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group', has a cause to confront that agency. As indicated in Figure 6,
this confrontation process has four basic steps: Investigation and Research,
Administrative Negotiation, Publicity and Public Pressure, and Litigation.
These elements of confrontation are not offered in such sterile form as
mutually exclusive properties. They are not presented in rigid mandatory
sequence, but rather in logical sequence. In certain instances, some steps
might be left out or utilized in a different order. This flexibility allows
the group to decide the sequence appropriate for the individual issue.
As in the case of the overall advocacy group methodology, "Research
and Investigation" is the most significant step within the confrontation
process. This element is the basis for actions that follow. Suspicion of
institutional neglect or denial of guaranteed services is insufficient rea-
son for confrontation. Any exclusion from services by the constituency
must be proven. This is often a tedious undertaking, but one which engenders
the advocacy group with its potency to affect change.
There are numerous ways to substantiate an allegation of institu-
tional failure. One approach is the use of public records, statistics
gathered by the institution itself and other data collated from reports
and studies about or by the institution. Ironically, the documentation
useful to the advocacy group in substantiating institutional failure is
often developed by the organization itself. In the generation of data to
facilitate management and decision-making, these labors can provide the
seeds for t'neir ox^n ridicule, embarrassment or even destruction.
The study
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FIGURE 7
THE CONFRONTATION PROCESS
C 0 N F R ONTATION
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of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health by MAC, for example, was
documented with substantial help from the Department’s own records,
Another approach to substantiating illegal neglect or denial of
services is investigation. One asset of the large bureaucracy employing
many people is that there is almost always someone within the organization
sympathetic to the cause and willing to cooperate. Uncovering such valua-
ble allies will greatly aid in documenting the agencies’ failures. Even
when acting anonymously, a person inside the organization can direct the
advocacy group to the source of the problem, the offending individual, or
department causing a malfunction.
A popular approach to substantiating institutional failure, followed
in conjunction with the other strategies or especially in their absence,
is the ’’public hearing.” This has been an effective tool in forcing the
institution to respond to the allegations in the public arena. Collecting
testimony from citizens and public officials about a key issue is an
effective way of substantiating institutional failure. MAC has used this
mechanism with impressive success.
A new tactic in confrontation peculiar to the era of the large
26bureaucracy is administrative negotiation. Once it has been established
and documented that an individual or group has been excluded from a guaran-
teed service, the next step has often been publishing the results making
2 S
Task Force on Children Out of School, Suffer the Cnildren , op. cit.
^^Xhis term is borrowed from Peter Edelman, ’’The Massachusetts
Task Force Reports: Advocacy for Children,” Harvard Educational Review ,
Vol. 43, No. 4, November 1973, p. 647.
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the accusation. Administrative negotiation is an intermediary step employed
by the advocacy group to achieve the necessary change. The benefits of this
tactic are compelling and it is becoming central to the advocacy group stra-
tegy.
Wlien an advocacy group has shox^m that an institution has failed to
fulfill its responsibilities, and proceeds to immediately expose the failure,
the organization is forced into a defensive, reactive position. The conse-
quent resistance to admit its shortcoming and correct the situation is
typically stubborn as the target agency fights to protect its reputation
and overall credibility. Such resistance can result in refusal to coopera-
tive or long delays in responding with change— the change that is the objec-
tive of the entire undertaking.
By acting first with discretion, and presenting the agency with the
findings of their research and investigation, the advocacy group affords
the administrators the opportunity to respond without fear of public pres-
sure. In -this context, there is less defensiveness and emotion. From a
perspective of dispassionate clarity, the agency can respond more effec-
tively to clearly documented malfunctions. Cliange, the prime objective,
stands a better chance of realization.
Administrative negotiation, when utilized sensitively, can avoid
unnecessary pressure on the advocacy group. As institutions who are moni-
tored by the group learn that they will be alerted first to the discover^
of negligence, they are likely to become less defensive about
the advocacy
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group and more cooperative with the group's efforts. It is foolish to
make needless enemies through needless haste. Administrative negotiation
is the strategy of effective discretion.
The effective use of publicity and public pressure is a confronta-
tion strategy that is a major determinant of the overall efficacy of an
advocacy group. A key reason for Ralph Nader's success as an advocate,
for example, has been his skillful use of the media to arouse public
opinion. In many advocacy group endeavors, this step immediately follows
the substantiation of an institutional failure. In the present scheme,
it is preceded by administrative negotiation. But in those cases where,
having been presented the documented allegations an institution fails to
cooperate or refuses to willingly correct the problem, the next step is
arousing public opinion.
Taking the findings of the research and investigation, collated
from public hearings and public records and presenting them in compelling
form at a press conference or through a press release is a powerful
weapon for the advocacy group. The media is usually anxious to cooperate
in the uncovering of institutional neglect or malfunction. The media is
also the most effective conduit between the institution and the public.
The reaction of the citizenry to the publicity generated by the advocacy
group's efforts is a potent tool in forcing corrective action within the
target agency. As seen in the analyses of Chapter III, all the groups
carefully groomed their relations with the press.
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The culmination of the confrontation process is the use of the
courts. When an institution stands opposed to fulfilling a statutory
obligation, or is perceived guilty of negligence in its official responsi-
bilities, the advocacy group has at its disposal the use of litigation to
force resolution of the problem. Certain cases necessitating adjudication
are obvious incidents of institutional malfunction. For example, a school
system which is refusing to offer bi-lingual education in a school with a
majority of hispanic children is not in compliance with the law.^^ In
such a case, the advocacy group uses the court to compel the institution
to respect the legal rights of its constituency. Other cases are not as
clear. For example, the special education services now provided in
Pennsylvania grew out of a law suit initiated by a state-wide advocacy
group, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children. The suit was
aimed at determining if, in fact, special needs children had a legal right
2 8to the educational programs provided for other youngsters. Such litiga-
tion is a useful, albeit tedious, mechanism for an advocacy group to forge
new ground for expanded services to their constituency. The expense and
time required to pursue interpretive litigation may not always be practi-
cal for an advocacy group. This last step in the confrontation process
is a flexible tool for change available to an advocacy organization.
2 7
Massachusetts General Court, "The Transitional Bilingual Education
Act," 1971.
^^Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Children, Nancy Beth Bowman,
et al versus Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, David Kurtzman (1971).
-171-
Lobbylng
Influencing the development and implementation of state and
federal legislation is a common activity among advocacy groups. Some
organizations devote all of their energies to lobbying on behalf of
their constituents' point of view. However, when lobbying is made
part of an overall advocacy methodology, the impact of the group's
actions in the legislature becomes even more significant. Common Cause
provides a good example. A major part of their resources is devoted to
lobbying the Congress and state legislatures. They also utilize other
advocacy strategies such as evaluative monitoring and confrontation.
Common Cause has earned a reputation as a force to be reckoned with by
decision makers who have come to realize CC will utilize the media to
expose their actions, court suits, etc. CC's lobbying effort is more
effective because of the presence of other more challenging vehicles
for reform.
The use of lobbying tactics first necessitates a well-defined
constituency. The group's influence on legislators is valid when CC
can connect the position they assume with the expressed needs of a
tangible population. When the group represents a narrow special interest,
(such as the National Rifle Association), legislators know the lobbyists
accurately voice a certain public's opinion, i.e. , gun owners.
When the
group is more broadly defined, focusing on government
reform or education
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for example, it is more difficult for the lobbyist to point to a specific,
supportive constituency. When the constituency is left vague, the Influ-
ence of the lobbyist is significantly lessened.
The lobbying component of the advocacy methodology is a powerful
tool. It requires, however, a clear understanding of exactly who the
group represents—for whom they advocate. The ability to incorporate
lobbying into an advocacy methodology is dependent to a high degree on
an accurate identification of the constituency. Advocacy groups which
are membership organizations are the most logical types to utilize lobby-
ing effectively and successfully.
S trategy Identification and Methodological Synthesis:
Confrontation Strategies for Urban Education
"Public service institutions
. . . are organs of society. They
do not exist for their own sake, but to fulfill a specific social purpose
9Q
and to satisfy a specific need of society, community or individual.""”
Insuring this other directedness
,
all of the states in the nation have
constituted and legislated certain rights to services by each citizen.
The delivery of these services are the responsibility of public institu-
tions. As the state continues to expand the quantity and quality of human
services, we have become a nation of institutions: from banks to hospi-
tals; from public schools to universities; from libraries to v;elfare.
OQ
Peter F. Drucker, Management (New York: Harper and Row,
1973), p. 3-9.
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The present concern is for urban educational services. Within
its sphere, the state guarantees services to children not only through
instruction, but many aspects of child health and welfare. The "State
Education Agency" avails federal resources for nutrition, including
breakfast and lunch programs; remedial or compensatory instruction;
development of special and innovative educational programs, etc.^^
These mandated programs are channeled through public schools. And yet
almost two million children between the ages of seven and seventeen are
not enrolled in any school program. This represents over four percent
31
of the eligible population. The denial of access to education for
minority citizens is dramatic. Six percent of the non-white children in
32America are not enrolled in school.
To refer to the number of children either denied or rejecting
access to public school is indeed a small portion of the picture. It is
a reference to a grave problem in part of the institution of education,
but only part of a much larger issue. Education is a life-long process
of learning. Slowly the educational institutions are expanding both
their role and their responsibilities.
^^Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ Department of Education, General
Laws Relating to Education (Boston: Department of Education, 1970),
p. 39.
^^Children’s Defense Fund, Marian W. Edelman, Director, Children
Out of School in America (Washington, D.C.: Washington Research Project,
Inc., 1974), p. 193.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 201.
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Clearly, a sizable portion of our population is capable of
absorbing more formal education than it now is given an
opportunity to secure. The stratification system operates
to remove some of these people from school before they have
an opportunity to realize their educational potential.
Accepting the limited scope of the education institution for the
moment, the child is guaranteed a variety of services by law. As already
pointed out, two million eligible children are not currently participating
at all. There are also millions more who, although enrolled in school,
are not receiving other services whose availability is obliged. These
range from bi-lingual instruction for non-English speaking children, to
o /
health and nutrition programs so important in urban communities. The
advocacy group strategy described in the analyses is applicable to change
agents committed to addressing the failures of the urban education insti-
tution to conscientiously abide by the law and avail guaranteed services.
The advocacy group is, in essence, an organized redress effort.
This study makes no recommendations about who are the advocates, but what
does an advocacy group do. For present purposes, then, the group can be
any collection of citizens who come together with a common goal; to
change the institutional or programmatic regularity that has failed to
correct the problem itself. As with so many strategies for change, advo-
cacy efforts find need from negative inspiration: the failure of an in-
stitution to function properly. Many advocacy groups currently in
opera-
^
^Raymond W. Mack, Transforming America: Pat^rns of Social
Change (New' York: Random House, 1967), p. 73.
^^Current and extensive data on children not in school
can be
found in Childrens Defense Fund, Children Out of
School in America.
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tion grew out of an organized effort to force compliance with the law by
a negligent institution.^^ It is a discouraging epitaph that many insti-
tutions continue to deny or neglect services despite a mandate of law,
(and) despite their use of public monies.
In pursuing compliance with the law by service institutions, the
advocacy group finds its most potent influence. In areas of legally
guaranteed services
,
there is no requirement for rationalizing need or
justifying the effort. Wherever and whenever the nefarious performance
of an institution is illegal, the advocacy group has unquestioned cause
for action.
Identifying the Source for the Failure of Services ;
The Basis for Service Evaluation
It is not enough to be convinced that an institution is failing
to provide a service it is obliged to deliver by law. Being sure that a
teacher in a local school is denying lunches to certain children is not
sufficient proof that the problem is widespread or even true. The advo-
cacy group must assemble and utilize its resources to substantiate that
the problem they suspect is in fact real. To do this, the group must
first locate the source of the problem. Most institutions operate as
large, complex bureaucratic organizations which are centralized to vary-
ing degrees. Urban school bureaucracies typically encompass countless
divisions and subdivisions . To locate a negligent source within the
^^One example is the Massachusetts Advocacy Center (MAC) , which
grew out of an issue-centered group: "The Task Force on Children Out
of School." See Chapter III, Section 4.1.
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education establishment, especially the urban school bureaucracy, is a
task, that can involve a classroom, a school, a system, and up through to
the state or federal government. It is a frustrating experience for the
grieved parent, acting alone, to try to locate the course of a problem.
The advocacy group as a problem solver, finds justification in
the powerlessness of individual citizens when confronting a large insti-
tution. When representing a specific population, the advocacy group
approaches the establishment with potent credibility and strength. The
impact of this is the forcing of the institution to recognize the voice,
and respond to the charges of a one time ignored constituency. If a key
difficulty in effecting an institutional change is locating the root
cause of the problem in an expansive bureaucracy, the advocacy group
creates a collation of power that can more readily uncover the source
of failure.
Institutions do not exist in a vacuum. They must respond to other
institutions as well as the society at large. In pinpointing institutional
failure, for example, the press and media establishment is an institution
that induces response, whether it is cajoled or bullied. The advocacy
group has a variety of means to illicit information from an accrued insti-
tution. For example, by seeking response on behalf of an identified
con-
stituency holding a clear right to know; or by a plathora of
investigative
tactics that seek out cooperative or sympathetic officials
within the
target organization. The advocate organization has
rich resources offer-
ing the potential for success at the elementary
level of the solution pro-
cess: determining what and/or who has failed
to abide by the precepts of
the institutional mission.
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Peter Edelman, writing one of the first and few descriptions of
group advocacy as a social change mechanism, tenders some basic guide-
lines for advocacy method. "... one for cltlcen advocacy,"
he states, is that "someone must identify the problem and set the pro-
cess for action in motion."^® He describes this as the need for "leader-
ship." The advocacy group is a new form of leadership for change in that
it initiates the process of substantiation of failure that victimizes its
constituency. Ralph Nader has provided an effective model for this leader-
ship. The work of his advocacy groups have documented compelling proof of
institutional failure that has deceived and duped the consumer in the
37
economic arena, as well as in the social services field. The Massa-
chusetts Advocacy Center exercised similar leadership in educational change
with their publication offering an evidential expose on children involun-
tarily excluded from Boston’s public school programs. They published an
equally provocative account challenging the Massachusetts Department of
Mental Health for its failure and ineptitude in dealing with the develop-
Peter Edelman, "The Massachusetts Task Force Reports: Advocacy
for Children," op. cit., p. 641.
37
Nader reports^ illuminating these failures include Unsafe at Any
Speed (1966); Corporate Power in America (1972); The Company State: Ralph
Nader’s Study Group Report on Dupont in Delaware (1969)
.
38
Nader reports on these issues include Old Age: The Last Segre-
gation
,
Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on Nursing Homes (Nev; York:
Grossman Publishers, 1970).
^^Task Force on Children Out of School, The Way We Go to School :
The Exclusion of Children in Boston, op. cit.
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mentally disabled population of the state. These and other like efforts
have done for the public what individuals and disorganized groups have
been unable to do force a response from the large institution. Once the
institution has publicly recognized the problem, the first step toward
change has been taken.
The ability to verify areas of negligence or denial of guaranteed
services by public institutions demonstrates a basic validity of the ad-
vocacy group as an effective change agent. In this task, however, the
method is clear, because such issues present accessible avenues for re-
dress. When an institution has denied a service the law demands it to
deliver, although the advocacy group proves its worth in the task of
verification, there already exists a recourse through adjudication. The
advocacy group, when involved in such issues, functions as a representa-
tive for the public, guiding them through the court process, in their
efforts to correct a problem. In this sense, they become the public's
41
attorney, or advocate as it is more traditionally defined. But the
advocacy group finds more in its potential than simply identifying and
substantiating problems, or merely serving as an attorney for the pub-
lic. The advocate organization can exercise leadership in a wide variety
^°Task Force on Children Out of School, Suffer the Children :
The Politics of Mental Health in Massachusetts , op. cit.
^^"Advocate" is offered as a synonym for "lav/yer." See Webster s
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts, G and C
Merriam Co., 1970), p. 57.
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of tasks. For example, a problem urban educators have long knovm about
is the destructive uses of students’ records and files. On November 20,
1974, the "Privacy Law" became effective.^^ In sum, the bill had three
basic intentions:
First, it was a response to widespread evidence that student
files sometimes contained da^naging and incorrect statements
based on teacher, principal, counselor or psychologist judg-
ment. Some such files carried entries like students'
"homosexual tendencies" or "radical tendencies." When these
notations were looked into, they were found to be totally
without justification . . . Second, the law sought to
curtail the practice of making these school record available
not only to colleges and prospective employers, but also to
credit agencies, banks, local police departments, and other
agencies. Third, the law proposed to make available to parent^
information previously kept from them but available to others."*^
In urban schools, where the problems of arbitrary evaluation of
students are rife, parents are powerless to even gain access to their
children's records, let alone challenge their content. In Massachusetts,
for example, more high schools permitted access to student files to the
police, juvenile courts (sans subpoena) and prospective employers than
44
they did to parents or the students themselves. With the enactment
^^U.S. Congress, "Protection of the Rights and Privacy of Parents
and Students," (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974).
^^Albert Shanker, "In the Public Good: A Second Look at the
Privacy Law," New York Times, November 24, 1974, Sec. E, p. 9.
^^William E. Allen, "Student Permanent Record Files: The Right
to Privacy Related to the Content and Accessibility of Student
Records
in Massachusetts Public High Schools," an unpublished education
study
by Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education, Appendix C,
Table
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of the Privacy Law, there is no guarantee that public officials will readily
comply. Herein lies a powerful Issue for an educational advocacy group.
Their resources can provide for greater chances of forcing the rightful
access to records than parents’ individual efforts.
The Justification for Unavailable Services ;
The Basis for Lobbying
Tlie public s needs are often neglected despite the clarity or sig—
of the omission. The absence of legislated mandate denies the
citizen a clear course of action to challenge a public institution for
fulfilling that need. The special education issue offers h userul exam-
ple. In Massachusetts, there was a clear need for better basic services
for the mentally retarded child. Despite an estimated 30,000 children
in Massachusetts whose retardation was severe enough to require special
45help, only little more than half were actually being served. In many
instances, the parents of the neglected children had no legislated basis
for demanding that services be expanded or that functioning institutions
change. Those children who were receiving help were often subjected to
substandard care in state hospitals where the dehumanizing conditions per-
petuated unabated over one-hundred and twenty-five years after Dorothea
Dix described their horrid realities. Beyond outrage and disgust by
^^Task Force on Children Out of School, op. cit., p. 12.
^^Dorothea L. Dix, "Memorial to the Legislature of Massachusetts"
(Nutley, New Jersey: Roche Laboratories, Reprint, 18h 3) as cited by
Ibid
. , p . 25
.
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those witnessing such conditions.''^ the retarded citizen was not recog-
nized as having the "right" to comprehensive rehabilitative or educational
programs in Massachusetts beyond limited access to antiquated custodial
care. This is a dramatic, but quite real example of a compelling need
for services which are not guaranteed by law. Up until 1966, parents of
retarded children in Massachusetts had almost no official recognition of
their children s needs by the state. Had an advocacy group been active
in leadership for this issue, change might have come earlier.
Predictably, the urban poor comprise the constituency having the
clearest need for expanded educational services not presently provided.
For them, school systems fail on almost every basis. The effects of
racism and poverty refute any contention of equal services for equal
needs. It is evident that the state's educational services to the urban
community are not working. Yet as with the case of the handicapped citi-
zens, there is no legislated mandate to alter the quantity or quality of
the status quo. Without the recognition of law, a service is thereby
peripheral, or "compensatory," and its delivery is at the whim of special
funding from the federal government or private grants. As the economy
fluctuates, so does the existence of such services.
^^For descriptions of the conditions in Massachusetts state hospi-
tals
,
see Burton Blatt, Exodus from Pandemonium (Boston: Allyn & Bacon,
1970), and Burton Blatt and Fred Kaplan, Christmas in Purgatorv (Boston:
Allyn & Bacon, 1966).
^^Massachusetts General Court, "Comprehensive Mental Health
and
Retardation Act," 1966.
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In transformxng an educational need into a guaranteed service, a
vigorous leadership is required. In the nation's cities, the educational
needs of the poor and minority people are repeatedly ignored. Efforts by
the people to alter damaging or useless practices, or to expand the scope
of services rendered are consistently futile. The potential strength of
the advocacy group as an agent of educational change is its meaning to
the power of the disenfranchised citizen. In essence, it is an organiza-
tion acting out a full-time conscientious citizenship. Its goal, however,
is not to aluer institutional regularities for the people; this is con—
decension. The goal of the advocacy group is to involve the public in
their goal-setting and change process; to initiate public expression of
the need for institutional response.
For increasing numbers of Americans, citizenship should become a
full-time career role, supported by other citizens, to work on
major institutions of government and business for a better society.
It is this fundamental role of the public citizen in a democracy
that must attract more adherents and supporters from across America.
As an "initiator" of public action, then, the advocacy group is
interested in far more than simply monitoring institutional compliance
with legally guaranteed public rights. Its role in education is larger
than such issues as involuntary exclusion from school, or denial of trans-
portation to school children. The advocacy group can act, on behalf of
and with citizens, to shape the unmet educational needs of the entire
community. It can help transform these identified needs into educational
Donald K. Ross, A Public Citizen's Action Manual (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1973), introduction to Ralph Nader, p. xxv
(emphasis in the original)
.
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rights. The methodology is the active utilization of the legislative pro-
cess by drafting and lobbying for legislation at every level through town
and city government, the state legislature, and the Congress. Further,
it involves working with public officials for broader and more comprehen-
sive interpretation of existing statutes to include a greater range of
assigned services to a more liberally defined audience.
Filling the Gaps in Public Services ;
The Basis for Program Development
There are many instances when more traditional advocacy methods,
such as lobbying or litigation, are powerless. Tlie issue of Special
Education will again serve the point. After several years of work, pres-
sure groups in Massachusetts succeeded in having a comprehensive education
bill passed. Chapter 766 guranteed educational services to all special
needs children between the ages of three through twenty-one. Vlliat does
an educational advocacy group do now to secure expanded services for the
thirty-five year old developmentally disabled citizen? or the handicapped
two-year-old in need of specialized treatment? This constituency has no
legal claim on services thus eliminating confrontation as a realistic
strategy. And with Chapter 766, it is highly doubtful that the legisla
ture would move to include a broader constituency thereby minimizing the
practicality of lobbying. As an effective representative of their
consti
tuency, the advocacy group
services independently. T
p has within its means the ability
to secure new
liis seldom used method of advocacy can
round-out
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the group's methodology to make them a comprehensive public representative.
The Massachusetts Advocacy Center engages in this activity to some degree.
but its use as an advocacy tool is still largely untapped.
The educational advocacy group can serve a unique role in the com-
munity by functioning as a broker for new services. By determining an
important constituent need, the group can design and implement programs
that are not easily acquired in the public sector, or not within the pur-
view of the state. For example, the urban educational advocacy group may
identify a need for more comprehensive reading programs in the neighborhood
which the schools do not provide. If the school system is not able to ex-
pand their program, the group can secure resources for establishing an
afternoon or summer time reading clinic. Their own resources would enable
them to develop such a program that the parents would not have the capacity
to initiate on their own. By writing proposals, searching for available
but unknown service agencies, or simply using their organization and power
to initiate a response to a documented need, the advocacy group can become
a significant change agent for urban education. As Figure 7 shows, the
advocacy group can work as a direct link between the public and the educa-
tional institution.
Advocacy for a Constituency :
Maintaining a Sense of Purpose
Tlie appropriate and timely nature of the current growth of advo
cacy or "citizen" groups lies within the wide recognition of the gap
be-
^°See Chapter III, MAC: "Methodologies."
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tween the public and the decision-making process. The complexity and
sheer size of the American republic presents an inevitable gap between
the citizen and his representatives. Even in municipal government, the
elected school board representative works for such a large constituency
that the individual member has small chance of a proximate understanding
of the needs and priorities of citizens. Despite the abhorence of an
indignant nation, the social upheaval of the 1960 's demonstrated that,
even when the motivation was selfish and perversely political, violent
confrontation by desperate people or angered groups yielded the most
attentive response. Those who cried loudest were usually listened to,
even if for only a moment.
The failure of demonstrations and conflicts by disenchanted stu-
dent groups, and more seriously by poor and minority people, was not in
gaining attention to the problem. Most Americans came to know of such
people, their leaders, and their causes. The failure of these encounters
was in the absence of follow-up methods to enact meaningful change. There
were few, if any, systematic, organized efforts to capitalize on the na-
tional awareness of racism, poverty, or urban school failure. l-Ihat
may
have been a torrid issue in May, seeped from the public mind by
November’s
election, or December's vote in the legislature. Once an
issue is de-
flated, the elected representative no longer feels
pressure from citizens,
but from Che full-time lobbyists of large institutions
and special interest
groups. -The legislative outcome on an issue is
typically in line with the
interests of the latter.
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The advocacy group methodology is a process of systematic follow-
through on issues. After an issue is gone from the headlines, the advo-
cacy group practices the art of *'watchdog" and lobbyist for their consti-
tuency. It has the power of re-arousing public attention after the issue
seems spent. It is a force to be recognized.
It has been an underlying contention of this study that many advo-
cacy groups do not see their organization as a means to reform, as much
as they see it as an end in itself. The advocacy group often does not
understand the process of change that they are engaging. One sympton of
such ignorance is the identification of "the public" as their constituency.
The methodology of advocacy as a rational means to change will be plagued
by the same protestations of citizen exclusion as those institutions they
accuse of insulation from the public. For example, the current contro-
versey concerning forced busing to achieve racially balanced school popu-
lations has created hostile polarization within many cities. Vehement
resistance to the implementation of busing programs indicates the wide-
spread disagreement with the judicial mandates. If an urban-based educa-
tional advocacy group purports to represent "the public," where do they
stand on the issue of busing? For that matter, where do they stand on any
divisive social issue?
The advocacy group must carefully identify the constituency for
whom they function. The danger in creating an advocacy group that
sees
itself as a totally independent entity and not a process or
method of
change, is the development of a new institution which
does not represent
any constituency. Such an organization does not
provide for publxc
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identification of issues, or public control over the direction of change,
which is the very reason for the advocacy group’s creation. For example,
the Massachusetts Advocacy Center, analyzed in this study, grew out of
one specific issue. They began by representing a particular constituency,
parents of children involuntarily excluded from public schools in Massa-
chusetts. The group utilized a variety of strategies to change the status
quo on behalf of this constituency. They were able to assert with vera-
city that they represented the interests of a specific population relative
to a particular issue. After they received funding and were established
as the Massachusetts Advocacy Center, were they representing this or
another population? As indicated in the study, MAC is vague about their
notion of a constituency.
The advocacy group, as a methodology of change, must become a
liaison between a particular population and their service institutions.
Unless the link is clear and tangible, the group advocates their own
needs, and not those of a particular public.
CHAPTER V
ORGANIZING ADVOCACY FOR THE URBAN COMMUNITY:
LMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL CHANGE
Adapting an Appropriate Scope
The advocacy group techniques outlined in this study hold signifi-
cant potential for the urban public seeking an effective mechanism to ini-
tiate change in the educational services presently available to them. It
is unrealistic to suggest implementing a comprehensive advocacy organiza-
tion such as Common Cause in each community. What is possible, however,
is to analyze the elements of such ambitious organizations and isolate
their replicable components. The advocacy group representing a neighborhood
or small community within a city advocates for the interests of that popula-
tion. By mobilizing this community, seeking small member contributions, and
collecting information about their educational priorities, an advocacy group
can be formed. The organization might be as simple as the formation of a
Board of Directors and hiring one staff member as a coordinator, but even
this small group could become a new force for change in the community. By
beginning to pursue advocacy tactics in the area of education, the city s
educational establishment is put on notice that their actions are going to
be monitored, evaluated, and challenged. In many cases, it may be
the
first time local education officials are forced to be accountable
for
heretofore silent and povjerless constituency.their actions to a
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Funding and Resource Development
The Common Cause funding vehicle offers the best model for
developing an advocacy group. Building a membership and establishing a
system of dues can reduce the expense to each individual yet yield a
solid funding base to begin operation. For the small or poor community
this approach may not provide enough revenue to support more than a part-
time advocacy organization. By combining this primary funding mechanism
with supplementary aid from grants and fund-raising efforts, even this
small or poor constituency can initiate educational change through advo-
cacy techniques. It is important that the base of their funding eminate
from constituent support. Isolating the funding completely from the com-
munity risks isolating the basic purpose of the advocacy organization as
a representative of a group of people.
All three groups analyzed in Chapter III showed effective use of
a voluntary work force. While volunteers are not critical to the organi-
zational stability of MassPIRG or Common Cause, they may offer an invalu-
able contribution to the small, local advocacy group. Involving volun-
teers is a useful way to increase member interest as well as strengthen
organizational operation and efficiency.
Sequence of Methodological Development
The first stages of advocacy group development in an urban setting
are not likely to include implementation of a complete methodology. A
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collection of concerned people who cot.e together to seek participation in
educational decision-making as a means to effect reform, must determine
what tactics are appropriate and realistic. An essential beginning is a
planned sequence of organisational development. Hie four components pre-
sented as an advocacy methodology are each ambitious undertakings. When
resources are scarce, the community must begin with the methods they can
afford and build new components if and when they are able. Sequencing
this development is an important factor. Based on the preceding organi-
zational analyses, the sequence that is both realistic and achievable for
an urban educational advocacy group would begin by designing a service
evaluation effort. This would be followed by adding confrontation capa-
cities to the group. If resources permit further development, lobbying
could be added, and followed by a program development component. This
scheme, as shown in Figure 8, requires careful planning and evaluation of
available resources.
Education is a complex flow of services which come in myriad pro-
grams and projects. In the urban center there is an even greater maze
of compensatory and specialized programs offered to the community. The
urban community initiating an advocacy group would have a logical starting
point in sorting out these services and evaluating their performance in
their own neighborhoods. l>fhat might be an effective program in one part
of the city may be dysfunctional in another. Any attempt to alter such a
situation has to begin with an analysis of the program's history and
performance. Service evaluation is the most essential element in the
advocacy group methodology. It is therefore the first step to be taken
- 191-
figure 8
THE ADVOCACY GROUP
METHODOLOGICAL SEQUENCE
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when a coTranunity is organizing for educational change. It has the benefit
of being the least expensive component available to the group. Much of
this work can be done successfully by volunteers under the direction of
a full-time educational advocate.
Confrontation strategies present the best second phase of develop-
ment for a community based educational advocacy group. It offers a potent
change mechanism yet is not necessarily a major expense. Once educational
services are evaluated, and problems are substantiated, a small advocacy
group can appoint an investigative task force to study and corroborate a
suspected institutional malfunction.^ By inviting community leaders to
work with a group of organization members, such a task force increases the
effort's credibility while insuring systematic research into educational
services . This approach provides the group with greater leverage when
they approach public officials with their findings. This process of ad-
ministrative negotiation can be very successful in securing a change for
the community's existing educational services. It is especially appropriate
in urban education given the complex administrative bureaucracy which typi-
cally manages these services and programs.
If redress cannot be gained through negotiation, the third step in
confrontation is still a relatively inexpensive pursuit. Publicity and
public pressure can be realized by conscientiously working with
the local
press and media. The media is almost always willing to
cover noteworthy
^See Chapter III, MAC:
ft
"Methodologies
.
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news events. A local advocacy group challenging their school system about
the quality of the reading programs, for example, is a controversy they
would enthusiastically cover and print. The resulting publicity, gained
at little or no expense, helps generate public opinion on the issue. This
public sentiment, when sympathetic, places great pressure on public offi-
cials to respond favorably to the group’s cause.
,
Litigation is the final confrontation strategy. While it is
usually the most decisive, it is unfortunately the most costly. A local
educational advocacy group, whose constituency is poor, will have a diffi-
cult time adding a litigation com.ponent to their methodology. Once they
are established and membership increases, even a small group could add
legal expertise on a part-time or retainer basis, or work with local
legal services organizations who work in the community for little or no
fee.
Adding a lobbying component is an ambitious task for a local advo-
cacy group. The benefits of lobbying are clear in education. Innumerable
decisions affecting educational services are made by state and federal
legislators. Without the capacity to influence these decision-makers,
the advocacy group can neither secure the rights to new services for their
constituency, nor help reform poorly operating existing services. Lobby-
ing is a powerful tool of advocacy. Without constituent backing, the group
can influence key decisions in the legislature, school boards, and other
decision-making bodies. For the local advocacy group representing a poor
constituency, the cost of such efforts can be prohibitive. The most pain-
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ful expense could be the difficulty in organizing as a non-profit corpora-
tion. The federal laws prohibiting lobbying activities by tax-exempt
agencies would necessitate an advocacy group relinquishing one of its
few fiscal advantages.^ Not only would they lose revenue through tax
payments, but they would not be able to coliclt monies using the deduct-
able contribution as an encouragement to prospective donors.
There is a compromise strategy that would allow a local advocacy
group to avoid lobbying yet influence legislative decisions on education.
The Massachusetts Advocacy Center is not allowed to lobby because of
their tax-exempt status. By actively researching the needs of children
and the quality of services offered them, MAC's position on relevant
issues i often sought by legislators and legislative committees. They
do not contact law-makers directly to sway their decisions, but their
work in investigating services makes them an influential voice in the
state's legislature. They have had a direct impact on Massachusetts'
special education law and its regulations, as well as legislative action
3
concerning the State Department of Mental Health.
The special problems urban residents face daily often cry for
unique and specialized services in education. The need for supplementary
services, such as breakfast and lunch programs, reading projects, or
2
The Tax Code permits some organizations to function as tax exempt
lobbyists provided the organization convinces the Internal Revenue Service
that it promotes the general welfare in non-partisan fashion. Common
Cause is organized this way. This is a difficult task for a smalx, local
advocacy organization.
^Ibid., MAC: "Major Activities and Accomplishments."
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racial and cultural enrichment programs, are made necessary by the poverty
and racism society heaps on the urban community. In difficult economic
times, these specialized programs are often the first to be jeopardized.
When an advocacy group determines a need for a specific program, and can-
not secure its delivery by the public educational system, they can serve
a valuable advocate role by seeking an independent source for the program.
A need might be identified, for example, for a vocational program for high
school aged dropouts, or an adult learning program. Such a project may
not involve a large enough population to realistically warrant a city or
state commitment to provide these services. The advocacy group, however,
can work to secure a grant for initiating such a project; or seek out
private agencies who can offer the service. Program development efforts
complete the advocacy methodology to make the group a more total catalyst
for educational change.
Organizational Recommendations
for an Urban Educational Advocacy Group
The advocacy group for urban education should be structured as a
non-profit corporation staffed by at least one full-time professional
skilled in one or more areas of advocacy methodology. Strategic decision-
making in the group should rest with an active, elected Board of Directors
similar to that used in the Common Cause model. Tactical decision-making
should be the responsibility of the professional(s) who in turn
must sys-
tematically report to the Board of Directors.
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Organizationai goals should be clearly stated and reflect the
identified educational priorities of the group's constituency. The urban
educational advocacy group should build upon their goals a mechanism for
institutional change which could be described as:
Developing an independent membership organization which system-
atically solicits constituent priorities on educational services
and issues, and mobilizes the resources of full-time professionals
to monitor educational programs and influence decision-making
processes
.
The professional staff should have clearly delineated responsibilities
which coincide with their individual skills and interests. Staff members
should have opportunities to contribute their skills to all group projects
other than those for which they are principally responsible. The staff
should be selected according to the skills needed to implement those
methodologies the group will employ, i.e., lobbying, service evaluation,
litigation, etc.
The advocacy group should be funded primarily by constituent con-
tributions through membership dues or member donations. Funding from
other sources, such as grants or philanthropic contributions, should be
confined to use for specific projects of the group. Such monies should
not be used, and therefore depended upon, for basic organizational admini-
stration or operation.
All issues should be determined by the advocacy group's constitu-
ency. However, final determination of how issues will be
addressed should
be the responsibility of the Board of Directors selected
from expressed
priorities of the member/cons tituency
.
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The urban educational advocacy group should begin building Its
methodological program by staff expertise in service evaluation. Once
this capability has been realized, the group can begin development of
other methodological components. The second phase of strategy develop-
ment should be in the area of confrontation tactics. With this capacity
the group can effectively compel educational agencies to provide guaran-
teed program services, and to distribute these services equitably. The
third phase of development should add a lobbying component to the advo-
cacy group. This element allows the group to influence decisions con-
cerning new areas of services that their constituency wishes expanded,
diminished, or eliminated. The final phase of methodological design
should include skills in program design and development. When needed
services cannot be obtained by public educational institutions, the
advocacy group can serve as an educational resource broker for the inde-
pendent delivery of such programs
.
The urban educational advocacy group should be structured as a
membership organization with an identified population for whom they advo-
cate. Through constant dissemination of information and solicitation of
member input, the group should offer continuous and open avenues for con-
stituent participation in goal-setting and project implementation.
The advocacy group should establish an evaluation team, functioning
as a committee of the Board of Directors and composed of organization mem-
bers, who would perform on-going evaluation of all organizational compon-
ents. They would report directly to the Board with recommendations for
group reform.
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These recommendations represent the strengths that were identified
in the preceding analyses of Common Cause, the Massachusetts Public Interest
Research Group, and the Massachusetts Advocacy Center.
Implications for Urban Education
The first two chapters offered a treatment of the failures of urban
educational institutions to meet the needs of poor and minority people.
The ensuing research into the potential of advocacy methodology as prac-
ticed by three organizations forwards a unique concept to disenfranchised
urban residents who are seeking an effective educational change mechanism.
One of the failures of education in urban areas is the continual
exclusion of the public voice in determining priorities and program direc-
tion. The advocacy organizational techniques and methodologies generalized
in this study contribute a notable vehicle for disenfranchised urban resi-
dents dissatisfied with the status of schools, adult learning programs,
higher education opportunities, special educational services, or federally
funded supplementary educational services. The community which mobilizes
to support an advocacy group can force their rightful participation in
educational decision-making. Such an effort can make a traditionally
powerless population a visible and forceful voice in the shaping of educa-
tional priorities for the community.
The advocacy concept fosters a genuine prospect for
introducing
urban public participation in decision-making for education.
As a self-
initiated strategy for change, it stands a better chance
of stability
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than an externally imposed mobilization endeavor. It eliminates the often
fatal pattern of external interests deciding educational needs for the com-
munity. Within advocacy methodology lies the potential to achieve new
power for a politically impotent public, while preserving community seif-
determxnation. Advocacy, as its application is presently proposed, has
no bearing on the nature of issues being advocated. It is a methodology
to achieve publicly determined change. In urban education, where decisions
are often made without regard for the wishes of the poor and minority pub-
lic, advocacy is a strategy capable of rectifying institutional misrepre-
sentation and malfunction. The urban public can adapt these techniques to
begin influencing educational services that align with their own prescribed
needs and priorities.
New Power for the Urban Community:
The Advocacy Group Versus the
Recalcitrant School Bureaucracy
While this study has purposely referred to urban education in its
broad context, it is most clearly relevant to the issues of urban school
reform. Advocacy techniques are directed at improving the totality of
educational services. Their application will most often be targeted at
school-related problems. The broad reference allowed relevant issues to
be included in the treatment, such as non-school services for the develop-
mentally disabled, higher education, and adult learning programs, etc.
Tlie successful application of advocacy methods will undoubtedly appear
in issues revolving around public school performance in the urban communicv
.
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In New York City the controversies which continually swirl around
the public school system yield unending debates by a plethora of power-
ful, usually polarized special interest groups. Despite the growth of
the teacher's union, the Supervisory Association, the central office
and city government, the one constituency which has never kept pace as a
strong voice in the debate is the poor and minority public—the consumer
of educational services. Using advocacy techniques for organizing, there
is an opportunity to change this inequity. If advocacy groups developed
in communities throughout the city, there could be a new balance in the
deliberations of what is best for school children.
Implications for Research
In many ways this study was an ambitious research attempt. It
sought to analyze three diverse, often confusing organizations; extract
a generalizeable methodology of advocacy for institutional change; and
apply these organizational methodologies to change in urban education.
The final evaluation of the study is for others to belabor.
There are, however, five important issues that are left unresolved
in the study:
1. Constituency Identification: There is a discrepancy remain-
ing which appears to divide advocacy theory and advocacy application.
Theoretically, the study shows that an advocacy group must represent a
specific, identified population. If the group does not have a clear idea
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of whom they advocate for, they are not, in fact, an advocacy group. This
is why the study recommended the membership structure to insure that the
advocacy group is promoting a real public interest. The problem arises
when one reviews a group such as the Massachusetts Advocacy Center. MAC
has only a vague sense of its constituency: children in Massachusetts.
Although their actions could never verify total "constituent" support
(diversity precludes that possibility)
,
MAC has been a successful change
agent in the state. They enjoy impressive support from a diverse public;
they have few public detractors. The study, however, could not explore
in adequate depth the paradoxical premise upon which MAC and other such
groups function with success; i.e., they do not teally know who their
constituency is when they act. ^-Jhile logic denies a uniform "public
interest," can a non-membership organization justify itself as a citizen’s
group or a public advocate?
2. Issue Identification: This problem is closely related to
the first limitation. For those advocacy groups who do not have an identi-
fied constituency, on what basis do they determine issues to act upon?
Even those groups who know their constituents, but do not have a mechan-
ism for obtaining their priorities, how do they justify the issues they
choose to pursue? The study could not accommodate a detailed treatment
of this problem and it nags for analysis.
3. Replicable Funding Mechanism: The analyses failed to offer
insight into a satisfactory model for funding an advocacy group in
an im-
poverished urban community. The most stable funding mechanism
is that
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used by Common Cause and the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group.
While the study recommends such a membership contribution system as a fund-
ing base, in an urban educational advocacy group the community may often
be unable to support an organization through such means. The MAC system
of securing corporate grants for their entire operation is a weak one for
practical and theoretical reasons. They are abandoning this system them-
selves. The study could not satisfactorily resolve this question. A
workable proposal for a stable funding base for a local educational advo-
cacy group is still needed.
4. Optimal Level of Division of Labor: The categorical analysis
of staffing patterns in the advocacy organizations left the appropriate
conclusion unclear. ^"Jhile traditional organization theory proposes a
high division of labor as the most effective system, the study did not
bear this out. The advocacy groups investigated provided a diverse com-
parative ranging from the very high division of labor, departmentalization
in Commoa Cause to the almost non-existent division of labor, total spatial
3
mobility of the Massachusetts Advocacy Center. WTxen analyzing the accom-
plishments of each group as change advocates, the MAC staff performed equal
to, if not superior to the Common Cause and MassPIRG staffs. MAC's record
^James L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness , op. cit., p. 192.
Price contends that spatial mobility contributes to effectiveness in
organizations where "Type A spatial mobility is coupled with a high degree
of professionalization." Type A spatial mobility is defined as the per
formance of different roles in different locations.' MAC does couple
Type A spatial mobility with high staff professionalization. Consequently,
Price's formula would judge the MAC staff as less effective than, for
example. Common Cause or Mass PIRG.
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is an impressive list of social reform that their small and seemingly con-
fused staff helped realize. The study left unsettled the optimal staff
model for an advocacy organization working in an urban community for educa-
tional change.
5. Strategy Untested: The major drawback to the study is that it
was unable to prove that advocacy methodology will work for the local ur-
ban community seeking educational reform. The analyses offered convincing
evidence that advocacy techniques are effective change strategies in areas
such as consumer protection, government responsiveness, and public agency
accountability when practiced by large organizations with a middle class
constituency.^ There is still no evidence, however, that advocacy group
techniques can be taken in generalized form and applied by an inexperienced
constituency to resolve local problems in education. The strategy must
now be tested as a change mechanism for urban education.
Suggestions for Further Research
Given the limitations perceived to be present in the study, there
are correlating suggestions for continued research in the area of advocacy
theory and application to educational change in the urban community. Much
of the work in the study involved new and unknown issues, or known issues
that were never collated in this form. \'Ihile this endeavor was an
attempt
*See Chapter III, MAC: "Major Activities and Accomplishments
^The two organizations with an
Cause and Mass PIRG, both advocate for
white, suburban middle— income citizens
support from a population on the lower
cannot substantiate any constituency.
Identification and Participation.
identified constituency. Common
a membership that is primarily
.
\>Tliile MAC activities suggest
socio-economic strata, they
See Chapter III, "Constituency
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to explore these issues, it must be seen as a first step. Specifically,
there are four areas recommended for further researchi
1. The discrepancy left in the study concerning the theoretical
implication that the constituency of an advocacy group should be clearly
known, and the practical experiences of groups who successfully function
without a constituency is a vexing problem. Further investigation is in
order. It would be useful to know, for example, if advocacy groups who
either do not have a known constituency or do not seek their input to
determine issue priorities actually choose issues consistent with the
priorities of their known or implied constituency. For instance, does
the Massachusetts Advocacy Center pursue activities consistent with the
priorities of a substantial portion of the state's children and parents?
If so, how does this system of organizationally determined issues compare
for accuracy with constituent priorities when held against a system which
actively seeks to identify constituent priorities, such as Common Cause
or MassPIRG? Such a measurement would be valuable to the further under-
standing of how to effectively apply advocacy organizational techniques
to varied environments.
2. A major question still unanswered is whether a workable fund-
ing mechanism can be found to initiate an advocacy group among a poor urban
constituency. An easy model is to propose philanthropic subsidy. As was
pointed out, however, such a mechanism cannot guarantee long-range sta-
bility, and raises serious questions about what such support does to
the
-205-
purpose of the organization. A deeper look is necessary to arrive at an
applicable vehicle for financial support. One initial step would be a
statistical analysis of selected urban communities to determine the feasa-
bility of establishing a membership organization and an expected level of
financial support that an educational advocacy group could probably gener-
ate.
3. The diversity of organization type that was found even among
the three groups studied leaves doubt about what would be the most effec-
tive staffing model for a local educational advocacy group. Common
Cause's departmentalization of tasks and the Massachusetts Advocacy Center's
fluid staff mobility have both been successful models. Further research
is needed to determine which model is best, or what synthesis would pro-
vide the most useful application for operating with both efficiency and
efficacy
.
4. Nothing will really be known about the potential of advocacy
techniques to change urban education until the mechanism is tried. The
most crucial research to be pursued is a field test of what this study
suggests: the advocacy methodologies successfully employed by organiza-
tions seeking social reform can be focused to successfully resolve pro-
blems in educational services in the urban community.
Until new change strategies are designed and implemented, the
educational needs of poor and minority citizens will continue to be
ignored. . The failure of education in the American city has
persisted
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because the victims have been rendered powerless to change a system that
is dominated by white, affluent interests. New change mechanisms for
urban education must focus on strengthening the voice of the powerless.
They must force decision-makers to respond to the demands of poor and
minority citizens whose rights to participate in democratic processes are
mandated by the Constitution. Advocacy methodology is one mechanism
worthy of test.
-207-
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